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1 Outlook and appraisal 
Brian Ashcroft, Economics Editor, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Overview 
The Scottish and UK economies are continuing to grow and recover from the Great Recession. With 
growth of 0.6% in the final quarter of last year (2014) – the latest data point - the Scottish economy has 
now enjoyed positive growth for the last 11 quarters (since 2012q1) while in the UK, also with growth of 
0.6% in 2014q4, the sustained recovery period has been shorter at 8 quarters.  
The introduction of a new system of accounts ESA 2010 has brought in to the production calculus some 
activities (such as research and development and military expenditure) that were not previously treated 
as outputs alongside the inclusion of previously uncounted ones (such as illegal activities). In 
consequence, the nominal value of GDP has risen by around 1 to 4% per year due to the addition of 
these new activities within the production boundary. A further consequence of these accounting changes 
is that the extent of the recovery from recession is now greater in both UK and Scotland but it is stronger 
in the UK. When oil and gas production is removed – to compare like with like, since offshore activity is 
included in the UK but not the Scottish GDP data - we find that the gap in the strength of the recovery 
widens further in the UK’s favour. UK GDP stands 5.1% above the pre-recession peak compared to only 
2.3% in Scotland. We speculate that the relatively stronger UK recovery under the new accounting 
system could be due to the recovery in R&D activity being stronger in the rest of the UK after the 
recession than in Scotland and, if so, may not augur well for Scotland’s growth performance in the 
longer term. However, there may simply be a technical rather than an economic cause due, for example, 
to different sub-sectoral weights between Scotland and the UK. 
When we examine the performance across different industries and sectors, we see that the pattern of 
growth between Scotland and the UK differed considerably in the fourth quarter.  In the UK, the service 
sector was by far the main driver of growth, while in Scotland the sector made no contribution to growth. 
In contrast, the principal driver of growth in Scotland was the construction sector while the sector in the 
UK was a drag on growth. In addition, the production sector contributed about a third of the growth in 
Scotland but made no contribution to growth in the UK. Within production, manufacturing in both 
Scotland and the UK made no contribution to growth, while in Scotland it was mining & quarrying and 
electricity & gas that provided the contribution to growth. 
The latest labour market data show that jobs continue to be created at a fairly fast pace, indeed in the 
latest February – April 2015 quarter at a faster rate in Scotland than the UK both in the quarter and over 
the year. However, the picture differs on unemployment with the numbers seeking work rising slightly in 
the latest quarter and the reduction over the year, while sizable, is proportionately less than in the UK. 
By the end of the fourth quarter, Scottish jobs as reported in the LFS household surveys were 2.6% 
above the pre-recession peak, while UK jobs were 4.6% higher than the peak. So, the latest data show 
the recovery in the labour market to be continuing but there is now some evidence that the rate of 
recovery is slowing in Scotland and despite recent stronger Scottish jobs growth overall the recovery 
remains stronger in the UK. 
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Now that the UK General Election is over and with the Holyrood elections less than a year away there 
may be a small window of opportunity for politicians, policymakers and others to reflect on the 
challenges facing the Scottish economy. One way of organising thoughts about the challenges is to 
separate them into short-term and long-term issues. More specifically we can distinguish between 
capacity utilisation and capacity growth. In the former, we are largely focusing on the issue of demand 
deficiency, while the longer-term capacity growth question is essentially about supply. In the present 
Commentary we focus on the short-term capacity utilisation issue returning to the more long-term 
capacity growth question in the next issue of the Commentary. 
Our conclusion on capacity utilisation is that despite the recovery the Scottish economy still has spare 
capacity available, most notably in the labour market where the number of total weekly hours worked in 
Scotland was close to but still -0.4% below the pre-recession peak. Moreover, by January - March 2015, 
the ratio of employment to working population stood at -2.4% below the pre-recession peak, a worsening 
of the position in the final quarter of last year, compared to -6.7% at the trough of the recession. In the 
UK as a whole, in contrast the ratio is only -0.6% below its pre-recession peak but still below a peak that 
was attained 7 years ago. We note that there are clear positive influences boosting the demand for 
Scottish goods and services: domestic demand is still growing strongly, domestic inflation is close to 
zero, below nominal earnings/income growth and so boosting real income, and external demand 
remains reasonably strong, with growth in the euro area beginning to strengthen while US growth having 
faltered earlier in the year looks set to pick up again. Yet, there are continuing threats to the further 
recovery of demand which policy should seek to minimise.  
First, growth remains unbalanced with household spending the key driver fuelled largely by rising 
household debt, which we fear may soon become unsustainable. The growth of imports continues to 
strongly outstrip the relatively weak growth of exports and so net trade acts as a drag on growth. Policy 
must seek ways to boost export performance because it is becoming clearer that a more competitive 
price through a lower sterling exchange rate is insufficient to boost export demand. Issues of product 
quality and marketing would appear to be at the root of this Scottish and UK problem. One bright spot in 
this picture of unbalanced growth of demand is the performance of capital investment, which is now 
contributing significantly to demand and the growth of output in Scotland. Infrastructure spending is 
playing a big role in Scotland – think of the new Forth Road Bridge – but also foreign direct investment 
where Scotland again enjoyed a successful year in 2014 with over 80 inward investment projects 
attracted.  
Secondly, the victory of the Conservatives with a small majority in the May 2015 UK General Election 
appears likely to lead to a continuation and perhaps a tightening of the previous Conservative / Liberal 
Democrat Coalition austerity plans. We shall find out more in the Chancellor’s forthcoming Budget. With 
more austerity households can expect a further reduction in their incomes, on average. What that means 
is that household spending will also be reduced and the fall is likely to be greater the more quickly the 
Chancellor seeks to bring the UK government’s budget into balance. Austerity will continue to be a major 
drag on capacity utilisation and economic recovery in Scotland and the UK. 
Finally, there is Greece. At the time of writing we do not know the outcome of the negotiations between 
the Greek government and its creditors. The risks of Greece both defaulting on its debt and leaving the 
euro have increased since we last reported. This issue is again fast becoming a major threat to the 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(1) Outlook and appraisal 
 
June 2015  5 
recovery not simply in the eurozone but perhaps, with the possibility of contagion, in the rest of the 
world, including Scotland. 
It is against this background that we have prepared our latest forecasts. 
Our GDP forecast for 2015 is 2.5%, which is revised down slightly from our forecast of 2.6% in March of 
this year due to the evidence of a slowing of the rate of growth through the first half of the year. For 
2016, we have also revised down our forecast to 2.3% from 2.4% in March, in recognition that while the 
recovery is continuing the growth of demand is now anticipated to be slightly weaker than previously 
thought. We also are prepared to acknowledge that the negative effects of the oil price fall on the oil 
production and services, may be a little greater than we anticipated in March. We are forecasting 2017 
for the first time and the underlying determinants suggest that growth will be little different from 2016 and 
so we retain the forecast of 2.3% for 2017. 
The number of total employee jobs is forecast to continue to increase in each year of the forecast 
horizon 2015 to 2017, and at a faster rate than that seen during 2014 (although not as strongly as in 
2013). Our forecast for the number of jobs added in 2015 has been revised down marginally since 
March’s forecast, from 51,350 to 51,250. The number of jobs at the end of 2015 is now forecast to be 
2,444,250, an increase of 2.1% in 2014. Our current forecast is that the Scottish economy will add 
49,600 jobs in 2016, down by 8,000 from our March forecast, while we forecast the addition of 51,700 
jobs in 2017. 
Given the small revisions to the growth in employee jobs over the next two years in our latest forecasts, 
there are only small revisions to the levels and rates of unemployment from our earlier forecasts. The 
improvement in the labour market is forecast to continue with unemployment rates and numbers falling 
to end 2017. Our projection for unemployment on the ILO measure at the end of 2015 is 138,200 (5.1%), 
falling further to 122,364 (4.5%) by the end of 2016, and 108,150 (3.9%) by end 2017. It is worth noting 
that our unemployment forecast for 2017 means that the unemployment rate finally falls to where it stood 
when the Great Recession started in 2008, nine long years ago. 
Recent GDP performance 
Scottish GDP data are now based on the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010). The Scottish 
data are now comparable with the UK GDP data, which moved from ESA 1995 to ESA 2010 in 2014q2. 
The key changes between ESA 1995 and ESA 2010 that are relevant to the estimation of aggregate 
GDP include the treatment of some activities (such as research and development and military 
expenditure) as outputs alongside the inclusion of previously uncounted ones (such as illegal activities). 
As a result the revisions to the Scottish data are substantial. In general, the nominal value of GDP has 
risen by around 1 to 4% per year due to the addition of these new activities within the production 
boundary. The uplift to Scottish nominal GDP is less than for the UK because while illegal activities have 
been apportioned across the UK territories on a population share basis, the apportionment of R&D 
outputs reflects the lower level of R&D activity in Scotland compared to the UK as a whole.  
The new data show that in the fourth quarter of last year (2014q4) GDP rose by 0.6% in Scotland in the 
quarter.  UK GDP also rose by 0.6% in the quarter but a little faster over the year – four quarters on four 
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quarters – with growth of 2.8% compared to 2.7% in Scotland. The Scottish and UK quarterly growth 
rates back to 2007q1 are presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: UK and Scottish Quarterly GDP Growth, 2007q1 - 2014q4 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and Fraser of Allander Institute 
(FAI) calculations 
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Figure 2: GVA in recession and recovery: UK and Scotland to 2014q4 (Relative to pre-recession 
peak) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 3: GDP (ex oil & gas): Recession and Recovery to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
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As noted in previous Commentaries there is, however, the complicating factor of oil and gas production 
which for offshore production is included in the UK GDP data but not in the Scottish data. Removing oil 
and gas production from UK GDP data gives us Figure 3. 
When oil and gas production is removed, we find that the gap in the strength of the recovery widens in 
the UK’s favour. UK GDP stands 5.1% above the pre-recession peak compared to 2.3% in Scotland. 
The long period of weak UKCS oil and gas production has slowed the recovery of UK GDP from 
recession. So, UK GDP - ex oil & gas - has had an even stronger recovery from recession than Scottish 
GDP. Scottish GDP has recovered by 7.6% since the trough of recession while UK GDP - ex oil & gas - 
recovered by 11.8% from its trough by 2014q4. In the latest quarter, UK GDP ex oil and gas rose by 
0.6% and by 2.9% over the year – four quarters on four quarters. 
Sectoral Components of GVA growth 
Turning now to individual sectors of the economy, we see that the pattern of growth between Scotland 
and the UK differed considerably in the fourth quarter.  In the UK, the service sector was by far the main 
driver of growth contributing +0.7% points, while in Scotland the sector made no contribution to growth. 
In contrast, the principal driver of growth in Scotland was the construction sector contributing +0.4% 
points while the sector in the UK was a drag on growth by -0.1% points. In addition, the production 
sector contributed +0.2% points to growth in Scotland but made no contribution to growth in the UK. 
Within production, manufacturing in both Scotland and the UK made no contribution to growth, while in 
Scotland it was mining & quarrying (+0.1% points) and electricity & gas (+0.1% points) that provided the 
contribution to growth. 
 
Figure 4: UK and Scottish Services GVA Growth 2007q1 to 2014q4 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
 
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Pe
rc
en
t 
Scotland UK
+2.3%  
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(1) Outlook and appraisal 
 
June 2015  9 
Services sector  
The Scottish service sector, which – on 2012 weights - accounts for 75% of GDP in Scotland and 78% in 
the UK, exhibited zero growth in Scotland in the fourth quarter and produced 2.3% growth over the year. 
UK services output registered positive growth of 0.9% in the quarter - see Figure 4 – and 3% over the 
year. 
The state of the recovery in Scottish and UK services is presented in Figure 5. The adoption of ESA 
2010 has clearly widened significantly the gap between the recovery in services in the UK and Scotland, 
with the UK recovery now seen to be much stronger. The possible stronger performance of R&D activity 
in the rest of the UK during the recovery may be explanation. After experiencing as shallower but more 
drawn out recession in Scotland of -3.1% compared to -4% in the UK, output the sector stood at just 
under 3% above its pre-recession peak by the fourth quarter of last year significantly less than the 8% 
above peak attained in the UK. 
 
Figure 5: Services GVA in recession and recovery, UK and Scotland to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
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recovery continues to outstrip, by a fair margin, the overall recovery in GDP when oil and gas extraction 
is excluded and by a large margin when oil & gas is added back into the mix.  
Production / Manufacturing sector 
The production sector in Scotland further continued to boost Scottish growth, growing by nearly 10% 
over the recovery, compare to nearly 8% for overall GDP. In the UK the sector remains a drag on the 
recovery with growth of 1.5% to 2014q4 since the trough of the recession compared to the 10% growth 
of overall GDP. Scottish production output rose in the fourth quarter by 1% while UK production output 
grew by 0.2%. Over the year - four quarters on four quarters – Scottish production GVA rose by 1%, 
while UK production output rose by 1.6%.  
Within production, Mining & quarrying GVA grew by 3.2% in the fourth quarter and rose by 5.4% over 
the year (UK mining & quarrying changed by 0.8% and -0.6%, respectively). Electricity & gas supply 
GVA rose by 4.1% in the fourth quarter but fell by -7.2% over the year (UK electricity & gas supply -2.6% 
and -5.5%, respectively). In the fourth quarter, GVA in Scottish manufacturing fell slightly by -0.1% but 
rose by 1.4% over the year, which is very weak given that we are in a supposedly strengthening 
recovery phase.  UK manufacturing output rose by 0.2% in the quarter and by 2.9% over the year. 
Figure 6 charts the quarterly percentage changes in GVA in Scottish and UK manufacturing.  
 
Figure 6: UK and Scottish Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 2007q1 to 2014q4 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
 
Under the new ESA2010 data system the recovery in manufacturing is now weaker in Scotland than in 
the UK compared to the situation under ESA 1995. By the fourth quarter Scottish manufacturing GVA 
was -5.8% below its pre-recession peak, compared to -4.9% for manufacturing in the UK. UK 
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
Pe
rc
en
t 
Scotland UK
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(1) Outlook and appraisal 
 
June 2015  11 
manufacturing has enjoyed a more sustained recovery since the first quarter of 2013, while the recent 
performance of Scottish manufacturing has been more erratic, in part influenced by the shutdown and 
reopening of the Grangemouth refinery in the final quarter of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014. But the 
fact that manufacturing output in Scotland has exhibited no growth since 2010q3 must be a cause for 
concern. The UK is a little better with around 2% growth since the second half of 2010 but that too is 
worrying. 
Figure 7 shows the impact of the latest data on the manufacturing sector's recovery from recession. 
 
Figure 7: Manufacturing GVA in recession and recovery UK and Scotland to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
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0.4% over the year; refined petroleum, chemical & pharmaceutical products (accounting for 13% of 
manufacturing GVA) which grew by 1.7% in the quarter and by 3% over the year; and transport 
equipment (accounting for 6% of manufacturing GVA) which grew by 1.2% in the quarter and by 0.1% 
over the year  
The four manufacturing sub-sectors that contracted in the quarter were: clothing & leather products 
(accounting for 4% of manufacturing GVA) which contracted -0.3% and by -2.5% over the year; metals, 
metal products & machinery n.e.c. (which accounts for 17% of manufacturing GVA) contracted by -2% in 
the quarter but grew by 5.3% over the year; other manufacturing industries, repair & installation 
(accounting for 23% of manufacturing GVA) contracted by -0.9% in the quarter but grew by 1.4% over 
the year; and electrical and optical products (electronics) (accounting for 10% of manufacturing GVA), 
contracted by -5.1%% in the quarter and by -1.2% over the year. 
 
80.00
85.00
90.00
95.00
100.00
105.00
Scotland UK
-12.6% -13.2% 
-4.9% 
-5.8% 
 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(1) Outlook and appraisal 
 
June 2015  12 
Construction sector 
Turning now to construction, the latest data are presented in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8:   UK & Scottish Construction GVA Volume Growth 2007q1 - 2014q4 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
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grew by 3.4% over the year, compared respectively, to growth of 1.3% and 3.9% in the UK. Figure 10 
shows the growth of the sector in Scotland and UK during the recession and recovery. 
 
Figure 9: Construction, Recession and Recovery UK and Scotland to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
 
Under ESA 2010 there has been a significant improvement in UK business & financial services activity 
both absolutely and relative to the UK. Whereas under ESA 1995 the sector in Scotland had recovered 
much faster than in the UK, the new system almost reverses the position. The scale of the recession 
now looks to have been less severe in both Scotland and UK with the new data showing a fall in GVA of 
-5.4% in Scotland and -4.5% in the UK compared to -7.4% and -6.9%, respectively, under ESA 1995. By 
the fourth quarter, output or GVA in the sector had moved to +6.4% above its pre-recession peak in 
Scotland compared to +11.8% in the UK and the recovery in the sector in Scotland appears to have 
slowed in the last two quarters. As noted in previous Commentaries, the aggregate GVA data for 
business and financial services in Scotland have recently masked significant differences between the 
performances of financial services on the one hand and business services on the other, where the 
former has been doing considerably worse than the latter. Figure 11 shows what has been happening to 
financial services in Scotland since peak output in the second quarter of 2008. 
The chart shows that the latter recovery in the sector has faltered recently while the revisions under ESA 
2010 now indicate that the sector is further away from its pre-recession peak than appeared to be the 
case under ESA 1995 e.g. -9.8% in 2014q3 on ESA 2010 compared to -7.8% in 2014q3 on ESA 1995. 
By the fourth quarter of last year GVA in the sector was -9.6% below the pre-recession peak compared 
to the trough of -15.9% in 2012q4.  
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Figure 10: Business & Financial Services UK and Scotland: Recession and Recovery to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 11:  Financial Services in Scotland, Recession and Recovery 2007q2 to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
The first of the two principal sub-sectors in private services not displaying negative growth in the fourth 
quarter was distribution, hotels and catering (accounting for 18% of services sector output in Scotland), 
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where output was unchanged. Over the year, the sector grew by 1.7%. In the UK, the sector grew by 
1.4% in the quarter and by 4.8% over the year. Figure 12 shows the performance of the sector during 
recession and recovery. 
 
Figure 12:  Distribution, Hotels & Catering: Recession and Recovery to 2014q4 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
Figure 12 reveals that by the fourth quarter the sector in the UK was +6.3% above its peak, while the 
sector in Scotland was doing much worse at only +2.8% above peak. The introduction of ESA 2010 
looks again to have favoured output more in the UK sector than in the sector in Scotland, so again under 
ESA 1995 2014q3 GVA in the sector was 1% above peak in the UK and only +0.6% above peak in 
Scotland but under ESA 2010 GVA was +4.7% above peak in the UK and +2.8% in Scotland. The scale  
of the recession in the sector in both Scotland and the UK is less under ESA 2010 than under ESA 1995 
with output falling in Scotland by -5.3% compared to -7.4% and in the UK by -9.1% compared to -10.0%. 
The track of the recovery in the sector picked up in the UK during 2013 and 2014 but not in Scotland. 
Output in Government & Other Services fell in Scotland in the fourth quarter fell by -0.5% compared to 
no change in the UK. Over the year, output in the public sector grew by 0.9% in Scotland and by 1.1% in 
the UK. Figure 13 shows the performance of GVA in the sector in recession and recovery. 
By the fourth quarter GVA in the government sector in the UK was 4.9% above the pre-recession peak, 
which as we have noted in many earlier Commentaries is difficult to understand at a time of fiscal 
consolidation, whereas output in the sector in Scotland was only 1% above its pre-recession peak.  
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Figure 13:  Government & Other Services UK and Scotland: Recession and Recovery to 2014q4 
  
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 14: Transport, Storage & Communication UK and Scotland: Recession & Recovery to 
2014q4 
  
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 4th QUARTER 2014, and FAI calculations 
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Finally, Figure 14 highlights the performance of transport, storage & communication in Scotland and UK 
in recession and recovery. The sector accounts for nearly 8% of total GVA and about 10% of service 
sector output. 
The sector grew by 2.4% in Scotland in 2014q4 and by 0.9% in the UK. Over the year, growth was 3.9% 
in Scotland and 2.5% in the UK. On that basis it might appear that the sector is recovering more strongly 
in Scotland. However, under the new ESA 2010 system as Figure 14 shows, the sector has performed 
significantly differently than under ESA 1995 and much worse in Scotland. The recession was stronger 
and much more drawn out in the Scottish sector with output falling by -15.2% up to as late as 2011q1 
whereas in the UK sector the recession was over by 2009q2. By the end of the fourth quarter GVA in the 
Scottish sector was -9.4% below its pre-recession peak compared to +3.9% above in the UK, a dramatic 
difference in the performance of the sector between Scotland and the UK. 
The Labour Market 
Figure 15 shows the performance employment in Scotland and the UK during recession and recovery to 
2014q4.  
 
Fig 15: Total Employment, UK and Scotland: Pre-recession peak to 2015q1 
 
 Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
The latest labour market data for February – April 2015 published on 17 June 2015 (see Scottish Labour 
Market section below) show that the recovery has faltered slightly while employment rose as did 
unemployment. Specifically, employment rose by 14,000 (0.5%) in the quarter while unemployment rose 
again by 1,000 (0.7%) with the rate remaining unchanged at 5.9%. In the UK, employment rose a little 
more slowly, with 11,400 jobs created or a rise of 0.4%, while unemployment again fell by 43,000 (-
2.3%) to a rate of 5.5%. Over the year, Scottish jobs rose by 53,000, a rise of 2%, while UK jobs rose 
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424,000, or 1.4%. Unemployment in Scotland fell by -19,000 over the year, or -10.6%, while in the UK 
unemployment also continued to fall even more strongly by -349,000, or -16.1%. 
By the end of the fourth quarter, Scottish jobs as reported in the LFS household surveys were 2.6% 
above the pre-recession peak, while UK jobs were 4.6% higher than the peak. So, the latest data show 
the recovery in the labour market to be continuing but there is now some evidence that the rate of 
recovery is slowing in Scotland and overall the recovery remains stronger in the UK. 
Challenges facing the Scottish economy 
Now that the 2105 UK General Election is over and with the Holyrood elections less than a year away 
there may be a small window of opportunity for politicians and policymakers to reflect on the challenges 
facing the Scottish economy. It should not of course be concluded that any identified challenges 
confronting the economy are simply for the politicians and policymakers to deal with. Many of these 
challenges require a social consensus and community action or action by one or more key groups of 
actors in Scotland: for example, the business community, the unions, the voluntary sector etc. We would 
like to contribute to this process by highlighting some of the issues and challenges that we consider to 
be worthy of consideration and reflection. 
One way of organising thoughts about the challenges is to separate them into the short-term and long-
term. More specifically we can distinguish between capacity utilisation and capacity growth. In the 
former, we are largely focusing on the issue of demand deficiency, while the longer-term capacity growth 
question is essentially about supply. In the present Commentary we focus on the short-term capacity 
utilisation issue returning to the more long-term capacity growth question in the next issue of the 
Commentary. 
Capacity Utilisation 
In considering the issue of capacity utilisation, we essentially seek to ask whether there is any room to 
expand output and create jobs before running up against a supply constraint and the risk of raised 
inflation. Once we hit that constraint then further growth with stable inflation can only be achieved by a 
sustained expansion of capacity. Despite the recovery taking hold more strongly after 2013 there is still 
spare capacity available in the Scottish economy and there are question marks about how sustainable 
the growth of demand is given that it still remains fairly unbalanced. A role for policy exists in both areas. 
An indication that there is still a deficiency of demand in the economy comes from the Scottish labour 
market. We can look at the number of weekly hours being worked currently compared to the situation at 
the peak of capacity utilisation before the recession. Figure 16 charts this statistic from 2007 for the total 
weekly hours worked compared to the pre-recession peak for Scotland and the UK. 
By the period January 2014 – December 2014, the number of total weekly hours worked in Scotland was 
close to but still -0.4% below the pre-recession peak. So despite the number of jobs being higher than 
before the recession, the demand for labour as measured by hours worked is still lower and appreciably 
lower relative to the UK which has expanded by 4.3%. 
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Figure 16: LFS Total weekly hours worked: UK and Scotland in recession & recovery (Compared                   
to Pre-recession peak) 
  
 
Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 17: Employment to population (16 & over) ratio, UK and Scotland in recession & recovery 
(Compared to pre-recession peak) 
 
Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
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But, of course, capacity utilisation depends not only on demand but also on demand in relation to supply. 
The demand for labour may be growing but if the supply of labour is growing more quickly then capacity 
utilisation will fall.  One appropriate labour market measure is the employment to population (aged 16 
and over) ratio. Figure 17 charts this ratio relative to pre-recession peak for Scotland and the UK to 
January - March 2015. 
By January - March 2015, the ratio stood at -2.4% below the pre-recession peak, a worsening of the 
position in the final quarter of last year, compared to -6.7% at the trough of the recession. In the UK as a 
whole, in contrast the ratio is only -0.6% below its pre-recession peak but still below a peak that was 
attained 7 years ago. So while the jobs market has recovered substantially there is still a reasonable 
amount of slack in the labour market - especially in Scotland - and the need for a continuing growth of 
demand before capacity level are reached. 
Yet, as we note above and have done in previous Commentaries, the growth of demand in the Scottish 
and UK economies continues to be unbalanced and because of that (and for other reasons) it may fail to 
be sustained. In the previous Commentary (Vol. 38, No. 3, March 2015), we highlighted the following 
positive and negative influences on the future growth of demand in the Scottish economy: 
Positive influences: 
x Currently strong and above-trend growth in Scotland and UK but now may be beginning to 
slow. 
x Growth in the US is strong and improving. 
x Inflation is falling, helped by a sharp fall in the price of oil and some other commodity prices, 
with the fall in the oil price being key. 
Negative influences: 
x Growth is unbalanced both domestically and across the globe, with demand growth depending 
on investment and household spending mainly fuelled by rising debt, which raises the risk that 
the recovery might falter.  
x The fall in the price of oil will have a negative impact on the Scottish economy (as an oil 
producer) though overall it will have a favourable impact. 
x Further planned austerity will, if implemented, act to slow growth unless the private sector 
grows more quickly to compensate. 
x The continuing problems in the Eurozone, with the risks of deflation and a Greek exit (Grexit). 
x A small downside risk of deflation of prices in the UK economy. 
Continuing positive influences 
There have been only small changes to these positive and negative influences since we last reported. 
On the positive side, growth in the Eurozone economy picked up in the first quarter of this year with GDP 
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rising by 0.4%, which while not fast growth may help to settle fears that a deflationary process has been 
set in train. US data offer a mixed picture with growth weak in the first quarter but evidence – retail sales 
- that household demand was strengthening in May 2015. The still low employment-population ratio and 
weak nominal wage growth all suggest that capacity utilisation is sub-optimal with clear evidence of 
spare capacity and that it will be a little time yet before the Fed raises interest rates in the US, although 
some are suggesting that the Fed rate could rise in September followed by a slow rise in small 
increments over several years. Against this background, the IMF has raised its forecast for GDP growth 
in the Eurozone in 2015 by 0.3% points to 1.5% and in 2016 by 0.2% points to 1.6%. Conversely, it has 
lowered its forecast for the United States in 2015 by -0.5% points to 3.1% and in 2016 by -0.2% points to 
3.1%. Its forecast for overall world output remained unchanged for 2015 at 3.5% and rose very slightly – 
by 0.1% - to 3.8% for 2016. The latest UK CPI inflation data show that UK prices rose slightly – by 0.1% 
- over the year to May after the -0.1% fall in April, as fuel prices rose and falls in the price of food 
moderated. This also should put to rest the admittedly lesser deflationary concerns in the UK. House 
price growth appears to be moderating, especially in London, and inflation overall is expected to remain 
close to zero over the next few months until the large fall in fuel prices falls out of the annual calculation. 
Low inflation should help the growth of real wages to support household spending as nominal wages rise 
but only weakly by pre-recession standards with little productivity growth evident. 
Continuing negative influences 
On the negative side, the latest Scottish business surveys (see Business Surveys section) suggest that 
activity in the Scottish economy slowed in the first quarter of the year mirroring performance in the UK. 
The apparent slowdown may have been the result of the bad weather in January, the initial negative 
effects on the oil supply chain of the fall in the price of oil, and weakness in export markets exacerbated 
by the rise of sterling against the euro. However, expectations from the surveys remain positive and 
point to improved performance in the second quarter. 
Growth remains unbalanced as Figure 18 shows and we have argued that the sustainability of the 
recovery will depend on a more balance recovery. 
The data in Figure 18 are drawn from the latest Quarterly National Accounts Scotland – Supplementary 
Tables. The expenditure elements of these accounts are still based on ESA 1995 rather than ESA 2010 
and so may be subject to change when they are so revised. However, it seems to us that it would be 
unlikely that the changes attendant upon the introduction of ESA 2010 would have much of an effect on 
the relative size and direction of the expenditure components, with the possible exception of investment. 
Household spending – consumption – and investment were the main drivers of Scottish nominal GDP 
growth in 2014. The significantly larger negative contribution of imports compared to the positive 
contribution from exports indicates that net trade was a major drag on Scottish growth in 2014. While 
exports are growing, they are not growing as quickly as other components of aggregate demand such as 
household spending and investment, a proportion of which is spent on imports, and so this effective net 
leakage in spending from the Scottish economy is a drag on growth. The continuing growth in 
consumption is to be welcomed but with the growth of real wages being close to zero spending is being 
sustained by rising household debt as noted in the previous Commentary. Figure 19 shows the latest 
OBR forecasts for the ratio of household gross debt to income. 
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Figure 18: Expenditure components of Scottish nominal GDP growth 2014: percentage 
contribution to GDP change 
 
 
Source : Quarterly National Accounts Scotland - Supplementary Tables - ESA 1995 and FAI calculations. 
What is clear from Figure 19 is that despite the downward revision between the December 2014 and 
March 2015 forecasts, the burden of gross household debt is still expected to rise above pre-crisis peak 
household debt before the end of the forecast period. While these are forecasts of gross debt and so 
take no account of the asset position of UK households it is nonetheless worrying that the Scotland and 
the UK’s future growth over the medium term is forecast to depend on rising debt and debt that is 
predicted to rise above the level that was strongly associated with the financial crash and the onset of 
the Great Recession. 
However, the one positive in the data presented in Figure 18 is that capital investment is recovering in 
Scotland. In 2014 there was strong investment in structures and particularly infrastructure as work 
intensified on the new Forth road bridge. In addition, the recent survey by Ernst and Young of 
investment into the UK including Scotland showed Scotland continued successfully to attract inward 
investment in 2014. According to the report, Scotland secured its third best year on record for Foreign 
Direct Investment: 
x 80 projects in 2014, with scientific research, financial services and manufacturing the key 
activities (with interestingly manufacturing projects up from 15 to 31 projects) 
x 2014 was Scotland’s most successful year attracting investments from the US (46% - 
above trend), though the report suggests that Scotland needs a higher profile in Asia 
(particularly India and China where the UK performed well)  
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Figure 19: UK household gross debt to income: OBR forecasts (Dec. ’14, March ‘15) 
 
Source: Office of Budget Responsibility 
An investor perception study also undertaken by Ernst and Young confirms Scotland’s brand was 
boosted globally in 2014 by high-profile events such as the Commonwealth Games and the Ryder Cup. 
The report concludes that in an uncertain world, Scotland continues to punch above its weight in 
securing global FDI. Its challenge is to build further on its achievements to date, and tackle areas where 
it can do better. 
In its latest State of the Economy Report, the Scottish Government’s Chief Economist argues that its 
analysis suggests that the fall in the price of oil should have a broadly neutral effect on the Scottish 
economy in 2015 and 2016. This falls within the range of projected outcomes that we discussed in the 
March 2015 Commentary. Our feeling was that there was a strong chance there could be net benefits to 
the Scottish economy with the boost to real incomes and spending offsetting the negative effects on the 
oil industry supply chain and wider knock-on spending effects. The evidence to date is insufficient to 
draw any conclusions, although the softening of Scotland’s economic growth suggested by the business 
surveys in the first quarter may be, in part, a reflection of the early incidence of the negative supply-side 
effects on the oil industry in Scotland. 
The victory of the Conservatives with a small majority in the May UK General Election appears likely to 
lead to a continuation and perhaps a tightening of the previous Conservative / Liberal Democrat 
Coalition austerity plans. We shall find out more in the Chancellor’s forthcoming Budget. The IFS noted 
in the its pre-election analysis of the parties’ public finance plans for government that  
“With significant deficit reduction still to come, households can expect the tax and benefit changes 
implemented over the next parliament to reduce their incomes, on average.” 
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What that means is that household spending will also fall due to further austerity and the fall is likely to 
be greater the more quickly the Chancellor seeks to bring the UK government’s budget into balance. 
Austerity will continue to be a major drag on capacity utilisation and economic recovery in Scotland and 
the UK. 
Finally, a note about Greece. At the time of writing negotiations between the Greek government and its 
creditors appear to have broken down. The risk of Greece both defaulting on its debt and leaving the 
euro have increased since we last reported. This issue is again fast becoming a major risk to the 
recovery not simply in the eurozone but perhaps, with the threat of contagion effects, the rest of the 
world. 
Forecasts 
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational procedure adopted in previous 
Commentaries. We present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast errors to establish the 
likely range that the true first estimate of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie between.  
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2015-2017  
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2015 2016 2017 
Central forecast 2.5 2.3 2.3 
March forecast 2.6 2.4 n.a. 
UK mean independent new forecasts (June) 2.4 2.4  
Mean Absolute Error % points +/- 0.41 +/- 0.95 +/- 1.11 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts © 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at basic prices - for 2015 to 2017. The forecasts 
are presented in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this Commentary. 
Table 1 shows that our GDP forecast for 2015 is 2.5%, which is revised down slightly from our forecast 
of 2.6% in March of this year. The downward revision is due to the evidence of a slowing of the rate of 
growth through the first half of the year. For 2016, we have also revised down our forecast to 2.3% from 
2.4% in March, in recognition that while the recovery is continuing the growth of demand is now 
anticipated to be slightly weaker than previously thought. We also are prepared to acknowledge that the 
negative effects of the oil price fall on the oil production and services, may be a little greater than we 
anticipated in March. We are forecasting 2017 for the first time and the underlying determinants suggest 
that growth will be little different from 2016 and so we retain the forecast of 2.3% for 2017. 
Table 1, also compares our GVA forecasts with the median of latest independent forecasts for the UK as 
published by the UK Treasury in June 2015. These show that as forecasts are being generally revised 
down for the UK and Scotland we now expect Scottish growth to be slightly better this year than the UK, 
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reflecting the relatively stronger investment in infrastructure north of the border. So, we are now 
forecasting growth of 2.5% in 2015, 2.3% in 2016 and 2.3% in 2017. Given our previous forecast errors 
the lower and upper bounds for growth in 2015 are expected to be 2.1% and 2.9%, for 2016, 1.3% to 
3.3%, and for 2016, 1.2% to 3.4%. 
Production and manufacturing continue to be the major sectors exhibiting the fastest growth in 2015, 
2016 and 2017. Growth of production is forecast to be 2.9% in 2015, 2.8% in 2016 and 2.6% in 2017. 
Service sector growth is projected to be 2.4% in 2015, 2.2% in 2016, and 2.2% in 2017. The 
construction sector again continues to lag with growth of 1.4% in 2015, 1.3% in 2016 and 1.4% in 2017. 
Employment Forecasts 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2015-2017 
 2015 2016 2017 
Upper 62,100 72,650 80,600 
March forecast 64,215 85,790 n.a. 
Central  51,250 49,600 51,700 
March forecast  51,350 57,600 n.a. 
Lower 40,400 26,550 22,800 
March forecast 38,500 30,750 n.a.. 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts © 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the years 2015 to 2017 in terms of a central 
and upper and lower forecast. Note that in forecasting employee jobs we are not forecasting self-
employment, which has been an important component of the recent jobs recovery. Moreover, employee 
jobs can differ from the self-reported employment in the monthly Labour Force Survey. 
The number of total employee jobs is forecast to continue to increase in each year, and at a faster rate 
than that seen during 2014 (although not as strongly as in 2013). Our forecast for the number of jobs 
added in 2015 has been revised down marginally since March’s forecast, from 51,350 to 51,250. The 
number of jobs at the end of 2015 is now forecast to be 2,444,250, an increase of 2.1% in 2014 (the 
same percentage growth forecast as in March’s Commentary). Our current forecast is that the Scottish 
economy will add 49,600 jobs in 2016, down by 8,000 from our March forecast, while we forecast the 
addition of 51,700 jobs in 2017. This year, we expect 28,150 service sector jobs to be created, with 
around 7,150 added in production, and growth of 950 in agriculture. Construction jobs are now forecast 
to rise this year by 14,962, reflecting the surge in activity in the sector. In 2016, the bulk of the jobs 
created are again expected to be in the service sector with an additional 41,000 jobs forecast, while 
5,600 are added in production, 950 in agriculture and 2,050 in construction. In 2017, job creation in the 
service sector is projected to be even stronger at 43,300 jobs, with production adding 5,450, agriculture 
700, and construction just under 2,200, 
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Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Forecasts ILO unemployment 2015-2017 
ILO unemployment 2015 2016 2017 
    
Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+) 
March forecast 
5.1% 
5.0% 
4.5% 
4.6% 
3.9% 
n.a. 
Numbers 138,200 122,364 108,150 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts © 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies those workers who are out of a job and are 
looking for work, whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed who are in receipt of 
unemployment benefit. The most recent figures (published on 17th June 2015) show an ILO 
unemployment rate of 5.9% for the three months to April 2015 – down from 6.6% on the same period 
one year ago. The level of unemployment stands at 163,000 in the same period this year, up 1,000 on 
the previous three months and down 19,000 over the last year. Given the small revisions to the growth in 
employee jobs over the next two years in our latest forecasts, there are only small revisions to the levels 
and rates from our earlier forecasts. Yet, the improvement in the labour market is forecast to continue 
with unemployment rates and numbers falling to end 2017. Our projection for unemployment on the ILO 
measure at the end of 2015 is 138,200 (5.1%), falling further to 122,364 (4.5%) by the end of 2016, and 
108,150 (3.9%) by end 2017. It is worth noting that in our unemployment forecast for 2017, the 
unemployment rate finally falls to the rate it stood at when the Great Recession started in 2008, nine 
long years previously. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
18 June 2015 
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2 Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
Grant Allan, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Abstract  
The latest figures on economic growth in Scotland confirm that the Scottish economy grew by 2.7% 
during 2014: the fastest annual rate of growth since 2006. Recent evidence supports the view that much 
of the growth during 2014 was however from increases in household consumption, although there were 
signs of much welcomed growth in investment (largely from public infrastructure projects). Surveys point 
to a slowing of growth in the first half of 2015, while the extent to which growth will be sustained through 
2016 and 2017 is critically dependent on the return of stronger real wage growth and an easing of 
household debt to income ratios, and the measures announced in the UK Government budget in July 
(and the outcomes of progress of further powers to the Scottish parliament). On the back of recent 
evidence, we have slightly revised down our forecasts for growth in 2015 and 2016 by 0.1 percentage 
points since March. Critically, Scottish export performance remains weak, and the possibility of 
fundamental change in the Eurozone driven by the outcome of Greek debt discussions - which are 
coming to a head at the time of writing - will be critical for the external economic environment facing 
Scotland in the short and medium term.  
Survey context and recent trends 
Households 
Household spending continues to be important for the level of activity in the Scottish economy. On 
average, between 2013 and 2014, household spending contributed 0.60 percentage points to nominal 
quarterly growth, with Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Government contributing 0.47 and 0.15 points 
respectively per quarter. Net trade has contributed an average of minus 0.1 percentage points over the 
same period indicating issues both of Scotland’s narrow export base and the economic health 
particularly of the Eurozone economies. The data on which these calculations are based – produced by 
the Scottish Government – are currently not available on the same basis as previously, so we will further 
examine trends in the Commentary later this year, when these data are available. The data that we do 
have suggests that the household element is diminishing as a source of growth, but that the domestic 
household sector remains the major driver of Scottish growth.  
What is also clear from Figure 1 is that consumption expenditure since the start of 2011 has grown 
reasonably strongly – only in the second quarter of 2013 does there appear to have been a quarterly 
(real terms) fall in household spending. Most recently, it appears that Scottish consumption has grown 
almost identically to the UK as a whole, with growth of 0.37% in the most recent quarter in Scotland, and 
0.45% in the UK. The household savings ratio for the UK has continued to remain below historic 
averages for the last twenty years, and for the UK was 5.9% in the fourth quarter of 2014. Comparable 
data for the fourth quarter in Scotland are not available, but Figure 2 shows that the lower savings rate of 
the UK as a whole through 2013 and 2014 has been mirrored in Scotland. Recent data on household 
spending, for instance the Retail Sales Index for Scotland, show that in the first quarter of 2015, 
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spending in Scotland grew by less than in Great Britain as a whole, and fell in nominal terms over the 
year (while GB consumer spending in nominal terms increased). The latest figures on house price 
growth in the UK show a slowing from the previously high rates of growth, led by a weakening in price 
growth in London after a sustained period of significant growth. Transactions and therefore house price 
indices in Scotland were affected by the introduction of Land and Buildings Transactions Tax from the 1 
April 2015 (with a greater number of high value house sales seeming to be brought forward in advance 
of its introduction).  
 
Figure 1: Household real consumption spending growth, Scotland and UK, Q1 2000 to Q4 2014, 
(% quarter-on-quarter) 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
Investment 
Figure 3 shows comparable figures for Scotland and the UK for investment spending between Q1 2010 
and Q4 2014. These suggest that investment spending in real terms in Scotland and UK are, 
respectively, 13.3% and 14.1% above their 2011 value. This compares broadly with the GDP figures for 
the Construction sector in Scotland, which has risen sharply through the second half of 2014 and were 
17.0% higher at the end of 2014 than their average during 2011. As noted above, investment spending 
is contributing positively to overall growth in Scottish economy, and in greater amounts than in the 
immediate aftermath of the recession period. Over a longer time horizon, investment spending remains 
broadly at the same level as in 2007. Recent survey evidence – covered in the Review of Business 
Surveys section – suggests that a number of sectors are bullish about investment plans for 2015. The 
Bank of England’s November Inflation Report (Bank of England, 2014, p. 20) noted that the outlook for 
business investment was robust, supported by “conducive financing decisions and expanding domestic 
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demand”. Though demand uncertainty was again important, it appeared to have “receded” over 2014. 
The Bank had previously warned of the chance that excess capital in firms was potentially holding back 
new investment. Recent survey results however suggest that this fear is not restraining investment. 
Confidence levels from recent surveys, for instance, the Scottish Construction Monitor, show high levels 
of confidence. 
 
Figure 2: Household saving ratio, Scotland and UK, Q1 2008 to Q4 2014, % 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations. Note: Comparable Scottish saving ratio figures are only currently 
available to Q3 2014. 
 
Trade 
The most recent statistics on Scottish exports to the rest of the world – covering manufacturing exports 
alone (roughly 60% of Scottish exports outside of the UK) – were published on the 22 April 2015, and 
cover the last three months of 2014. They show that on a quarterly basis, the volume of exports fell by    
-0.8% in the quarter (2014q3), and that on an annual basis (i.e. the four quarters of 2014 compared to 
the four quarters of 2013) there had been growth of this key measure of only 1.0%. This quarterly 
contraction was caused chiefly by disappointing figures that showed a fall of -1.5% in Food and Drink 
exports, with Drink exports – worth some 28% of all Scottish manufactured exports - falling by -2.0% in 
the quarter, and by -3.0% on an annual basis. Much of this decline was however caused by a sharp 
contraction during the first three quarters of 2013; since then the exports of the Drinks sector has been 
showing small increases before the most recent quarterly fall. There was also a continued quarterly 
contraction in Engineering exports from Scotland (down by almost -2% in the quarter, and in volume 
terms worth about one-quarter of all manufactured exports). 
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Figure 3: Real gross fixed capital formation, Scotland and the UK, Q1 2010 to Q3 2014 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
 
In terms of key markets for Scottish products, the latest figures suggest positive growth is continuing, but 
with major downside risks largely from the political discussions about the future of the Eurozone. On a 
number of measures, including Markit’s PMI for the Eurozone in April 2015, suggest a slight weakening 
of activity, however it is an economy which is on average displaying “growth” signals. Clearly, as noted 
elsewhere in this Commentary, the massive “elephant” in discussions of the Eurozone’s future is the 
outcome of current Greek debt negotiations. For the reasons noted in earlier Commentaries, these 
decisions will have a major impact on the economic future of major trading partners of Scottish firms, 
and not directly on the sales of exports from Scotland per se. Additionally, Scottish banks have major 
exposure to Eurozone borrowing, and will feel the outcome of any significant movements on this front. 
Writing in mid-June (and with a “immoveable object” of Greece “bundling up” debt repayments from 
throughout the month into one single payment at the end of the month) it seems likely that any 
movement on Greece and the Eurozone will occur quickly and will have profound consequences firstly 
for the Greek economy, the economies of the Eurozone – absent a major plan to move faster on greater 
sharing of debt risks – and the UK and Scottish economies.  
Growth in the US is forecast to continue to strengthen, with continued strong business and consumer 
confidence and positive labour market signals including, in the IMF’s language, “steady job growth”. The 
low oil price – although massively damaging for shale producers and specific regions across the US that 
had previously enjoyed an energy “boom” - is likely to aid production and consumer spending through 
2015. In the longer term in the US, however there is uncertainty around the pace and trajectory for 
interest rates. “Liftoff” – the point at which interest rates are expected to begin to be raised – is forecast 
by many to occur in the third quarter of 2015, and will have consequences for the continued growth 
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through 2016. As the single largest destination for Scottish exports outside the UK, this will have a direct 
consequence for many of Scotland’s key exporting companies.  
The IMF also noted there was scope for advanced economies to bolster policy support for growth, 
highlighting opportunities for infrastructure investment and supply-side policies to speed up medium-
term prospects. Developing countries, on the other hand, continue to see a slowing of growth prospects, 
and while a number will be affected significantly as major oil producers, the factors affecting the oil price 
do not affect other commodities and reflect market specific consequences. Overall, the IMF model that 
global output could be between 0.5% and 1% higher during 2016 as a result of the lower price of oil – 
although this depends crucially on the extent to which low oil prices translate into lower costs of energy 
to households and industries. As we noted in our March 2015 Commentary, the consequences for 
Scotland – while likely to be less positive than for the UK as a whole – will not be uniform, with already 
signs of lower activity in the North East of Scotland, where many firms active in the UK Continental Shelf 
are based. The Scottish Government’s Chief Economic Advisor argued in June 2015’s State of the 
Economy publication that its economic modelling work found that the “overall net effect on the economy 
in 2015 and 2016 should be broadly neutral”. 
 
Table 1: Economic growth forecasts for 2015 and 2016 for Scotland’s major export markets, plus 
UK, China, Japan and the Euro area, % p.a. 
  2015 2016 
 
Share of total (i.e. 
international and rest 
of the UK) exports, % 
2013 
IMF (April 
2015) 
Revision 
since January 
2015 
IMF (April 
2015) 
Revision 
since January 
2015 
USA 5.3 3.1 -0.5 3.1 -0.2 
Netherlands 2.8 1.6 - 1.6 - 
Germany 2.6 1.6 +0.3 1.7 +0.2 
France 2.5 1.2 +0.3 1.5 +0.2 
Denmark 1.9 1.6 - 2.0 - 
Norway 1.5 1.0 - 1.5 - 
      
UK 62.4 2.7 0.0 2.3 -0.1 
China 0.8 6.8 0.0 6.3 0.0 
Japan 0.4 1.0 +0.4 1.2 +0.4 
Euro area - 1.5 +0.3 1.6 +0.2 
Sources: World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund, IMF, April 2015). Notes: “-” indicates a country 
forecast is not produced, “n/a” indicates that the share of exports from Scotland to Euro area countries is not available 
from official sources.. 
Table 1 shows the forecasts for growth in key markets for Scottish exports through 2015 and 2016. 
Since our previous forecasts in March 2015, economic forecasts for the UK this year have remained 
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broadly flat. The average of 2015 forecasts in February 2015 was 2.6%, and range between 2.0% and 
3.0%. The Office for Budget Responsibility forecast growth in this year of 2.5% in March 2015. Forecasts 
for 2016 averaged 2.3% in March, with a range between 1.2% and 3.0% (HM Treasury, 2015), while in 
May the average of forecasts made in the last 3 months is 2.4% (with the range the same as earlier in 
the year). 
Forecasts for the Scottish economy: in detail 
In June 2014 we identified that there was an apparent cooling of the Scottish economy as it entered the 
second half of the year. This has been borne out by the data we now have on the performance of the 
Scottish economy in 2014. The first release, published on the 15 April 2015, shows that growth in the 
final quarter of 2014 was 0.6% and annual growth in 2014 was 2.7%: the fastest annual growth rate for 
the Scottish economy since 2006. This meant that after Q1 2014 there were three consecutive quarters 
of 0.6% growth for Scotland during 2014. The annual growth outturn figure was therefore slightly higher 
than our forecast made in March 2015, with an absolute forecast error of 0.2 percentage points, and so 
slightly higher than our forecast error over that forecast horizon (0.164 percentage points) for all FAI 
forecasts since 2000. 
Moving to 2015, for the UK as a whole the official “Preliminary estimate” of UK growth in the first quarter 
(published on the 28 April 2015) was 0.3%, down from 0.6% in the final quarter of 2014. In a separate 
and new ongoing piece of research, Fraser of Allander Institute “Nowcasts” of the Scottish economy also 
reveal a slight slowing in Scottish growth for the first half of the year compared to the end of 2015. This 
research currently “nowcasts” quarterly growth of 0.52 per cent for both Q1 and Q2. As well as 
suggesting a pattern of growth in the first half of 2015 consistent with the second half of 2014, they are 
also consistent with no significant adjustments to the growth outlook since our forecasts in March 2015.  
Looking to the longer term, it appears that household spending will continue to play a major role in the 
next year, although since March, the figures on the growth in investment appear to have improved: in 
line with earlier surveys of investment intentions. On the consumption side, the Monetary Policy 
Committee noted at its May meeting that the inflation rate on the CPI measure was precisely zero (0.0%) 
in March, largely due to persisting low energy prices. It also noted that it was likely that productivity and 
hence real wage growth would remain low during 2015, with total pay growth likely to return to levels of 
around 4% seen prior to the great recession from mid-2016 onwards. Private sector pay growth has 
risen in the recent figures, but at 2.2% is around half of its pre-2008 level. The recent Markit Economics 
Report on Jobs provides some evidence of higher growth in salaries in Scotland than in the UK, driven 
as much by worsening labour availability as by increased demand. The Bank of England noted that there 
was little evidence that low inflation was feeding into inflation expectations. 
Early in February 2015, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth John Swinney MSP 
set out the Scottish Government’s final budget plans for year 2015-6, including (a headline measure) 
total spending about 1.6% less in real terms than the previous year. Fiscal Affairs Scotland has 
examined the long-term projections to the Scottish budget over the coming years, and concluded that 
2015-16 is likely to be one of the “milder” years for the Scottish budget which will see three years of 
accelerated real terms reductions from 2016-17 (Fiscal Affairs Scotland, 2014). More recent work 
however examining the funding for Scottish local authorities – which is around 10% lower in the current 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2)  Scottish economy 
June 2015  33 
financial year than compared to 2009-10, and in (indicative) real terms, comparable to financial year 
2003-4 (Fiscal Affairs Scotland, 2015). (This is only indicative as much activity which was previously 
within Local Government budgets – such as police and fire and rescue services – is now funded 
separately).  
The outlook for overall UK government spending will be confirmed in the new Conservative 
government’s Budget on 8 July 2015. Some measures have already been announced, including a 
reduction of £12 billion to the social security budget which could include reductions in tax credits and 
housing benefits for both private and social tenants. Additionally, reductions in (non-protected) areas of 
Department spending will have consequences for public spending in Scotland – although the powers 
devolved through the Scotland Act and Smith Commission proposals could lead to policy divergence 
between Scotland and UK over the longer term. The IFS for example project a fall in the block grant to 
Scotland of less than 6.6% between 2015-16 and 2018-19. More will be known on the specific 
immediate path of spending in Scotland after July’s Budget, and this will continue to have an impact 
upon economic activity in Scotland. 
Results 
In this section of the Commentary, we forecast year-on-year real growth in Scotland’s key economic and 
labour market variables. In this issue, we forecast all variables for 2015, 2016 and 2017. This is the first 
time that we have forecast growth for 2017. Our forecasts cover Scotland’s Gross Value Added (GVA), 
employee jobs and unemployment. The model used is multi-sectoral, and where useful, results are 
reported to broad sectoral categories. 
We begin with the forecasts for GVA growth in the Scottish economy. The growth performance of 
Scotland between 2010 and 2014 and our forecasts for the period 2015 to 2017 are shown in Figure 4. 
This also includes our upper and lower forecasts of growth. As previously, the range around the central 
forecast is based on our past forecast accuracy of the first release of growth data for the year.  
Based on FAI forecasts since 2000, the mean absolute error of forecasts (i.e. the difference between 
forecast and “outturn” annual growth) made in the summer for growth in that same year is 0.41 
percentage points, while for the following year the average absolute forecast error is 0.95 percentage 
points. This gives the range for the upper and lower bands in 2015 and 2016. Our past forecast errors 
for the longest forecast horizon is 1.111 percentage points, so this is used to give the range around our 
central forecast for 2017. 
Relative to our March 2015 forecasts we have now revised down slightly our central forecast for GVA 
growth in 2015 from 2.6% to 2.5% (i.e. a downward revision of 0.1 percentage points since our March 
2015 Commentary) and this is largely driven by evidence of a slightly slowing of the rate of growth 
through the first half of the year so far. Our forecast for 2016 was 2.4% and we have similarly revised 
this down by 0.1 percentage points, to 2.3% annual growth. Our first forecast for 2017 is 2.3%. We are 
therefore, on our central forecast predicting the same rate of growth in both 2016 and 2017. 
For comparison purposes, the UK’s Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) forecast for growth in 
2015 (made in March 2015) and the median of new independent growth forecasts for the UK in 2015 are 
2.5% and 2.6% respectively, while for 2016 the respective figures are of 2.3% and 2.4%. 
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Figure 4: Actual and forecasts of annual real GVA (%) growth for Scotland, 2015 to 2017 
 
Sources: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2015 ©  
 
In addition to the aggregate growth forecasts in our central scenario, Table 2 presents our forecasts for 
GVA growth in 2015, 2016 and 2017 for three broad sectoral groupings: the “production”, “construction” 
and “services” sectors of the Scottish economy.  
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2015 to 2017 
 2015 2016 2017 
GVA 2.5 2.3 2.3 
 
   
Production 2.9 2.8 2.6 
Construction 1.4 1.3 1.4 
Services 2.4 2.2 2.2 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2015 ©  
Employment and unemployment 
Detailed commentary on recent developments in the Scottish labour markets can be found in the 
Overview of the Scottish Labour Market section of this Commentary. Here we present our forecasts for 
the number of employee jobs in the Scottish economy. We forecast the number, sectoral breakdown and 
percentage changes in employee jobs at the end of 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively, as well as the 
ILO measure of unemployment over the same period. 
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The most up to date employee jobs series for Scotland shows that there were 2,393,000 employee jobs 
in Scotland in the final quarter of 2014, an increase of 37,000 jobs from the end of 2013, only slightly 
lower than the number of jobs forecast in March 2014 to be added during the year (39,000). This follows 
the addition of 76,000 jobs in the Scottish economy during 2013. 
Our new forecasts for employee jobs are shown in Table 3, alongside a sectoral breakdown of employee 
job numbers. The number of total employee jobs is forecast to continue to increase in each year, and at 
a faster rate than that seen during 2014 (although not as strongly as in 2013). Our forecast for the 
number of jobs added in 2015 has been revised down marginally since March’s forecast, from 51,350 to 
51,250. The number of jobs at the end of 2015 is now forecast to be 2,444,250, an increase of 2.1% in 
2014 (the same percentage growth forecast in March’s Commentary). Our current forecast is that the 
Scottish economy will add 49,600 jobs in 2016, down by 8,000 from our March forecast, while we 
forecast the addition of 51,700 jobs in 2017. The net change in employee jobs, consistent with our 
upper, central and lower forecasts for GDP growth, is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 3: Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (‘000s, except where stated) and net change in 
employee jobs in central forecast, 2015 to 2017 
 2015 2016 2017 
Total employee jobs, Dec 2,444,250 2,493,850 2,545,550 
Net annual change (jobs) 51,300 49.600 51,700 
% change from previous year 2.1 2.0 2.1 
    
Agriculture (jobs,000s) 26 27 30 
Annual change 950 950 700 
Production (jobs, 000s) 244 250 255 
Annual change 7,150 5,600 5,450 
Construction (jobs, 000s) 149 151 153 
Annual change 14,962 2,050 2,199 
Services (jobs, 000s) 2,025 2,066 2,110 
Annual change 28,150 41,000 43,342 
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2015 ©  
We present out forecasts for unemployment at the end 2016 and 2017 in our central scenario in our 
central forecasts in Table 5. We report the forecast number (and rate) of those unemployed using the 
International Labour Organisation definition of unemployment. This is preferred to the claimant count 
measure as it gives a more complete picture of the extent of labour resources available for work but 
unable to find work, and so is a better measures of the level of spare capacity in the Scottish labour 
market. 
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Table 4: Net annual change in employee jobs in central, upper and lower forecast, 2014 to 2016 
 2015 2016 2017 
Upper 62,100 72,650 80,600 
Central 51,250 49,600 51,700 
Lower 40,400 26,550 22,800 
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2015 ©  
 
 
Table 5: Forecasts of Scottish unemployment in central forecasts, 2015 to 2017 
 2015 2016 2017 
ILO unemployment 138,200 122,364 108,150 
Rate (%)1 5.1 4.5 3.9 
Note: Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by 
total of economically active population aged 16 and over. The most recent labour market statistics are detailed in the 
Labour Market section. 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2015 © 
 
 
Figure 4: Scottish ILO unemployment rate, 2009 to 2017 including forecasts from 2015 
 
Sources: ONS and Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, June 2015 © 
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More detail on recent trends in the Scottish labour market can be found in the Labour Market Section of 
this Commentary. In March 2015, we forecast that the unemployment rate would fall to 5.0% by the end 
of 2015, and 4.6% at the end of 2016 in our central scenario. Given the small revisions to the growth in 
employee jobs over the next two years in our latest forecasts, there are only small revisions to the levels 
and rates from our earlier forecasts. The most recent figures (published on 17 June 2015) show an ILO 
unemployment rate of 5.9% for the three months to April 2015 – down from 6.6% on the same period 
one year ago. The level of unemployment stands at 163,000 in the same period this year, up 1,000 on 
the previous three months and down 19,000 over the last year. Our new forecasts for the unemployment 
rate in Scotland at the end of 2015 and 2016 are 5.1% and 4.5% respectively. We forecast the 
improvement in labour market outcomes to continue, with the level and rate of unemployment falling to 
the end of 2017, but the decline in absolute numbers unemployed falling by less than in 2016. Figure 4 
shows both the performance of ILO Scottish unemployment rate since 2006 as well as our ILO 
unemployment rate central, upper and lower forecasts to 2016. 
 
Grant Allan 
16th June 2015 
References 
Bank of England (2015), “Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting: 4 and 5 February 2015”, published 18 
February 2015, available online at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2015/feb.pdf 
HM Treasury (2015), “Forecasts for the UK economy: A comparison of independent forecasts, February 2015”, 
published 18 February 2015, available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/404865/forecomp_201502.pdf 
Pain, N., Lewis, C., Dang, T-T, Jin, Y. and Richardson, P. (2014), “OCED forecasts during and after the financial 
crises: A post mortem”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 1107, March 2014. 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2)  Scottish economy 
June 2015  38 
3 Review of Scottish Business Surveys 
Eleanor Malloy, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Abstract  
 
Business surveys are a useful tool and provide accurate and timely data that are extremely helpful in 
pinpointing subtle movements in the economy.  Business surveys collect information on a wide range of 
topics such as business confidence, orders, turnover, exports, investment, employment etc. and when 
analysed provide a view of the overall economy. They are also useful for short term forecasting and 
pinpointing turning points.  Many business surveys use net balances, determined by subtracting the 
percentage reporting declines from the percentages reporting increases.  A number of recent surveys 
continue to show that more and more businesses report that net trends, although remaining positive, 
have eased somewhat (with a growing number of respondents reporting ‘no change’) and despite many 
of the trends reported not being quite as high as recent quarters, most remain positive and more 
importantly for many of the respondents to recent Business Surveys, expectations remain strong and at 
pre-recession levels. 
Bank of Scotland Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) 
 
The Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for Scotland (a single-figure measure of the month-on-month 
change in combined manufacturing and services output) saw activity levels dip marginally lower during 
March 2105 (49.4) compared to 50.2 in the previous month.  Growth in the manufacturing sector was 
offset by a decline in services. January 2015 saw output fall for the first time in 28 months from 52.8 in 
December 2014 to 47.7; this was the first sub-50 reading since September 2012, indicating a 
contraction, with output declines recorded for both manufacturing  and service firms.  The December 
PMI showed that Scotland’s private sector economy ended 2014 in a fairly strong position with the index 
unchanged in December from November’s 52.8.  The November index indicated weakening growth, with 
the index easing from 54.2 in October to 52.8. 
 
Bank of Scotland Business Monitor 
 
The latest Bank of Scotland Business Monitor, December 2014, January and February 2015 (with 
expectations to August 2015) shows that despite the economy slowing significantly in the survey period, 
that expectations remain high. 
 
In the three months ending February 2015, turnover, on balance, remained static with a third of firms 
each reporting an increase, a decrease and no change resulting a zero net balance, down somewhat on 
the +16% reported in the previous survey and the worst result for seven quarters.   Firms in both the 
production and service sectors reported sharp declines with service firms reporting +19% in the previous 
quarter and +4% in the current quarter and production firms declining from +12% to -4%.  A net of 14% 
expect an increase in turnover in the 6 months to the end of August, slightly down from the +19% of the 
previous quarter and significantly lower than the net balance of +37% in the same quarter a year ago.  
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Services firms (+19% expect a rise in turnover) remain more confident than production firms (+8% 
expect a rise in turnover). 
Volumes of total business generally eased compared to the previous quarter and the same quarter of 
previous year with the downward trends again more apparent in production rather than service firms.  
The trend in the volumes of repeat business eased to +1%, down from the +15% of the previous quarter 
and the +10% of the same quarter one year ago.  Expectations for the volume of repeat business also 
eased, dropping to +10% compared to +13% for the previous quarter +27% for the same quarter one 
year ago.   
Similarly trends in the volume of new business eased to +2% compared to +18% of the previous quarter 
and the +22% of the same quarter one year ago.  Also expectations for new business volumes during 
next six months to the end of August were optimistic but again slightly down compared to last quarter’s 
+14% and as compared to +19% in the previous quarter and down on the +34% of the same quarter one 
year ago. 
 
Figure 1: Total volume of business Scotland, 2004-2015  (net balance of SBM respondents) 
 
Source:  Bank of Scotland Business Monitor 
 
Export activity improved in this latest survey rising from a net balance of -4% in the previous survey to a 
net of +6%, although it remains below the +12% recorded in the same quarter one year ago.  A net 
balance of 2% expect a rise in exports, down on the +5% last quarter and the +42% a year earlier.  
Cost pressures eased in the latest quarter falling to +23% from +35% in the previous net of 26 expect 
pressures to increase in the three months to May.  Concerns over credit availability increased slightly for 
production firms while easing for services firms.   The importance of the sterling exchange rate 
increased for production businesses but eased for services.  The importance of late payment eased for 
both production and services firms in the three months to the end of February 2015, whereas concerns 
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over cash flow increased.  The importance of staff availability in the three months to the end of May 
declined for production firms but increased for services firms.    
Capital investment appears to be declining as in the three months to the end of February a net balance 
of 1% reported a decline in the levels of capital investment compared to a net rise of +7% in the previous 
quarter.  
 
In the recent past the Business Monitor indicated that the economy began to slow around the second 
half of 2008 and slowed significantly at the end of 2008 before steadily improving until 2010. During the 
following 2 years, respondents to the SBM showed no real change in the economy until the middle of 
2014 when respondents indicated some growth. This continued until the current survey where firms 
reported no overall change, however expectations remain buoyant. Professor Donald MacRae of the 
Bank of Scotland noted that “These expectation levels suggest the private sector of the Scottish 
economy will show trend level growth in the second quarter of 2015 recovering from a slowdown at the 
start of the year.”  
 
Manufacturing 
 
Sales revenue among rest of UK and export business improved during Q1 for a net balance of Scottish 
Chamber of Commerce members responding to the latest QEI survey whereas domestic sales revenue, 
on balance, declined.  Domestic sales and orders both declined over the quarter (net balances of -7% 
and -8% respectively). A net balance of 30% of firms increased total investment during Q1 2015 and 
37% of these firms did so in order to expand capacity. Average capacity utilisation was at the highest 
point in 10 years at 83%.  Almost two thirds of firms reported no change to total employment 
nevertheless a net balance reported a rise (+10%).   
 
Respondents to the Q1 2015 Scottish Engineering Review reported that for the first time in 10 years 
firms of all sizes reported a negative balance of optimism with only firms in the electronics sector 
reporting a positive net balance.  Following seven consecutive positive quarters the trend in output 
volumes contracted in the first quarter of this year, however small and medium firms are forecasting a 
rise in Q2 although large firms continue to expect a negative trend.   Most firms reported that prices were 
unchanged from the previous quarter however small firms reported that UK prices continued to improve.  
Small and medium companies continued to report upward trends in both capital and training investment 
during Q1 2015.  For the first time since Q2 2010 a net balance of engineering firms reported a decline 
in total employee numbers.  Medium and large companies reported a decline although small firms 
continued to report employment growth. Nevertheless, the outlook for manufacturing employment is 
generally positive.   
Construction 
 
Optimism in the construction sector increased during Q1 for a net balance of Scottish Chamber of 
Commerce members responding to the latest QEI survey (a net balance of +8%), lower than in the 
previous quarter (+23%) and also lower than the same quarter of last year (+21%). Total sales 
unexpectedly declined for a net of 13% of construction respondents. Contracts were also down 
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compared to the same time last year, particularly public sector contracts, which declined for a net 
balance of 11% of respondents. Investment trends remained broadly positive although most firms 
reported no change to overall levels. Investment is expected to continue to grow in Q2 2015 for 22.2% of 
construction firms. Almost half of all firms experienced a decline in profits during Q1 2015 but fewer than 
a quarter expect profits to decline in Q2 2015. 
 
The latest Scottish Construction Monitor, a quarterly survey of the membership of the leading trade 
body, the Scottish Building Federation reported that business confidence rose to a record high to +29% 
in Q1 2015.  The Scottish Construction Monitor survey asked a number of questions focusing on how 
the 2015 Construction Design and Management regulations would impact on Scottish Construction. 
More than half of the respondents reported that they would face additional costs associated with the 
health and safety changes and more than 90% reported that although they were aware of the new 
changes they were unprepared for their implementation.   
 
Retail 
 
The Scottish Retail Sales Monitor conducted by The Scottish Retail Consortium and KPMG reported that 
total Scottish sales decreased by -3.1% in May 2015 compared to May 2014 when they had decreased 
by -1.6%. Additionally footfall in May was -1.8% lower than May 2014 and also down on the 1.1% 
increase in April this year. The report indicated that like-for-like sales decreased by -2.1% in May 2015 
compared to May 2014 with food sales declining by -2.1 and non-food sales by -3.9%. 
 
The Scottish Chambers Quarterly Business Survey reported that business optimism in the 
wholesale/retail sector returned to positive territory following a spell of negative balances in 2014. A net 
balance of 3% of firms reported a rise in sales, a significant improvement over the same quarter of 2014 
(-19%).   Investment figures were fairly strong with fewer than 10 reporting downward trends in either 
capital or training investment. Employment trends, on balance, declined for a net balance of 3% however 
most firms (71.1%) reported no change. 39% of firms actively sought to recruit compared to 23% last 
year. Future expectations of sales revenue and profits remain strong. 
 
Tourism 
 
QEI firms reported that net balances in the tourism sector generally remain in positive territory although 
the rate of increase has slowed since last year.  A net balance of 7% of hotels reported an increase in 
optimism in Q1; lower than the +21% of the previous quarter and the +28% in Q1 2014.  A net balance 
of 9% of Scottish hotels reported a rise in the total number of customers/guests during Q1 (the lowest 
rate Q4 2013 and also lower than the +21% reported in the same quarter of the previous year). 
Overseas visitors increased on balance whereas rest-of-UK visitors declined by a net % balance of -4. 
Investment expenditure increased during Q1 2015, with a net % balance of +22% reporting increased 
investment expenditure, and 40% of businesses increasing investment did so in order to expand 
capacity. Almost half of hotels decreased their average room rate, therefore despite the overall increase 
in customers & guests, a net balance of hotels reported a decline in both sales revenue and profits. 
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Outlook 
 
This latest set of Scottish business surveys continue to show a more cautious outlook, with many trends 
being well below the recent near record highs; but they still remain positive. Many expectations suggest 
that economic activity will increase, albeit at a more modest pace in 2015.  Expectations for 2015 are 
generally higher than their pre-recession levels but more and more firms are expressing a degree of 
caution reflecting an increasing uncertainty caused by a slowing in the world economy.  
 
Fewer businesses are as confident about their prospects as they were last quarter.  Inevitably the UK 
General Election caused a degree of uncertainty in the economy with many of the surveys conducted 
during the pre-election period.  Another reason for the easing of trends could be because the euro has 
only appreciated slightly despite the uncertainly (and potential impact) of the current situation in Greece.  
However notwithstanding this, overall expectations remained at a very good level.  Slow growth in the 
Eurozone, rising sterling prices plus restrained growth in the global economy, has clearly affected 
Scottish exporters  However on a more positive note, the fall in oil and other commodity prices should 
help ease businesses’ cost pressures and, by boosting consumer incomes, help boost economic growth.  
 
In conclusion, recent Scottish business surveys show that firms remain broadly upbeat about recent and 
near future business prospects with many trends still rising albeit more slowly than in recent quarters. . 
Though the pace of recovery may be slowing and the degree of uncertainly in both the UK and the rest 
of the global economy is having an effect on Scottish businesses, expectations remain at or above pre-
recession levels 
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4 Scottish labour market 
Andrew Ross, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
This section provides an overview of key labour market data in Scotland and contrasts these with both 
UK performance and changes over time. These data are from a range of the latest labour market data 
available for Scotland and the UK, to April 2015. The Scottish unemployment rate stands at 5.9%, above 
the UK rate of 5.5%. The employment rate in Scotland is 74.4%, with the UK figure 73.4%. Growth in 
employment is still sustained by part-time workers and self-employment. Full-time employment, 
however, has started to gain momentum. 
Recent trends and statistics  
The latest comparable figures on the labour market for Scotland and the United Kingdom are 
summarised in Table 1. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data show that in the quarter to April 2015 the level 
of employment in Scotland rose by 14 thousand, to 2,624 thousand and over the year by 53 thousand. 
For the same period, UK employment rose by 114 thousand and 424 thousand respectively. The 
Scottish employment rate (16 – 64) – i.e. those in employment as a percentage of the working age 
population – was 74.4%, up 1.2% from one year earlier. For the same period the UK employment rate 
was 73.4%, up 0.7% compared to a year earlier. Scottish unemployment, in the quarter to April 2015, 
increased by 1 thousand to 163 thousand, a fall of 19 thousand over the year. The unemployment rate 
fell in the months to April 2015 and now stands at 5.9%. The comparable unemployment rate for the UK 
stands at 5.5%. 
 
Table 1: Headline indicators of the Scottish and UK labour markets, February – April 2015 
  
Scotland 
Change 
on quarter 
Change 
on year 
United 
Kingdom 
Change 
on quarter 
Change 
on year 
Employment* 
 
Level 
(000s) 
2,625 14 53 31,053 114 424 
Rate 
(%) 74.4 0.4 1.2 73.4 0.1 0.7 
Unemployment** 
 
Level 
(000s) 
163 1 -19 1,813 -43 -349 
Rate 
(%) 5.9 0.0 -0.7 5.7 -0.1 -1.1 
Inactivity*** 
 
Level 
(000s) 
711 -15 -21 9,016 -10 60 
Rate 
(%) 20.8 -0.4 -0.6 22.2 0.0 0.1 
        
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland and UK, June 2015.  
Notes:   * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64). 
  ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64). 
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The relationships between employment, unemployment, total economically active and inactive are 
important in discerning the reaction of the labour market to overall economic conditions. It is important to 
appreciate that changing levels of employment and unemployment, and changes in employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in activity rates. For example, if people leave employment 
and become unemployed (i.e. are actively seeking work they remain economically active) the 
unemployment rate will increase, but the rate of those economically active will remain unchanged.  
However, if people leave employment and do not seek further employment, as seems to be a continuing 
pattern, they are then categorised as economically inactive, and as such the unemployment rate will 
remain unchanged, whilst the activity and inactivity rates will change. Equally, the changing pattern 
between full and part time employment is of interest as we uncover how the labour market is reacting to 
the overall economic conditions. We return to this issue later in this section. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in unemployment in Scotland and the UK since 2000. Between 2000 and 
2014 unemployment in Scotland was at its lowest (106 thousand) in March – May 2008, immediately 
preceding the worldwide financial crash and the subsequent Great Recession.  
In contrast, unemployment was at its lowest (1,396 thousand) in the UK beween August – October 2004. 
The highest number of unemployed in Scotland was in the period May – July 2010 (237 thousand) and 
in the UK in the period from September – November 2011 (2,708 thousand). Unlike the pattern of 
previous recessions, unemployment has fallen in Scotland (and the UK) more rapidly than expected to 
just below 150 thousand, reflecting in part the more rapid rise in part time and self-employment (see 
Figure 2 and Table 5) and the development – temporary or permanent – of a more flexible labour 
market. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the employment ‘recovery’ continues to be driven by an increase in part time 
work and self-employment. Growth in full-time workers remains subdued but has started to gain some 
momentum since 2014. However, a strong, sustained, and balanced recovery in the labour market 
requires a more robust growth in full-time workers.  
 
 
 
Note: In considering employment, activity and unemployment rates it is important to remember the 
bases and relationships of these figures. LFS data (estimated) is provided for: (1) all aged 16 and 
over and (2) for all aged 59/64. The first measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to higher numbers in 
employment, in the total economically active and economically inactive – but reduces the economic 
activity rates and unemployment rates, but at the same time increases the economically inactive 
rate. Conversely the second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads to lower numbers economically 
active, in employment and economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically active, 
employment and unemployment rates but lower economically inactive rates. See Scottish Parliament 
Information Centre briefing on Scottish labour market statistics: 
https://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/70894.aspx 
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Figure 1: Unemployment (in millions) in Scotland and the UK 2000 – April 2015 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland and UK, June 2015. 
 
Figure 2: Index of full, part time and self-employment in Scotland, January 2004 – December 2015 
 
Source:  ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, June 2015. 
Notes: Index - October 2007 – September 2008 = 100. 
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The economically active workforce includes all individuals actively seeking employment and those 
currently in employment (i.e. self-employed, private sector and government employed, unpaid family 
workers and those in training programmes). Between February – April 2015 the number of economically 
active (16+) in Scotland increased by 5 thousand, and the activity rate increased by 0.3% to 63.6%. 
There were 2,788 thousand economically active in Scotland during that period. This comprised 2,624 
thousand in employment (2,541 thousand aged 16–64) and 163 thousand ILO unemployed. The level for 
those of working age but economically inactive decreased by 10 thousand over the latest quarter, and 
decreased by 15 thousand (-0.9%) over the year to 1,592 thousand. 
The economic inactivity rate for men aged 16 – 64 increased by 0.9% over the year, and decreased by 
2.1% for women over the year to April 2015. In the year from January 2014 to December 2015 the key 
components of change in inactivity were more students, up by 5 thousand; fewer people looking after 
family members and/or home, down 1 thousand; retirees, down 2 thousand; long-term sick, down 17 
thousand; and those temporarily sick down 1 thousand. Though the majority of the inactive (578 
thousand) did not want a job, a third (191 thousand) did want employment. 
Data on employment by age, derived from the Annual Population Survey, is available up to January – 
December 2014. Table 2 illustrates the changing employment rates by age group from January 2006 
onwards. In the year to December 2014, employment rates decreased for the youngest age group (16-
17) by -2.2%. All other age groups saw an increase in employment rates. The largest increase in the 
employment rate was in the age group 35-49 (+3.1%), followed by that of the age group 25-34 (+2.2%). 
The employment rate for all workers aged 16 and over increased by 1.4% over the year to December 
2014 to 58.6%.  
 
Table 2: Employment rates (%) by age, Scotland January 2006 – December 2014 
(In %) Oct-
Sep. 
Dec-
06 
Dec-
07 
Dec-
08 
Dec-
09 
Dec-
10 
Dec-
11 
Dec-
12 
Dec-
13 
Dec-
14 
          All 16+ 60.4 60.5 60.2 58.9 58.0 57.4 57.3 57.4 58.6 
          
16 - 64 73.7 73.9 73.6 72.0 71.0 70.5 70.5 70.8 72.6 
16 - 17 43.3 38.9 40.6 34.2 32.0 30.9 29.8 26.8 24.9 
18 - 24 68.5 69.0 66.2 63.9 61.6 60.0 58.9 59.0 60.1 
16-24 63.1 62.6 60.7 57.6 55.5 54.2 53.2 52.6 53.2 
25 - 34 80.4 81.4 81.1 79.6 78.1 79.0 78.9 78.8 81.0 
35 - 49 83.8 83.5 83.2 81.9 81.6 80.9 81.5 81.8 83.5 
50 - 64 63.7 64.4 65.2 64.5 64.1 63.6 63.9 64.9 67.4 
65+ 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.4 6.6 6.4 7.6 8.2 8.4 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, June 2015.  
Note:  Denominator = all persons in the relevant age group. 
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Total workforce job figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total seasonally adjusted 
workforce jobs in Scotland for March 2015 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,704 thousand, (i.e. 
2,405 thousand employee jobs, 286 thousand self-employed jobs, HM forces and supported trainees 14 
thousand). Table 3 indicates the sectoral breakdown and provides some indication of both the impact of 
the recession and the differential recovery in jobs across sectors.   
As noted above, these trends need to be considered with some caution as workforce jobs measure jobs 
rather than people in employment i.e. the estimates of self-employment jobs and government supported 
trainee jobs differ from the estimates of people in self-employment and in government supported training 
and employment programmes.  
 
Table 3: Total workforce jobs by industry, Scotland, March 2010 – March 2015 
Industry (in thousands, SIC07) Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-14 Mar-15 
       All jobs  2,570 2,631 2,630 2,591 2,665 2,704 
       Agriculture, forestry & fishing 62 54 50 53 67 44 
Mining & quarrying 32 30 33 35 35 38 
Manufacturing 187 183 192 185 183 195 
Electricity & gas 20 20 17 16 17 21 
Water supply, sewerage, waste  14 17 16 17 16 17 
Construction 154 180 167 168 179 168 
Wholesale & retail trade 376 378 379 373 368 375 
Transport & storage 117 110 127 111 111 116 
Accommodation & food service  176 171 183 176 202 202 
Information & communication 67 65 73 75 70 74 
Financial & insurance activities 93 97 92 87 94 87 
Real estate activities 30 30 34 36 39 44 
Professional scientific & technical 171 196 176 186 188 195 
Administrative & support service 197 195 198 218 205 196 
Public admin & defence 161 156 155 153 151 152 
Education 196 213 203 195 202 222 
Human health & social work 380 390 381 376 384 398 
Arts, entertainment & recreation 71 85 95 71 85 86 
Other service activities 60 58 58 60 67 70 
People employed by households 4 3 3 2 3 3 
 
Source:  ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, June 2015. 
Notes:  * Workforce jobs are a measure of jobs rather than people. There are extensive revisions from previous 
figures. 
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The data in Table 3 suggest that the Agriculture, forestry & fishing sector has experienced a significant 
contraction of workforce jobs. Over the quarter to March 2015 this sector has seen a decrease of 7 
thousand (-14% change) workforce jobs. This is a 23 thousand (-34.5% change) decrease over the year.  
Table 4 outlines the changing patterns of full time and part time employment. The latest data indicates 
that from January 2014 to December 2014, the number of employees increased by 55 thousand (2.5%), 
and the numbers of self-employed increased by 14 thousand (4.8%). The number of part-time workers 
increased by 19 thousand (2.8%) over the year, and the number of temporary employees increased by 1 
thousand (0.8%).  
Table 4 also indicates that the numbers of full-time workers in Scotland increased by 52 thousand 
(2.9%) over the year from January 2014 to December 2014. Part-time employment numbers have grown 
through the recession, and have increased by 19 thousand over the year to December 2014.  
The number of those working part-time because they could not find a full time job is 112 thousand, a 
decrease of 10 thousand (8.1%) over the year to December 2014. The number of people who cannot 
find a full-time job is still almost double that of the pre-recession numbers. This reflects continuing issues 
in the wider economy.  
 
Table 4: Trends in Scottish employment statuses, January 2007 – December 2014 
All in employment  Dec-
07 
Dec -
08 
Dec -
09 
Dec-
10 
Dec-
11 
Dec-
12 
Dec-
13 
Dec-
14 (in thousands)  
         Employees * 2,247 2,248 2,215 2,189 2,178 2,159 2,182 2,237 
Self-employed * 264 269 265 271 284 302 288 301 
Full-time workers ** 1,895 1,903 1,847 1,799 1,790 1,776 1,798 1,850 
Part-time workers ** 632 628 648 677 683 694 684 703 
Workers with 2nd job 94 99 102 98 96 101 96 103 
Temporary employees 128 116 132 125 123 128 134 133 
Could not find full-time job 59 64 84 107 115 115 122 112 
Total * 2,528 2,535 2,498 2,480 2,476 2,481 2,494 2,559 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, June 2015 
Notes: * Includes people who did not state whether they worked part time or full time 
** The split between full time and part time employment is based on respondents’ self-classification 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of part-time workers that could not find a full-time job and temporary workers 
that could not find a permanent job from January 2004 – December 2014. Given that recent growth in 
employment has largely been fuelled by part-time workers and self employment (see Figure 2) it is 
positive to see that the number of part-time workers that could not find full-time jobs is (ever so slightly) 
decreasing.  
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However, the remaining high number of involuntary part-time workers (112 thousand) shows that there is 
still significant slack in the Scottish labour market. The same, even though to a lesser extent, holds true 
for temporary workers that could not find a permanent job. 
 
Figure 3: Trends in full, part time and self-employment January 2004 – December 2014 
 
Source:  ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, June 2015 
Public sector employment in Scotland continues to decline, although at a slower rate than previously. 
The latest data at the time of writing is for Q1 2015; it indicates that there were 546,800 employed in the 
public sector in Scotland, a decrease of 1,000 (-0.2%) since Q1 2014. This level is 1,300 (+0.2%) higher 
than in 1999, when the series began. In Q1 2015, public sector employment accounted for 20.9% of total 
employment, down from 21.4% in the previous year. In Q1 2015, there were an estimated 2,067,900 
people employed in the private sector in Scotland, an increase of 59,400 (+3.0%) over the year. Private 
sector employment in Scotland accounts for 79.1% of total employment (Scottish Government, 2015). 
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Editorial Introduction 
 
In this volume of the Fraser Economic Commentary we continue to mark the fortieth anniversary of 
Scot land’s leading commentary on the Scott ish economy; the Fraser of Allander 
Institute and the Fraser Economic Commentary.  We publish Part II of the Fraser Economic 
Commentary Catalogue for the years 1991 – 2000.  This includes all forecasts, outlook and reviews and articles 
published by the Commentary over the period which are now available on the Fraser Economic Commentary 
Digital Archive created by the Andersonian Library at the University of Strathclyde.  The Archive can be searched 
by author, title, and key words on any search engine.  
 
We also publish the second instalment of Alf Young’s ‘Forty Turbulent Years’: from recession to 
democratic renewal via privatisation and fading silicon dreams (1991-2000), a history of the 
Scottish economy and economic policy issues, as seen through the pages of the Fraser Economic Commentary.  
The concluding installment, bringing Scotland’s economic story up to date, will be published in October 2015. 
 
The Scottish economy is fundamentally part of the wider, global economy.  The implications for the 
Scottish economy of the on-going US / EU negotiations over what is known as TTIP, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership is outlined by Ian Wooton of The Department of Economics at 
Strathclyde Business School and a leading international trade specialist. He provides a guide to 
TTIP (and its cousin TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership), what its aims are, how it fits into the global 
agreement on trade and how it might impact on the Scottish economy and individual sectors.   
 
In ‘Ageing, health status, and economic activity in Scotland: a 20 year view’ Robyn Millar, 
Professor Sir Harry Burns and Alec Morton of the University of Strathclyde’s International 
Public Policy Institute’s Centre for Health Policy analyse the health and economic activity status 
of Scotland’s population over the next 20 years. Their analysis provides further evidence of the 
economic value of moving toward social public expenditure prevention – in health, economic inactivity 
etc. – and away from the high acute spend associated with accommodating ill health, economic 
inactivity and home-based living for the old and the ‘old, old’.  
 
As noted in this Commentary’s Scottish Labour Market overview, the changes in Scotland’s labour 
market reflect responses to the Great Recession and its jobs aftermath.  In ‘Scotland’s labour 
market, ‘jobs polarisation’ and inclusive growth’, Gail Rogers and Kenny Richmond of Scottish 
focus on the squeeze on middle-skilled and middle-waged occupations.  They note that these 
changes pre-date the Great Recession and have significant implications for both the scale and nature 
of future job opportunities and on the nature of inequality in Scotland.   
 
Finally, with the Smith Commission now being enacted by the new UK Government, Jim Cuthbert 
analyses The Barnett formula under the Smith Reforms.  He models Barnett using Holtham 
indexation and shows the Smith Reforms may make the Barnett formula produce untenable fiscal 
outcomes that will necessitate corrective action, either by Westminster (most likely) or by the Scottish 
Parliament.  He also proposes a practical adjustment method to take account of relative changes in the 
rate of population growth as between Scotland the UK, to help both forestall some of its wilder fiscal 
excesses. 
  
 
Kevin D Kane 
Managing Editor, Economic Commentary 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
March 2015 
k.kane@strath.ac.uk 
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Fraser Economic Commentary: Catalogue of all 
reviews, outlooks and articles, Part 2 1991 - 2000 
 
George Macgregor and Isobel Sheppard, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
To coincide with the 40th anniversary of the Fraser of Allander Institute and the Fraser of Allander 
Economic Commentary, the University of Strathclyde Andersonian Library has completed the necessary 
work to create a fully annotated and accessible digital archive of entire Fraser of Allander Economic 
Commentary, 1975 - 2015.  The archive is the single most complete, publically accessible archive of 
detailed analyses and commentary on Scotland’s economy and economic development from 1975 to the 
present day. The archive includes all economic forecasts, Scottish, UK and international outlooks plus all 
articles published by the Fraser Economic Quarterly (1975 - 2007) and then the Fraser of Allander 
Economic Commentary (2008 onwards).  
 
The archive is available at Strathprints (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/), the digital repository of 
research publications of the University of Strathclyde. Articles can be searched using the Strathprints 
search interface. All articles are also discoverable by searching your favourite Web search engine.  If 
required, greater specificity in searching Strathprints from your favourite search engine can be achieved 
by using the following syntax: 
 
Scottish financial sector site:strathprints.strath.ac.uk 
 
Where Scottish financial sector is the search query and site:strathprints.strath.ac.uk 
specifies which Web domain is to be searched by the search engine (i.e. strathprints.strath.ac.uk). 
 
Browsing is often preferable when perusing an archive for possible items of interest and a list of all 
articles published under the Quarterly Economic Commentary and Fraser of Allander Economic 
Commentary is therefore also available from Strathprints. 
 
The following is Part 2 of a three-part catalogue of the entire archive. This catalogue covers the period 
from Vol. 17 No. 2 (1991) to Vol. 25 No. 4 (2000).  Each substantive part of the Commentary, including 
all international, UK and Scottish outlooks and analyses plus all published articles are included in the 
catalogue.  The catalogue provides the item / article title, its author/s and the Commentary volume and 
number.  
 
As of June 2015, the entire digital archive of the Fraser Economic Commentary is available via 
Strathprints. Please note all items and articles have full abstracts plus keywords to better enable them to 
be located by researchers. 
 
Part 3 of the Fraser Economic Commentary catalogue, for items from 2001 (Vol. 26 No. 1) to present 
(Vol. 40 No. 1), will be published in the forthcoming October 2015 edition of the Fraser of Allander 
Economic Commentary as part of the full catalogue. 
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Title Author Year Vol Issue 
A finance policy for Scotland Dow, Sheila C. 1991 17 2 
A sketch of the economic consequences of the Gulf War Hallett, A H; Ma, Y 1991 16 3 
Commercialising academic research Cunningham, Edward 1991 17 2 
Corporate takeovers and the public interest by Alan Peacock and Graham Bannock Scouller, John 1991 17 1 
Enterprising local companies Hayton, Keith 1991 16 4 
New technology and steel production Bell, DN F.; Findlay, J; Oughton, C 1991 16 3 
Regional economic adjustment in the new Europe : the prospects for Scotland Moore, Chris; Booth, Simon 1991 16 4 
Scottish Enterprise: a force for economic change? Hayton, Keith 1991 16 3 
Short term fluctuations in Scottish output, employment and unemployment Yin, Ya Ping 1991 17 1 
Small firms and Scottish clearing banks Cowling, M; Samuels, J; Sugden, R 1991 17 2 
The determinants of standing and seated football attendances : evidence from three Scottish 
league clubs 
Smart, R. A.; Goddard, John A. 1991 16 4 
The development and implementation of a strategic role within Scottish Enterprise Hood, Neil 1991 16 3 
The employment and training implications of the Single European Market McGregor, A; Thom, G 1991 16 4 
The Highlands and Islands Development Board: the beginning of the end? Danson, M; Lloyd, M G 1991 16 4 
The Japanisation of Silicon Glen : implications for spin-off and supplier linkages McCalman, James 1991 17 1 
Cosmetics and crisis? An enterprise zone for Lanarkshire Danson, M W.; Lloyd, M G 1992 17 3 
Labour market activity in the Scottish service sector in 1991 : an analysis of evidence from the 
Scottish Chambers' of Commerce Business Survey 
Lockyer, Cliff; Malloy, Eleanor 1992 17 3 
New laps for old? The industrial strategies of Scottish Enterprise Halkier, Henrik 1992 17 4 
Reforming local government in Scotland Kerley, Richard 1992 18 2 
Scotland: where have all the trade union members gone? Beaumont, P B.; Harris, R 1992 17 3 
Scotland v Wales in the inward investment game: Wales' triple crown? Hill, Stephen; Munday, Max 1992 17 4 
The ERM and Scottish industry : preliminary findings Struthers, John 1992 18 2 
The impact of Scottish local government reform on local economic development Hayton, Keith 1992 18 2 
The Scottish economy : 1990-96 Stevens, J; Ashcroft, B; McFarland, M 1992 18 1 
Tourism administration in Scotland Smith, R. 1992 18 2 
Agency restructuring in the Highlands and Islands : a preliminary evaluation of the Local 
Enterprise Companies 
Black, Stuart 1993 18 3 
Progress in partnership : the future of urban regeneration in Scotland Hayton, Keith 1993 19 2 
Special article : Quarterly Economic Commentary: Volume 10-18 Fraser of Allander Institute 1993 19 1 
Telecommunications and local economic development in Scotland : detailing the issues Taylor, J. A.; Williams, H.; McLeod, B. 1993 18 4 
Telecommunications in Scotland : auditing the issues Taylor, J. A.; Williams, H.; McLeod, B 1993 18 3 
The impact of visitors to Strathclyde University of the Scottish economy McNicolI, Iain 1993 19 2 
The labour force in East Kilbride : a decade of development Taggart, James 1993 18 4 
The recent behaviour of aggregate consumer spending Carruth, A; Henley, A 1993 18 3 
The role of the Scottish financial sector [Mowlem Lecture, 31 March] Scott, James 1993 18 4 
Water and sewerage in Scotland : a review of responses to the government's consultation 
paper 
McGilvray, James 1993 19 1 
Will Scotland's oil and gas contracting industry survive the ending of the Petroleum Revenue 
Tax? 
Foster, J; Maguiness, H; Munro, A 1993 18 4 
Economic development in a unitary local government system Hayton, Keith 1994 20 1 
Local enterprise companies in the Highlands and Islands : further responses to the enterprise 
network 
Black, Stuart 1994 19 4 
Symposium on the Scottish labour market Fraser of Allander Institute 1994 19 3 
The economic impact of multinational enterprises in Tayside Liu, Xiaming 1994 20 1 
The ERM, Sterling depreciation and Scottish industry Struthers, John 1994 19 4 
The ERM, Sterling depreciation and Scottish industry : effects on company costs Struthers, John 1994 20 1 
The Scottish housing market : past, present and prospects MacRae, D J R; Bell, J 1994 19 4 
The Scottish water industry : recent performance and future prospects Sawkins, John W. 1994 20 1 
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Transport and tourism in the Hebrides : the impact of ferry improvements on tourism in Mull Jackson, Tony; Lynch, Bill 1994 20 2 
A LEC'S progress three years on - the customers' verdict Henderson, A; Wills, E 1995 20 3 
Charging for water in Scotland : options for change Sawkins, J W.; Mackay, D F. 1995 21 2 
Components of employment change in the Tayside manufacturing sector : a spatial analysis Glancey, Keith 1995 21 1 
International business cooperation and Scottish companies Raines, Philip 1995 20 4 
Inward investment and Scottish devolution : towards a balanced view Hood, Neil 1995 20 4 
The Scottish public finances in 1992/93 Stevens, Jim 1995 20 3 
Are there local labour markets in Scotland? Lythe, Charlotte 1996 21 4 
EMU, the UK and their future? Demertzis, M.; Low, K.; McAdam, P. 1996 22 1 
Getting to know the workforce Campbell, R. Craig 1996 21 3 
Scotland's trade in occupational skills : a summary analysis for 1989 McNicoll, I ; Alexander, J M.; Foley, M 1996 22 1 
An analysis of the Scottish National Party's 1997 election budget proposals Wood, Peter W. 1997 22 3 
Boosting the business birth rate in Scotland : evidence from the Lanarkshire development 
agency's entrepreneurship programme 
Talbot, Steve; Reeves, Alan 1997 22 2 
Import substitution and the demand for skilled labour in Scotland McNicoll, I. H.; Foley, M. 1997 23 1 
Reforming the Scottish water industry : one year on Sawkins, John W. 1997 22 3 
Stocking the glen : the relationship between original equipment manufacturers and the Scottish 
supply base 
McCalman, James 1997 23 1 
Stuck on the starting blocks : a response to Mr Steven's comment on the SNP General 
Election Budget 1997 
Wilson, Andrew J. 1997 22 3 
The economics of the "Tartan Tax" 
McGregor, Peter; Stevens, Jim; 
Swales, Kim; Yin, Ya Ping 
1997 22 3 
The future of local unemployment statistics : the case for replacing TTWAs Webster, David; Turok, Ivan 1997 22 2 
The SNP budget for Scotland - a comment Stevens, Jim 1997 22 3 
A critique of GERS : government expenditure and revenue in Scotland Cuthbert, Jim; Cuthbert, Margaret 1998 24 1 
Developing a strategic direction - taking Glasgow into the millennium Hayton, Keith 1998 23 4 
Government expenditure and revenue in Scotland : accounting for the fiscal deficit in 1996-7 Midwinter, Arthur 1998 24 1 
Income tax varying powers and the Scottish labour market Gasteen, A; Houston, J 1998 23 2 
The annual labour force survey and unemployment rates - calculating with confidence Watt, Patrick; Green, Adrian 1998 23 4 
The economic impact of Scottish ski centres of the Highlands and Islands Enterprise region Milne, N; Radford, A; Riddington, G 1998 23 2 
The privatised Scottish bus industry Cowie, J; Asenova, D 1998 23 3 
The restructuring and reform of the Scottish water industry : a job half finished Sawkins, John W. 1998 23 4 
The Scottish Parliament and the Barnett Formula Kay, Neil 1998 24 1 
Monitoring the financial aspects of the devolution settlement : issues and data requirements Cuthbert, J; Cuthbert, M 1999 24 4 
Paying for water in Scotland : a distributional analysis 
Sawkins, J W.; McMaster, R; 
Newlands, D 
1999 24 3 
Public investment and devolution Bell, David 1999 24 3 
Scotland's public finances from Goschen to Barnett McCrone, Gavin 1999 24 2 
Scottish express coach services - loss leaders and anti-competitive practice Sinclair, Colin 1999 24 2 
Sustainable competition? Ferries and competition on the Clyde Kay, Neil 1999 24 3 
The Government public expenditure plans for Scotland : 1999-00 to 2001-02 Ashcroft, Brian 1999 24 3 
Devolution and public spending : arguments and evidence Midwinter, A; Ashcroft, B 2000 25 4 
More effective economic development? A commentary on the Scottish Parliament's Enterprise 
and Lifelong Learning Committee's Inquiry into the delivery of local economic development 
services 
Hayton, Keith 2000 25 3 
Response to paper by Alexander Dow and Catherine Kirk "The number of Scottish businesses 
and economic policy" 
McVey, Brian 2000 25 4 
The impact of Scottish Enterprise policies on the economies of Scotland and the rest of the UK 
Gillespie, G; McGregor, P  G.; 
Swales, J. K; Yin, Ya Ping 
2000 25 1 
The impact of the Euro on the Scottish labour market : some possible scenarios Struthers, John J. 2000 25 1 
The industrial demand for skilled labour : a comparison of Scotland and the rest of the United 
Kingdom 
McNicoll, Iain; Marsh, Richard 2000 25 2 
The numbers of Scottish businesses and economic policy Dow, A;   Kirk, C 2000 25 4 
The political economy of Scotland's population decline Webster, David 2000 25 2 
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Forty turbulent years: How the Fraser Economic 
Commentary recorded the evolution of the modern 
Scottish economy 
 
Part 2: From recession to democratic renewal via privatisation and 
fading silicon dreams, 1991 – 2000 
 
  Alf Young  
 
Abstract 
The recent economic history of Scotland, its performance and place within the UK and international 
economy can be traced through the pages of the Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary. Created in 
1975 by a private bequest from Sir Hugh Fraser, a prominent Scottish businessman, the Fraser of 
Allander Institute has provided a continuous commentary on the economic and related policy issues 
facing Scotland over the period. In this the fortieth anniversary of the Fraser of Allander Institute, this is 
the second of three articles which chart Scotland’s transformation from an economy significantly based 
on manufacturing (and mining) to one that saw rapid deindustrialisation (in terms of output), the 
discovery of oil and the rapid transformation of its business base with the impact of both merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity as well as the varied impacts of successive governments’ industrial and 
regional policies. 
For the UK as a whole, the recession foreseen by Dr John Hall, TSB Scotland’s Treasury Economist, at 
the end of part one of this series, duly arrived. The Lawson boom of the late eighties had pushed 
inflation close to 10%. As chancellor, Nigel Lawson had tried to persuade Margaret Thatcher to take 
sterling into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). All he managed was an informal 
shadowing, by value, of the Deutschmark. With the UK economy embarked on an unsustainable credit 
boom, interest rates hitting 15% and an inflationary wage spiral in full swing, it was left to Lawson’s 
successor as chancellor, John Major, to persuade an increasingly-beleaguered prime minister to 
formally join the ERM, in October 1990,  However a day - or rather, days - of reckoning still beckoned. 
Thatcher herself was ousted by her own party within weeks, with Major taking her place. The ERM 
experiment lasted less than two years, sterling crashing out under speculative pressure, on Black 
Wednesday, September 16, 1992. With commendable Scottish understatement, the then-chancellor, 
Norman Lamont, confessed it had been a “difficult day”.  
In the first Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary of 1991, editor Jim Love noted “As late as 
November the Government was still denying there would be a recession, despite the mounting evidence 
to the contrary. The GDP figures for the third quarter of 1990 and provisional figures for the fourth 
quarter removed any lingering doubt.” (Vol. 16, No. 3) In previous recessions, the Scottish economy had 
taken its full share - sometimes more - of the resultant pain. And this time one of the last remaining 
mainstays of Scottish heavy industry, the Ravenscraig steel works in North Lanarkshire, was already 
under threat. In May 1990 British Steel had announced its intention to close the hot strip mill at the plant 
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in the first half of 1991. By the end of 1991 it went on to tell horrified Scottish ministers the rest of the 
complex, including its giant furnaces, would close too, in January 1992. Yet despite what was happening 
to Scotland’s biggest steel plant, Jim Love questioned whether this recession would hit Scotland as hard 
as the rest of the UK. While recent evidence did not “inspire much optimism”, there were reasons for 
believing any falls in output north of the border were “unlikely to be of the scale experienced in the UK as 
a whole”. Lower levels of borrowings by Scottish consumers left them more immune to high interest 
rates. Scotland had some export-intensive industries, like the burgeoning electronics sector in Silicon 
Glen, which were still enjoying growth in overseas demand. And the North Sea was going through a 
mini-boom in the wake of the first Gulf War.  
Love’s contrarian prediction proved a shrewd one. For the UK as a whole the 1990/91 recession proved 
shallower than those of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Overall, output contracted by 2.4% over five 
quarters and took twice that time to recover that loss in full. Yet, despite Ravenscraig’s fate, the Scottish 
economy barely contracted at all. Another manufacturing sector, that cluster of modern electronic 
assembly plants, collectively known as Silicon Glen, was booming. Between the first quarter of 1991 and 
the first quarter of 1998 its collective output tripled. In part that was down to growing capacity, as more 
American, Japanese and other overseas corporations were persuaded to invest in Scotland. 
But Silicon Glen’s competitiveness in these new digital export markets was also helped by the sharp 
depreciation of sterling that followed the UK’s abrupt departure from the ERM. The Fraser commentary 
had sensed that prospect too. “One of the expected effects of ERM entry is to remove the ‘easy option’ 
of maintaining competitiveness by devaluation, and the government sees this as a means of imposing 
discipline on firms to keep costs - especially wage costs - down,” wrote its editor at the end of 1990. 
“Entering the ERM at a fairly high rate and at a time of rising unit labour costs was bound to put a great 
deal of pressure on manufacturing industry, particularly those sectors geared towards exports which are 
crucial  to in providing an outlet for UK-produced goods at a time of faltering domestic demand. In the 
long-run the entry mid-point level of DM2.95 may prove unsustainable.” (Vol. 16, No. 2) 
While Scotland’s economy, as a whole, emerged relatively unscathed from the early 1990s recession, its 
two biggest banks were not so fortunate. Injudicious lending at both the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Bank of Scotland undermined profitability. Bank of Scotland had recorded pre-tax profits £194m in 1990. 
These fell sharply to £134m the following year before recovering marginally to £141m in 1992. In 1993 
they fell again to £125m. Its larger rival, RBS initially took a much more serious hit. Profits of £262m at 
the start of the decade fell 78% to £58m in 1991 and collapsed a further 64% to just £21m in 1992. By 
1993 RBS profits had rebounded to £265m. The Fraser commentary was alert to the dangers. “Fuelled 
by poor lending decisions and consequent bad debts, the banks have an urgent need to cut costs if they 
are to restore profitability. The bad debts, although severe, do not appear to threaten the existence of 
the companies at present but they must inevitably raise questions about how banking is organised in the 
UK.” (Vol. 18, No. 2) 
Indeed RBS was already well embarked on an internal revolution in how it did business. George 
Mathewson, an expatriate engineer by training who had been running the Scottish Development Agency 
since 1981, had joined the Royal in October 1987 as director of strategy and development. By 1992, 
surrounded by a hand-picked group of former SDA colleagues he had taken with him, Mathewson was 
the Royal’s chief executive, implementing Project Columbus to root out the banking “dead wood” he 
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thought was clogging the Royal’s decision making. Over at Bank of Scotland another unconventional 
banker, Peter Burt, who had started his business life in the computer industry, was taking over the 
leadership role. By the end of the decade these two men would lock horns over which of their banks 
would acquire the English clearer NatWest. The first seeds of what would eventually become the biggest 
banking crisis in UK banking history were already being sown. 
The SDA Mathewson left behind in 1987, to sort out RBS, was also approaching its political endgame. 
As we saw in Part 1, in 1988 Bill Hughes, a Scottish businessman with the ear of Margaret Thatcher, 
had proposed a much more balkanised model of economic development for Scotland, integrating skills 
training, stressing enterprise and innovation, and giving business people a much more powerful, 
localised voice in how the state helps grow an economy. Scottish Enterprise (SE), with its network of 
local enterprise companies (LECs), and its similarly configured northern counterpart, Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise (HIE),  which replaced the even older Highlands and Islands Development Board, first 
opened their doors at the beginning of April 1991. The man recruited to head SE was an ex-patriate Scot 
from California’s Silicon Valley, a human resources specialist called Crawford Beveridge. 
In the pages of the Fraser commentary, the advent of SE was greeted with plenty of healthy scepticism, 
notably from Neil Hood, Professor of Business Policy at Strathclyde Business School. (Vol. 16 Nos. 2 
and 3) Hood was also an insider who had been Director of Locate in Scotland from 1987-89 and then 
Director of Employment and Special Initiatives, SDA during the run up to its merger with the Training 
Agency in Scotland and the launch of SE.  He was concerned that, while in principle the SE core had 
been given a strong strategic role by ministers, the way its relationship with its network of 13 business-
led LECs developed in practice could leave it “strong and powerful” or “weak and impotent”. That SE 
core, he argued, should continue to be recognised as “a national development agency in it own right”. 
Were it to become either a channel through which more localised funding and support was negotiated, 
or simply a facilitator of the work of the LECs, any strategic benefits from the reforms would soon be 
“frittered away”. 
There were plenty of early tensions between the SE core and its LEC network. In another contribution to 
the commentary, Keith Hayton of Strathclyde’s Centre for Planning considered the local development 
pressures resulting from British Steel’s decision to close down its Ravenscraig site. Hayton cited one 
estimate of the funds needed by Lanarkshire Development Agency’s Chief Executive. It came to £650m 
spread over ten years! SE’s entire annual budget at the time was around £420m. “It is difficult to see 
funding on this scale being provided,” he observed. “A more likely scenario is that money will be diverted 
from the other LECs’ budgets. It may be that those LECs that have below average unemployment levels 
will be particularly at risk.” (Vol. 16, No. 3) The more prosaic reality is that, more than twenty years after 
the event, much of the Ravenscraig site has yet to be redeveloped. 
Even in its formative years, under Crawford Beveridge’s leadership, Scottish Enterprise did manage to 
pursue some bold new national strategic goals. Swopping California for the west of Scotland, Beveridge 
quickly grew concerned about the relatively low rate of new business formation in his homeland, even 
compared with other parts of the UK. In 1993, at his instigation, SE launched its Business Birth Rate 
Strategy, designed to close that yawning enterprise gap. A whole suite of interventions were launched -  
from personal enterprise shows to new materials to support enterprise education in schools; new 
business network groups and funding forums; a higher education entrepreneurship programme and 
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mentoring support. The strategy had a target of helping create 25,000 new start-ups by the end of 1999. 
However when the Fraser of Allander Institute was commissioned to review the Strategy’s impact over 
those seven years, it estimated the number of additional start-ups achieved was just 2124. At a cost of 
some £20m a year, the strategy had eaten up some £140m. And over its life, Scotland’s business birth 
rate had actually fallen from 30.4 per 10,000 of the adult population (using VAT registration data) in 1993 
to just 27.5 by 1999. 
The political rationale behind creating Scottish Enterprise’s devolved, business-led structure was that it 
would deliver better Scottish solutions to distinctively Scottish problems. However even Conservative 
governments of the 1980s and early 1990s could not resist the lure of prestigious international projects 
that promised large numbers of skilled jobs. Health Care International, a £180m private hospital, built on 
derelict industrial land on the north bank of the River Clyde between Clydebank and Dalmuir, was the 
showpiece project of that type, when it opened in June 1994. The brainchild of two Boston-based 
doctors, Ray Levey and Angelo Eraklis, the 260-bed HCI offered advanced medical treatments to 
patients from southern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Costs would be met by their own 
health systems or out of their own pockets. The complex incorporated a four star hotel so that relatives 
could travel to Scotland to be with patients. The project had started under the old SDA which spent £7m 
clearing asbestos and other pollutants from the site. SE invested in the hospital, alongside its builder, 
John Laing, British Aerospace, an investment arm of Harvard University and a consortium of Dutch, 
French and UK banks (including Scotland’s RBS).  
Less than three months after its official opening, at least one of HCI’s banks (IMG) was already very 
nervous. Only 400 of the promised 1800 jobs had been created. Patient numbers had fallen even more 
dramatically behind forecasts. Peak bed occupancy at that stage barely topped twenty. The Scottish 
Office and the Bank of England cracked the whip and support payments, from public sources and from 
the banking consortium, were accelerated. But to no avail. By November 1994 HCI had called in the 
receivers. In early 1995, the assets were acquired by the London-based Abu Dhabi Investment 
Company and the hospital relaunched with fresh investment and a plan to treat a steady stream of 
patients from the Emirate. But even this intervention, involving a son of Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, did 
not resolve HCI’s destiny. Increasingly it was used to treat urgent NHS cases from across the UK. In 
2002 it was acquired outright by NHS Scotland to help address lengthening waiting times and is now the 
Golden Jubilee National Hospital, specialising in heart and lung treatments, but also carrying out a 
significant proportion on orthopaedic procedures for NHS patients from across Scotland. 
What happened to HCI in the 1990s - a state-supported private health care initiative being turned on its 
head, through abject market failure, into much-needed additional capacity for Scotland’s domestic state-
provided health service - ran completely counter to what successive Conservative governments thought 
they were about at that time. Privatisation of state assets and utilities was one of the defining drivers of 
the Thatcher and Major years. British Telecom and British Gas were sold to the public in 1984 and 1986 
respectively. British Airways and water supply, in England and Wales, were disposed of too. While the 
HCI hospital was being built it was still full steam ahead on privatisation. In 1991 the Scottish Bus Group 
was privatised. At the beginning of 1993, the process of breaking British Rail up started, replacing it with 
a track, signals and stations operator; a series of privatised regional train operating companies, including 
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ScotRail; and three rolling stock leasing companies. the first of these three groups, Railtrack, was 
effectively renationalised after the Hatfield Rail Crash in 2000 and is now Network Rail. 
In 1991 along with the rest of the UK electricity supply industry, shares in Scotland’s electricity suppliers 
were offered to the public. However there was room for a specifically Scottish solution for those parts of 
the network operating north of Hardian’s Wall. Both the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and 
the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board were privatised as vertically-integrated businesses - Scottish 
Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric respectively - controlling everything from generation and transmission 
to distribution and supply in their designated areas. Only SSEB’s nuclear assets were ring-fenced from 
the sale, later to be merged into British Energy and sold to the French utility EDF. In England and Wales 
the old Central Electricity Generating Board was broken up into four - a National Grid company, 
responsible for the entire high voltage transmission system south of the border and three electricity 
generators, National Power, Powergen and Nuclear Electric (later British Energy). In addition twelve 
regional electricity companies were created, responsible for distribution and supply in their areas. 
Even before the privatisation process was complete, the commentary was noting (Vol. 15, No.4 and Vol. 
16, No.1) that both Scottish companies had much to gain by exporting more of their excess power south 
and exploring new collaborative generating opportunities and commercial supply deals there too. As the 
post-privatisation environment matured, both Scottish companies exploited their integrated structure to 
acquire regional supply companies over the border and develop their generating capacity there too. 
Hydro-Electric, now SSE, after its 1998 merger with Southern Electric, remains a listed company, 
headquartered in Perth. Scottish Power was acquired by the Spanish group Iberdrola in 2007. Like all 
their main competitors, SSE and ScottishPower now supply gas as well as electricity. Today, of the six 
biggest players, two are German-owned, one French and one Spanish. Only SSE and British Gas 
(owned by Centrica) remain in UK ownership. 
What happened to the electricity sector through privatisation has left one competitive wrinkle, causing 
tensions to this day. National Grid still owns the high-voltage network south of the border. Under BETTA 
(the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements), it is also the system operator for the 
entire UK-wide high-voltage grid. In effect it regulates flows of electricity around the whole UK and the 
terms under which these flows take place. However National Grid is a major commercial player in that 
market, just like SSE and Spanish-owned Scottish Power, who still own and operate their own parts of 
the high-voltage wires in Scotland. So when it comes to moving away from fossil fuel generation towards 
greener forms of generation (most notably onshore wind) there is growing political tension. 
Scotland wants to export as much green electricity south as it can. But its own baseload generating 
capacity is diminishing, now that Scottish Power is closing its massive coal-fired Longannet station next 
March. And no one, not even Scottish Power or SSE, seems interested in building new base-load 
capacity north of the border. The SNP-controlled devolved Scottish government has an embargo on any 
new nuclear generating capacity here too. And now the new majority Conservative government at 
Westminster is talking about cutting back on subsidies for renewable generators, like onshore wind 
farms. The future of BETTA, which the SNP, in its 2014 Scotland’s Future white paper, said it would 
continue to support, were Scotland to vote yes to independence, looks like becoming a growing source 
of political friction between Edinburgh and London over the next few years. 
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While the final decade of the 20th century was marked, right across the UK, by a very significant re-
drawing of the boundaries between what the state could best provide and what should be vested in 
market competition, it was also a time of significant political and constitutional upheaval, especially in 
Scotland. In 1994 the Major government legislated to abolish the two-tier structure of regions and 
districts across Scotland, introduced in the 1970s, and replace them with 32 unitary authorities. When 
the new Act came into force in 1995, the vast Strathclyde Region, centred on the City of Glasgow and 
the Clyde estuary, was no more. Water and sewerage services were taken away from local democratic 
control. However in the wake of a political campaign which included a ‘water referendum’ organised by 
Strathclyde Region, the Conservative government baulked at privatising these services the way it had in 
England and Wales. Instead three public water and sewerage authorities were created, covering the 
west, east and north of the country. In 2002 these would be merged into a single body, Scottish Water, 
created by an act of the new devolved Scottish parliament. 
Against all the predicted odds, the Major government had retained power in the 1992 UK general 
election. That gave it a mandate to continue to pursue its wide-ranging programme of privatisation and 
advance the wholesale restructuring of the architecture of the British state. But as the next general 
election loomed, in 1997, there were growing signs that eighteen years of Tory rule were coming to an 
end. The choice facing voters was particularly acute in Scotland, where the Labour opposition, now 
under Tony Blair’s leadership, was committed to holding another referendum on Scottish home rule and 
- if it proved to be the settled will of the Scottish people - the creation of a devolved Scottish parliament 
in Edinburgh for the first time since the Act of Union in 1707. 
A month before the 1992 general election, the Scottish Office published, for the very first time, what its 
press release of the time rather prosaically called a “booklet” on Government Expenditure and Revenues 
in Scotland. “In reading this booklet, the people of Scotland will be able to judge for themselves the 
extent to which Scotland derives economic benefit from being a part of the United Kingdom,” explained 
Ian Lang, the Secretary of State for Scotland at the time. That first booklet showed total public 
expenditure per head in Scotland just over 12% higher than in the UK as a whole, and identifiable 
general government expenditure 19% higher than its UK equivalent and 24% higher than in England. On 
the revenue side, over the four main classes of revenue raised in Scotland - income tax, national 
insurance, VAT and local authority revenue - Scotland’s contribution was below its population share. “In 
short,” claimed Lang, “we contribute less than our population share to the UK Exchequer, and receive 
more from it.” 
That analysis, now known universally by its acronym GERS, has appeared annually ever since. It has 
been refined. Since the start it has been the work of Scottish civil servants. It has proved contentious 
and sometimes inflammatory fuel for the ongoing political debate about Scotland’s constitutional future. 
A strong flavour of that controversy is evident in three linked pieces which appeared in the Fraser 
commentary in 1997 (Vol. 22, No. 3). The first is a comment on the SNP Budget for Scotland by the 
Institute’s Jim Stevens. The second is a riposte by Andrew Wilson, an economist, speaking for the SNP, 
later a list MSP for the party in the very first Scottish devolved parliament. The final piece is an analysis 
of the SNP budget, which formed part of the party’s manifesto for the 1997 UK general election, by Peter 
Wood, of the independent Scottish consultancy group Pieda. Intriguingly the pieces only appeared in the 
June edition of the commentary, six weeks after the votes cast on May 1 had been counted and Labour 
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had swept to power with a 179-seat majority. The SNP had doubled its Scottish seats tally from three to 
six. 
Stevens based some of his analysis on the latest GERS figures. He rejected the charge that, by doing 
so, he was accepting “Tory fiddled figures”. That was a “puerile slur on the professional integrity of 
government economists”. The SNP’s view of our fiscal prospects, Stevens concluded, was “ludicrously 
optimistic and fatally flawed”. Oil revenues would endure for a long time “but on a declining trend and 
would not be sufficient to ensure that we did not have to borrow more or tax more to enjoy the same 
level of public services that we would have enjoyed inside the Union.” If we are to opt for independence, 
he went on, “It will not be an easy ride and we should only do so with our eyes wide open. Suspect and 
inaccurate appraisals of our fiscal prospects are about as much use in the Scottish constitutional debate 
.... as a chocolate fireguard.” 
Wilson’s response, on behalf of the SNP, didn’t pull any punches either. He opened by recalling that, in 
1970, David Simpson and Kenneth Alexander had contributed essays to an OUP book, respectively for 
and against the economic case for Scottish independence. Simpson was the founder director of the FAI 
and Alexander professor of economics at Strathclyde. Alexander was, Wilson quipped, in “the grey 
corner” while Simpson occupied “the sunshine corner”. Clearly the gloves were off. Scotland’s inherited 
fiscal position on independence, Wilson argued, “is of less importance to the economics of 
independence than the dynamics. It is not the starting point but what happens through time that is of 
greater importance.” If an independent government proved better for the Scottish economy than London 
government, delivering faster growth and releasing latent enterprise, then any initial fiscal deficit would 
quickly diminish. Stevens’s contribution to the debate was “welcome”. But it contained “unsustainable 
arguments couched in pejorative language.’ 
It was left to Peter Wood of Pieda to offer a view from outside the ring. “Few, if any, economists would 
dispute that Scotland would be economically viable as an independent country,” he observed. “It is quite 
evident that Scotland’s economy is larger, more prosperous and more soundly based than many existing 
independent states. However there is much less agreement as to whether an independent Scotland 
would be more or less prosperous than a Scotland which remained within the UK.” He went on to point 
out that the budget the SNP proposed involved spending increases that, by 2001, would push Scotland’s 
budget deficit to almost £7bn, or nearly 10% of GDP. “With some determined belt tightening in terms of 
reduced public spending and/or tax increases” an independent Scotland could reach the Maastricht 
criteria for joining European Monetary Union. Whether it might become another Celtic Tiger in the longer 
term was, Wood judged, “far less certain”. And the idea that independence would deliver an instant 
public spending bonus he dismissed as “untenable”. 
The really striking thing about these exchanges, reading them again now in 2015, is how little has been 
resolved in this core economic argument about Scotland’s constitutional future over the eighteen years 
since they took place. Next year the devolved Scottish parliament and government will complete its 
fourth full term. We have had a referendum on Scottish independence where the yes side lost by a 
margin of more than ten percentage points. We have had another UK general election in which the SNP 
swept the board in Scotland in unprecedented fashion. The Smith Commission proposals have led to 
another Scotland Bill, offering more devolved fiscal powers to Edinburgh, currently being debated at 
Westminster. But, in tone, texture and temper, the economic arguments for and against further 
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constitutional change seem as entrenched and unresolved as ever they were. Even debates about the 
prospect of something short of outright independence - full fiscal autonomy within the existing Union - 
suffers from the same statistical trench warfare. 
In the final years of the old century, constitutional preoccupations were more about whether Scotland 
would vote for the new devolved parliament Labour had promised and whether Scots would also vote to 
give that parliament modest powers over tax. Labour, led by Tony Blair, won its huge 1997 majority in 
part on a pledge of strict fiscal rectitude. Blair’s chancellor, Gordon Brown, would stick, for their first two 
years in office, with the same tight spending plans already set by the outgoing Tory administration. Even 
Brown’s Treasury predecessor, Ken Clarke, later admitted he didn’t really think his party could have 
delivered on those legacy spending plans had they won. But Brown stuck with Clarke’s hair shirt. In each 
of its first three years in office, New Labour generated increasingly large budget surpluses, thanks to that 
squeeze on public spending. Such budget surpluses had only happened in four other years since the 
mid-sixties. For the vast majority of the past half century, annual budget deficits have been the norm in 
the UK whoever was in power. Against that backdrop, it is no surprise that the modest fiscal powers 
vested in the new parliament in Edinburgh in 1999 - to vary the basic rate of income tax up or down by 
up to three pence in the pound - has withered unused on the fiscal vine ever since. 
As the new millennium approached, did that tight squeeze on public spending have any significant 
impact on the real economy on terms of output and jobs? As we have seen, the 1990s had started with 
the Scottish economy narrowly escaping the recession that hit the rest of the UK. At the start of the 
decade unemployment, in both Scotland and the UK as a whole, had been on a downward trend for 
nearly three years. The Scottish jobless rate, while not as far adrift as it had been at the end of the 
1970s, was still a full three percentage points higher than the UK equivalent. However that gap narrowed 
when the recession was felt more keenly south of the border. Scotland’s unemployment rate even 
dipped below the UK rate in 1992/3 and stayed much the same until the middle of the decade. Then it 
began to drift higher again. 
Two contrasting forces were at work. Scotland’s push to attract more electronics assembly plants to its 
shores appeared, for much of the decade, to be paying dividends. Successive Fraser commentaries 
charted the way output from Scottish manufacturing plants caught up with equivalent UK output by late 
1994, then to soar higher right through to the end of the decade. There’s a chart on page 7 of the 
January 2000 edition (Vol. 25, No. 1) that captures that clear trend. However New Labour’s squeeze on 
public spending was also having its impact, in sectors where the Scottish economy was already more 
dependent, in employment terms, than its southern counterpart. On top of that, there were already clear 
signs, despite that soaring manufacturing output, that the silicon dreams fostered in Scotland through 
the 1980s and 1990s might be beginning to fade. 
Motorola had built a massive complex to assemble mobile phones at Bathgate  which opened in 1990 
and employed more than 3000 people. By 2001 it was closing down and shipping the assembly work off 
to cheaper host economies in eastern Europe. In 1996 the Taiwanese group Chungwha arrived at 
Mossend in Lanarkshire promising even more jobs, 3300, assembling cathode ray tubes. But that was 
yesterday’s technology. The advent of flat screens changed all that and Chungwha was gone in six 
years. The Korean group Hyundai agreed to come to Fife to fabricate silicon chips. A hugely expensive 
wafer fab was built, with lots of support from Scottish Enterprise and government. But Hyundai changed 
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its mind. And with other established wafer fabs, like the Japanese group NEC’s plant at Livingston, also 
closing. the Fife site never produced a single wafer. It has since been demolished. 
The Outlook and Appraisal in the last Fraser commentary of 2000 ( Vol. 25, No. 4) caught the mood. 
“The Scottish economy experienced a further contraction in output in the first quarter of the year. Growth 
was considerably weaker than in the UK,” it noted. “The service sector exhibited no growth, while 
manufacturing output fell markedly..... the fall in electronics output appears to be a key reason for the 
overall weakness.” Some in the Scottish media were already talking of another recession. The Fraser 
team disagreed. But with trouble in Silicon Glen, a stronger pound hitting exports and growth in public 
expenditure tightly constrained, the new century was starting on an uncertain note. In the final part of 
this series we will bring this story up to date. 
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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP):  The devil will be in the detail 
 
 Ian Wooton, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
The European Union and the United States of America are currently engaged in negotiations on a 
comprehensive  bilateral  trade  agreement,  known  as  the  Trans-Atlantic  Trade  and  Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). According to the European Commission (2015), the resulting bilateral agreement 
should “help people and businesses large and small, by: opening up the US to EU firms; helping cut red 
tape that firms face when exporting; setting new rules to make it easier and fairer to export, import and 
invest overseas.” Despite these ideals, the proposed agreement and the negotiations to achieve it have 
been subject to criticism by many people and organisations across Europe. This article attempts to shed 
some light on the issues and the potential benefits (or otherwise) of TTIP with a particular focus on 
Scottish interests. 
I Introduction and background 
It may be helpful to provide some background to the current negotiations. The first question that might 
be asked is why the US and EU, both strong advocates of multilateral negotiations, have turned to these 
bilateral trade talks. 
Since the end of World War 2, barriers to international commerce have fallen dramatically across the 
globe. This has been achieved largely under the aegis of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its 
pre-1995 predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions are 
multilateral in nature, such that that member states (currently numbering 161 countries) are required to 
give equal treatment to imports from all of the other members. Countries therefore set a single, “Most- 
Favoured Nation” (MFN) tariff (import tax) on a product regardless of its source (though countries 
outside of the WTO can face less-favourable access). The major advantage of multilateralism in trade 
negotiations  is  that,  while  larger  countries  generally  focus  on  resolving  trade  issues  between 
themselves, the benefits of improved market access in the resulting trade deal are extended to smaller 
countries. These nations would probably not have the clout to wring similar concessions out of their big 
trading partners on their own. Consequently small countries may be the collateral damage if large 
countries switch from multilateral to bilateral trade negotiations. 
Bilateral trade talks are nothing new. Prior to the establishment of the GATT in 1948, trade talks would 
generally  occur  between  small  groups  of  countries.  Despite  the  benefits  of  engaging  in  trade 
negotiations at a global scale, the multilateral nature of the GATT left it unable to address political and 
economic conditions specific to some of its member countries. Thus, almost from its inception, the GATT 
had to accommodate special deals arranged amongst smaller groupings of nations. Article XXIV of the 
GATT permits free-trade agreements amongst its members, whereby groups of countries can offer 
preferential access to each other’s markets with tariff rates less than their MFN rates.  Indeed, the strict  
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interpretation of Article XXIV is that the alternative to MFN is free trade and these bilateral tariffs should 
be zero. 
Article XXIV reconciles the trading regime within the EU with its membership of the WTO. The current 28 
member countries of the EU trade freely amongst themselves, with the MFN tariffs on imports only 
applying to goods from outwith the EU (although many of these exporters also enjoy preferential access 
thanks to the EU’s participation in additional free-trade agreements). Equally, though more recently, the 
US has availed itself of Article XXIV, most notably in the establishment of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NATFA) which, though less comprehensive than European integration, allows goods 
manufactured by Canada, Mexico and the US to move across their borders without import tariffs. 
While deeper integration in Europe is motivated by much more than mere economics, many of the other 
bilateral deals, including NAFTA, were in part a result of the perception that the central mechanism 
driving trade liberalisation, GATT/WTO, was running out of steam. In a respect, the multilateral trading 
system is a victim of its own success. Average tariffs have declined quite sharply, while an increasing 
share of the world’s trade is accounted for by members of the WTO as their numbers have grown. In a 
respect, the earliest rounds of tariff-cutting addressed the “low-hanging fruit”, products for which 
increasing market access did not present any great domestic concerns or political controversy. However, 
eliminating trade barriers on remaining products and services might be more politically charged, with 
strong domestic lobbies opposing further trade liberalisation. This issue might have been easier to 
resolve had the expansion of membership of the WTO not have also increased the diversity of the 
member countries. The increasing numbers and influence of developing nations has raised issues that 
the older membership of industrialised countries did not have to address. The larger and more diverse 
the membership of the WTO, the harder it has become for it to reach agreement on new trade deals. 
Indeed, the current, Doha Round of multilateral negotiations has been stalled for several years with little 
hope of an imminent breakthrough. Consequently, it is little surprise that many countries have lost 
patience with the WTO and have decided to pursue free-trade deals with their biggest trading partners. 
II Bilateral trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic 
Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP)  
The US is seeking to develop two major bilateral trade agreements on a grand scale. Not only is it in 
talks with the EU over TTIP but it has been engaged in negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) for much longer. Success with the TPP negotiations would result in a trade deal with eleven other 
countries on the Pacific Rim (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan plus 
Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile). In order to negotiate international trade agreements, the US President 
has to receive Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), more commonly referred to as Fast-Track negotiating 
authority, from the US Congress. This delegates to the executive branch of the US government the 
responsibility to negotiate trade deals  which are then presented to Congress for approval in their 
entirety, preventing them from being picked apart on the floor of the House of Representatives or the 
Senate. TPA expired in 2007 and trade negotiations have been conducted as is if it were in place but it 
will have to be renewed before either TPP or TTIP can be presented to Congress. 
The Obama administration has faced an uphill battle to get Congress to agree to a renewal and at the 
time of writing this is still in active debate in the US Congress. In part, this difficulty in getting renewed 
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TPA is a reflection of the concerns regarding the specific trade deals in the pipeline. These proposed 
deals go beyond the conventional trade issues of tariff rates and product standards and extend into the 
areas of labour laws, environmental laws, Intellectual property (IP), state-owned enterprises and 
government procurement. 
From a European perspective it is worth noting that commentators in the US view TPP as the more 
controversial of the two prospective trade deals. Thus, while TTIP is the focus of this article, it is worth 
noting briefly the opposition to TPP. The negotiations for TPP have been shrouded in secrecy (an 
accusation that has also been levelled at TTIP) but there have been a number of leaks that indicate 
where  some  of  the  opposition  lies.    These  include  objections  to:  Hollywood  studies  that  wish  to 
extend copyright protection to the life of the author plus 70 years; pharmaceutical companies that want 
to make it harder to introduce generic versions of brand-name drugs; and international investors who 
want better ways to challenge alleged government expropriation of their investments (Timothy Lee, 
2015). As Paul Krugman has said on TPP: “(T)his is not a trade agreement. It’s about intellectual 
property and dispute settlement; the big beneficiaries are likely to be pharma companies and firms that 
want to sue governments.” (Paul Krugman, 2015). 
Given this damning assessment of TPP, does the same hold true for TTIP? One popular myth can be 
immediately disposed. The claims of secrecy levelled against TTIP are largely unsubstantiated. The 
European Commission maintains a comprehensive website on TTIP objectives and negotiations 
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/).  Hence, what  is  up  for  discussion  is  not  in  much 
doubt. The gains or losses from TTIP will arise from the specifics of the agreement. 
The remainder of this article will look at the current state-of–play as regards trade relations between the 
two economic giants, the prospects for further liberalisation and harmonisation, and the other aspects 
that might be included in a comprehensive trade deal.  
 
Table 1: Shares in world trade US, EU and TTIP (2013)  
Shares in world trade 2013 USA EU TTIP 
Goods trade 
   
Share of world exports 8.39% 25.19% 33.58% 
Share of world imports 12.33% 19.74% 32.07% 
Services trade 
   
Share of world exports 14.25% 15.33% 29.58% 
Share of world imports 9.85% 14.78% 24.63 
Source: WTO, stat.wto.org  
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Table 1 shows the importance of the US and the EU to the world economy. Collectively, the two 
contribute around one third of global trade in goods and around one quarter of trade in commercial 
services. 
Not surprisingly, both the US and EU are very important trading partners to each other, even before any 
bilateral agreement is reached. This is shown in Table 2. From the perspective of the USA, the EU is its 
2nd-most important source of  imports  and  destination  for  exports.  The  USA  is  the  most  important 
market for EU exports and is the EU’s 3rd largest source of imports.
 
Table 2: Bilateral goods trade, EU and US imports / exports, by rank and % share, 2013 
Bilateral goods trade 2013 Ranking Share 
Ranking as export destination 
  
EU exports for US  2 16.7% 
US exports for EU 1 16.4% 
Ranking as import origin 
  
EU imports for US  2 17.0% 
US imports for EU 3 11.6% 
Source: WTO, stat.wto.org  
 
III TTIP - Trade in Goods 
Given that the US and many of the constituent countries of the EU have engaged in every round of the 
GATT multilateral negotiations, their MFN tariffs have already been driven to low levels. Looking at the 
trade-weighted tariffs (averages based upon the volumes of trade in the products imported), the US 
imposes an average tariff of 2.1% and the corresponding average tariff of the EU is 2.6%. While the 
trading partners have good access to each other’s market, there is room for further bilateral trade 
liberalisation that could have important effects for producers and consumers.  The difficulty in looking at 
average tariffs is that they can mask high import taxes on individual products, so there may be some 
industries for which trade liberalisation under TTIP may have significant effects. 
For many sectors of the economy, TTIP will have no direct impact. Over half of the goods traded 
between the US and the EU are freely traded with no tariffs. This is the case for Scotland’s most famous 
export to the US, whisky. The US has an MFN tariff on whiskies of zero, so TTIP will not improve 
distillers’ market access. 
The tariffs are higher between the US and EU for some traditional manufactures. Both have high 
average  tariffs  on  Clothing:  the  US  charging  11.6%  and  the  EU  11.5%.  Consequently,  trade 
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liberalisation under TTIP could make a significant difference to textile companies in Scotland if they were 
granted preferential access to the market in the USA. 
Imports of cars into the US are subject to a tariff of 2.5%, while the EU’s tariff on cars is the significantly 
higher rate of 10%. While there is no longer any production of cars in Scotland, TTIP could have a 
beneficial effect on Scottish consumers if imports from the US were not subject to the EU’s MFN tariff on 
cars. 
Establishing a free-trade area between the EU and US should allow substantially all of their products to 
cross the Atlantic without customs duties. But this is not as straightforward as it sounds and the gains 
from further trade liberalisation may be muted. The issue is to identify where goods are actually 
manufactured. Modern production processes often involve extended global supply chains where 
production takes place in different countries using inputs from a wide range of international sources. 
Hence, what is the “nationality” of a car that is assembled in England by a Japanese manufacturer using 
parts are manufactured in plants located throughout Europe and the rest of the world? There are few 
modern  goods  that  could  claim  to  be  the  product  of  a  single  country  in  every  respect.  The 
globalisation of manufacturing means that EU products are likely to have inputs from countries outside 
its  28  member  nations  while  production  in  North  America  –  Canada,  the  US  and  Mexico  –  is 
heavily integrated through NAFTA. 
If no good can claim to be 100% from a single country, what proportion of its production has to take 
place within the borders of that country in order for it to be deemed to be a product of that nation? The 
EU and the US have to decide upon the minimum domestic content of a product that will allow them to 
treat the good preferentially, letting in imports from each other without charging the MFN tariff. These 
Rules of Origin (ROO) are quite contentious to negotiate and are expensive to monitor. Given the nature 
of  existing  trade  agreements,  all  goods  can  move  freely  across  the  internal  borders  of  the  EU 
regardless of origin, but this is not the case for trade amongst the member countries of NAFTA. Nor will 
it happen even if TTIP successfully eliminates all tariffs on the products of the US and the EU. Customs 
inspection will still be needed to ensure that traded goods meet the ROO and can enter freely or, if they 
do not, are subject to the appropriate MFN tariffs. 
In summary, eliminating the tariffs remaining between the EU and US will bring benefits to consumers 
but, given that the trade taxes are low to start with, the gains will likely be modest. 
IV          TTIP and trade in services 
The EU’s expressed goals for TTIP with respect to services trade is to ensure that EU firms are able to 
compete in the US on the same terms as US firms, while safeguarding public services. A successful 
agreement from the point of view of the EU would be one that improved access to the US market for EU 
businesses and professionals, achieving mutual recognition of some professional qualifications (such as 
for architects) and enhancing the ability of firms to get licences or formal approval to provide consultancy 
services (accountancy, legal, management consultancy, etc.). This will promote opportunities for suitably 
qualified professionals to enter new markets while ensuring that there is less contagion resulting from 
the activities of underqualified professionals, particularly in the light of the recent financial crisis. 
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Improving access in services is more controversial that liberalising trade in goods. The EU is adamant 
that TTIP will not involve any commitments with respect to the provision of services in sensitive areas, 
such as publicly-funded health, education, or social services. Nor will public authorities be forced to 
outsource public services that are currently produced in-house. Furthermore, EU member states will still 
be free to maintain any restrictions in film, television and radio to protect EU media production. This is 
the area where the details in the final draft treaty will be crucial in determining whether TTIP will bring 
benefits. TPP has already been condemned for promoting the interests of Hollywood to the detriment of 
local cultural industries and there are concerns that service providers in the US will be seeking to 
enhance their position in the EU through TTIP. 
V            TTIP and customs and trade facilitation 
The general goal of this is to streamline customs rules and controls to make exporting easier. This would 
save time and money for all exporters but might have greater impact on some sectors of the economy. 
The task is to avoid unnecessary technical differences between the two markets, which often involves 
determining when standards are actually the same. When they differ, finding commons standards will 
reduce firms’ costs in selling in foreign markets. There is, indeed, an aspiration that the standards that 
TTIP establishes will become the global norm, giving EU and US firms an advantage in global markets. 
The fear about deepening regulatory cooperation is that the lowest standards will prevail, resulting in a 
detrimental impact on consumers to the advantage of large corporations. Negotiators have tried to re- 
assure the public that EU restrictions on, for example, genetically modified crops and hormone-fed beef 
are not on the table. Once again, the final draft will reveal what compromises have been reached. 
Engineering goods account for around 25% of the bilateral trade volume between the US and the EU. 
This sector is characterised by big differences in technical regulations and the procedures used to check 
that products are in conformance with them. This is a particular problem given that the volumes of 
products traded are relatively small, meaning that the fixed costs of meeting another country’s standards 
can have a significant impact on the firms’ average costs of serving the market. Scottish companies, in 
particular, have a big presence in this sector and stand to benefit from successful negotiations that 
establish common standards on both sides of the Atlantic. 
VI          Issues facing SMEs 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are at a particular disadvantage in selling into foreign 
markets. These are firms that employ fewer than 250 staff but account for two-thirds of private-sector 
employment. However, their production levels are generally so small that even small trade costs or 
minor differentials in product standards can create insuperable hurdles to their ability to export. 
TTIP negotiations are attempting to address the problems of SMEs by making progress on removing 
remaining customs duties, simplifying the custom procedures, sorting out differences in technical 
standards, and improving the protection of firms’ intellectual property rights. 
One goal of the TTIP negotiations is to have the US provide a free, online helpdesk to small firms that 
addresses questions of doing business across the Atlantic. This may sound trivial, but it could be of 
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great significance to small firms that do not enjoy access to the consultants and advisors at the beck and 
call of larger firms (and would mirror a similar facility offered by the EU). 
VII         Conclusions 
Much of the proposed TTIP treaty is uncontroversial in promising to lower the remaining barriers to trade 
in goods and services that prevent consumers from benefitting from the variety of goods and services 
that are available on both sides of the Atlantic. We are looking at two of the world’s largest trading 
partners taking the opportunity to deepen their trading relationship and this should provide dividends to 
firms and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. It may even have knock-on effects and reinvigorate 
the multilateral negotiations within the WTO. 
For Scotland, TTIP has some clear implications. If successful, TTIP may create opportunities for the 
textile and  engineering sectors  by  way  of  reduced  clothing tariffs  and  an  agreement  on  common 
technical standards. Further trade liberalisation in services may have positive impacts for Scotland’s 
important  financial  services  sector,  while  any  decrease  in  red-tape  and  other  regulatory  burdens 
may  help more of Scotland’s SMEs to enter the US market. However, TTIP will have little or no impact 
on perhaps Scotland’s most iconic export, Scotch whisky, given that it already benefits in the US market 
from a zero-rated Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff. 
As noted, the caveats are largely in the realm of the non-traditional areas of trade agreements, where 
TTIP might be used to force the partners to accept standards or behaviours that are unpalatable to their 
citizens. However, the EU is clearly aware of these issues. The question remains as to whether EU 
negotiators are able to provide a sufficiently robust defence of European wishes and values.  
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Ageing, health status, and economic activity in 
Scotland: a twenty year view  
Robyn Millar, Sir Harry Burns, Alec Morton 
 
Abstract 
Countries worldwide face the economic and public expenditure challenges of an ageing population.  
However, ageing per se is but one part of the challenge. The forecast for Scotland’s population health 
and labour market status will further impact on the scale of required public spending – in health and 
social protection - as well as on the base of those who are economically active and capable of bearing 
the scale of such expenditure (by way of taxation). This analysis points to the value on the public 
expenditure side of early health, education and social protection interventions to reduce future forecast 
expenditure in health and social protection.  On the revenue raising side, it points to the need to expand 
Scotland’s future effective working age population by way of reducing those considered NEET, 
expanding female and post age 65/67 labour market participation, and of attracting new working age 
migrants to Scotland. 
I Introduction and background 
Scotland, like many countries worldwide, faces a future of dynamic demographic change (Scottish 
Government, 2010), amid recovery from economic crisis and the Great Recession. The latter has thrown 
into sharp relief the uncertainty over the future level – and nature - of public spending.  This is now an 
increasing matter of public concern and debate and it is becoming ever more important to analyse how 
and why public spending might change in the coming decades.  In this paper we survey some of the key 
variables which will drive future public spending levels in Scotland and discuss appropriate policy 
responses. 
 
Figure 1: Total Managed Expenditure 2012/2013 (Scottish Government, 2014b) 
 
Changes in the size and age structure of the population will have particularly important implications for 
economic growth performance, the demand for public services, and overall levels of public spending in 
coming years (Scottish Government, 2010). As such, the future size and age structure of the population 
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is an important perspective from which to consider future spending, and consequent areas for 
investment. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show that 51% of total managed expenditure in Scotland relates to social 
protection1 and health, at 34% and 17% respectively. In 2012/13 this accounted for £33,742 million out 
of a total managed expenditure of £65,206 million. With spending on education and training, these three 
areas account for nearly two-thirds of public expenditure in Scotland. Figure 2 shows changes in the top 
three areas of public spending from 2008/09 to 2012/13. Though all post-2008 increases, social 
protection increased over the period by 21.0%; health spending by 10.0%; and education and training, 
the smallest increase of the three, by only 1.6%. 
 
Table 1 Total Managed Expenditure 2008-09 - 2012-13 (Scottish Government, 2014b) 
(£ million nominal terms) 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
General public services 10582 10641 12220 12484 11624 
Other economic affairs 12533 12963 12589 12695 12189 
Health 10255 10679 10938 11046 11284 
Education and training 7528 7729 7651 7490 7651 
Social protection 18543 20076 20692 21159 22458 
 
 
Figure 2: Total Managed Expenditure 2008/09 - 2012/13 top three areas (Scottish Government, 
2014b) 
 
                                                        
1
 Social Protection accounts for both personal social services and social security while personal social services 
covers both social work and social care services (residential homes etc.).  Social security primarily covers cash 
benefits given to individuals (pensions; employment-related benefits) (Scottish Government, 2010) 
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There are three key variables that have a key influence on overall levels of such public spending; one, 
the number of those in receipt of social protection; two, the number of those in receipt of healthcare 
services; and, three the number of those in education and training. However all of these are impacted by 
demographic change including ageing as well as health status and economic (in) activity.  All three of 
these factors impact directly on Scotland’s top three spending areas noted above (SHARE, 2014; and 
European Commission, 2012).  
The implications for this in terms of the public finances can be captured in the following inequality: 
 
The logic of this expression is that the costs of ageing (social protection) and health status (health 
spending) plus the costs of economic inactivity (social protection and health) need to be less than, or 
equal to that which can be generated from those of working age able to support those dependent upon 
society 2  if budget balance is to be preserved. Hence, much hangs upon an economically active 
workforce to provide sufficient support – via taxation - for forthcoming demographic change (Allen, 
2011). In this paper we consider ageing, health status, and economic activity in terms of their economic 
consequences for future public spending in Scotland. 
II Economic consequences of demographic change 
 
Figure 3: Current and Projected Population Pyramids 2013 and 2035 (GRO, 2014) 
 
 
We now consider trends in ageing, health status, and economic activity and how these might impact 
upon potential future levels of public spending in Scotland.  
                                                        
2
 In this analysis we assume no changes / increases in taxation.   
ܥ݋ݏݐ஺௚௘௜௡௚ +  ܥ݋ݏݐு௘௔௟௧௛ ௦௧௔௧௨௦ +  ܥ݋ݏݐா௖௢௡௢௠௜௖ ூ௡௔௖௧௜௩௜௧௬ ൑  ܵݑݎ݌݈ݑݏ 
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We use trend-based forecasts as our primary method of analysis.  These forecasts are based solely on 
past trends and as such, do not include future policy interventions i.e. they do not take into account the 
future impacts of policy implemented during the given time frame. However, trend-based forecasts do 
allow us to envisage what might happen in the coming years in Scotland if things continue on their 
current trajectory.  
 
Overall Demographic Change 
Figure 3 illustrates the General Registry Office’s (2014) current and projected Scotland population levels 
per age cohort for 2013 and 2035. Over the period 2013 to 2035 Scotland is expected to see the 
following changes in population ; an 8% increase in population; and 0.47% increase in the working age 
population and a 37.4% increase in the 65+/67+ age population (refer to Table 1). 
 
Table 2: Population Change 2013 - 2035 (GRO, 2014) 
 Overall population Working-age (16-pensionable age) 65+(2013)/67+(2035) 
Year Level %change Level % 
change 
% of total 
population Level 
% 
change 
% total 
population 
2013 5,327,700 8.03% 3,469,159 0.47% 65.1% 946,862 37.4% 17.8% 
2035 5,755,558 3,485,596 60.6% 1,300,742 22.6% 
 
1. Ageing 
In any welfare state, increasing numbers of those of pensionable age, mean increasing expenditure 
required to fund the state pension system, and also indicates a lesser proportion of the population 
contributing to the economy in terms of tax revenues. In fact, the UK Department of Work and Pension 
(DWP (2014b) figures show that social security benefit3 expenditure per head in Scotland has increased 
steadily since 1996/97, especially expenditure per pensioner. 
Those of pensionable age are reliant upon society4  in this way to have their pensions paid, and do not 
contribute to tax revenue.  The extent of reliance can be measured by the dependency ratio: the ratio of 
those not in the labour force (dependents: <16 and those of pensionable age) to those typically in the 
labour force (working-age population) (Scottish Government, 2010). Although the dependency ratio also 
includes those <16, it can still be deemed representative of dependency due to ageing, as the proportion 
of total population <16 is not forecast to change greatly over the given time frame (2013 – 2035) (refer to 
Figure 4). 
Using General Registry Office (2014) projections, figure 4 also illustrates how we can expect the 
dependency in Scotland to change by Taking those of pensionable age in 2013 and 2035 to be 65+ and 
67+ respectively, we can see a dependency ratio of 54 ‘dependents’ per 100 working-age people in 
                                                        
3
 Social Security primarily covers cash benefits given to individuals (DWP, 2013). 
4
 The state pension is paid weekly by the UK government to all citizens of state pension age (HM Government, 2014) 
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2013 rising to 65 ‘dependents’ per 100 working-age people by 2035. This 17% increase in dependency 
can be considered as a conservative estimate given the assumptions implicit in constructing the 
dependency ratio 5 .  Nevertheless, it serves to highlight the magnitude of changes in dependency 
Scotland might expect. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Total Population/Age Cohort 2013 and 2035 (GRO, 2014) 
 
2. Health Status 
The health of the population also indicates how dependent people might become upon society, in terms 
of the health care needs and utilisation, their call on social security benefits2, and on their ability to 
remain economically active over a longer period.  
Self-reported health is used to measure how the health of Scotland’s population might develop. There 
are criticisms of this measure that state that it does not reflect actual health; however much literature 
supports the measure’s validity6. Moreover, self-reported health is a commonly used measure among 
international studies of demographic change and ageing (SHARE; and the European Commission).  
The Scottish Health Survey results from 2003 to 2013 provide the data upon which to conduct a trend-
based forecast. Use of the logit function allows us to rate health status as good, fair and bad health and 
to forecast it by gender and age cohort. As such, we can formulate the population pyramids set out in 
Figure 5. 
The data (refer to Table 3)  shows that although the overall percentage of the population in fair or bad 
health increases only slightly in the 2035 estimates, by 0.9 percentage points, distribution of fair or bad 
                                                        
5
 Scottish Government (2010) and Spijker and MacInnes (2013) state that the dependency ratio takes no account of 
labour market or education participation rates. Börsch-6XSDQ&KáRĔ-'RPLĔF]DNDQG6NLUEHNNQRWHWKDWWKH
ratio assume all those above pensionable age are economically inactive. 
6
 Miilunpalo et al. (1997) found a strong and nearly linear relationship between self-rated health status and the use of 
physicians during the year following the survey. Self-reported health is inherently subjective and contextual; however 
Jylha (2009) states that the basis of self-reported health lies in the biological and physiological state of the individual 
organism. 
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health does change somewhat. In 2035, we see a greater proportion of elderly age cohorts in fair- or bad 
health, with less fair or bad health in the working-age population. The net result is an increase in 
dependency due to an increasing ageing population suffering from ill-health, and hence placing greater 
demands on health care services and social care. Figure 3 and Figure 4 highlight that this might follow 
from a change in the population mix (i.e. an increase in the number of ‘old old’7). 
 
Figure 5: Scottish population pyramids, based on self-reported health for 2013 and 2035 
(Scottish Health Survey, 2003- 2013) 
 
 
Table 3: Forecasted changes in good, fair, and bad health 2013 and 2035 (Scottish Health Survey, 
2003-2013) 
Measure 2013 2035 
  Good Fair/Bad Good Fair/Bad 
% population 16+ 73.8% 26.4% 73.5% 27.3% 
% population 16+ of working-age 61.8% 17.0% 56.5% 13.8% 
% population 16+, 65+ 12.1% 9.4% 17.1% 13.5% 
Figures may not add due to rounding 
Source:  based on Scottish Health Survey results, 2003-2013 
 
 
                                                        
7
 This paper defines an increase in ‘old old’ as increases in the numbers of those aged 75+ 
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3. Economic Activity 
Population growth, particularly increases in the working-age population, is a key supply side driver of 
GDP growth, along with labour market participation and productivity (Scottish Government, 2010). 
Lisenkova et al. (2010) note the economic impact of the working-age cohort as a decreasing proportion 
of total population (expected case in 2035 – see Figure 4). As such, a shrinking number of the 
economically active working-age will have to support a growing number of economically dependent 
people (SHARE, 2014), not only in terms of state pension, but also in terms of public service demands.  
 
Figure 6: Economic activity vs economic inactivity 2013 and 2035 (Scottish Government, 2014a) 
 
Hence, we need to consider the levels of economic inactivity which can be expected over the next 
twenty years, both in terms of those of pensionable age, but also those considered economically inactive 
within the working-age population itself. The same trend-based forecasting methods are used to 
formulate the population pyramids for economic in/activity8 in Figure 6 
As for between males and females (aged 16+) overall levels of economic inactivity  (including 
unemployment rates) are higher for females – and may reflect the fact that informal care is not classified 
as formal economic activity – and that the impact of this continues throughout the working age life 
course.  
                                                        
8
 Data on economic inactivity and employment rates is available on a national basis; however, some rates are not 
available disaggregated by age cohort. This makes graphical representation within the population pyramid difficult – 
the pyramids in this instance do not account for differing levels of economic activity at different ages. This is dealt with 
separately, as it does in fact have important economic implications. 
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The only available labour market data disaggregated by age are employment rates. Employment rates 
from 2004 – 2013 (Scottish Government, 2014a) show the three age cohorts displaying potential 
decreases in employment rates are: 16-24; 25-34; and 35-49, with the 16-24 cohort seeing by far the 
largest decreases. Projecting these trends forward shows that by 2035, the 16-24 age group would have 
the same employment rate as the 65+ age cohorts.  A caveat concerning this forecast is that in doing so 
this extrapolation carries forward the labour market effects of employment rates that have been 
significantly impacted by post-2008 financial / Great Recession. 
 
Table 4 Economic activity vs economic inactivity 2013 and 2035 (Scottish Government, 2014a) 
Measure  Year Male Female Overall 
Employment Rate 
2013 75% 68% 71% 
2035 61% 63% 63% 
Unemployment Rate 
2013 4% 4% 8% 
2035 10% 10% 21% 
Economic Inactivity 
2013 18% 28% 23% 
2035 21% 26% 24% 
 
 
Figure 7: Employment rate forecasts by age cohort (Scottish Government, 2004-2014) 
 
Taking the trend among the 16-24 cohort, we can disaggregate economic inactivity further to account for 
those who are so-called ‘NEET’ (not in education, employment, or training)(refer to Figure 8). Much of 
the NEET literature focus on the lifetime economic impact of being NEET at a young age (Coles et al., 
2011; Scott, et al., 2001; and Eurofound, 2012). In fact, being NEET at 16-19, has lifetime impacts for 
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both the individual and for society, in terms of the cost of economic inactivity over long periods, and in 
terms of their own health and well-being. Trend-based forecasts of those considered NEET in Scotland 
(16-19) are given in Table 5 (though it should be noted that there is a lot of volatility in the data). 
 
Figure 8: NEET population in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014a) 
 
 
Table 5: Levels and rates of NEET 2013 and forecasted 2035 (Scottish Government, 2014a) 
 
Despite a decreasing number of those aged 16-19, trend-based forecasts9 estimate an increase in the 
absolute numbers of those who are considered NEET.  
At 0.5% and 0.9% of total population in 2013 and 2035 respectively, the NEET group, although 
proportionally extremely small, is an easily identified group and represent a challenge both for future 
economic activity levels (and hence tax / revenue raising potential) and from a service utilisation / public 
expenditure perspective, given the known lifetime health and wellbeing impacts of being NEET at such 
formative stages in one’s adult life.  
 
 
                                                        
9
 A drawback of these forecasts comes from the volatility surrounding past rates of NEET (Scottish Government, 
2014a) 
Year % of 16-19 NEET Total 16-19 Level NEET 
2013 11.9% 255920 30454 
2035 19.9% 248771 49520 
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III Conclusions 
Scotland faces a future of dynamic demographic change which, as the literature shows, has a wide 
range of economic, health and public expenditure consequences. We have used trend-based forecasts 
to allow us to analyse Scotland’s future demography, with particular focus on those trends that have a 
notable economic and public spending impacts. Although trend-based forecasts take no account of any 
planned policy or economic changes, they do present a picture of how things might be in the future if 
present trends continue and if nothing were to change. 
As noted, the top three areas of public spending in Scotland are social protection, health and education 
and training – and all these areas are impacted by key known demographic trends that will have 
significant economic impact for Scotland into the future: ageing, health status and economic activity. For 
the system to remain in financial balance, the costs associated with ageing, health status and economic 
inactivity must be less than or equal to that which need be generated via the economically active, to 
support those dependent upon society. 
 
Our analysis shows a systemic increase in dependency due to increasing numbers of ‘old old’10, both 
through state pension/social protection recipients and prevalence of ill-health among the elderly. 
Although overall levels of fair or bad health do not increase much, the prevalence of chronic disease due 
to ageing will heighten the pressure and demand on public services. 
We also anticipate, given present trends, that there will be an increase in economic inactivity, particularly 
among the youngest age cohorts, the ‘cost’ of which can therefore be anticipated to rise – both in terms 
of foregone lifetime earnings (and tax revenues) but also the health and wellbeing impacts which will 
raise their demand for health and social protection of the youngest age cohorts across their life-course. 
“Our economic future depends on providing the tools for upward mobility, and building a highly 
educated, skilled workforce” Heckman (2012) – picking up the costs of those, say NEET and 
economically inactive, can have long-term costs spanning the life-course, as opposed to investing to 
prevent those individuals realising such states in the first place.  
Changes in Scotland’s forecast demography have significant impacts on future public spending in 
Scotland (as well as impacts of foregone tax revenue due to labour market inactivity). If Scotland wishes 
to remain a welfare state, caring for those most in need, policy must engineer a sustainable financial 
balance. This paper concludes that to generate sufficient surplus to cope with forthcoming demographic 
change, policy in Scotland needs to be targeted in order to ensure that the working-age population (and 
beyond) is economically active, skilled, healthy, and sufficiently supported to cope with the impacts of 
known forthcoming demographic change.  
Policy Options 
I.   Increase economic activity amongst the working age population (as well as amongst those of 
pensionable age) 
                                                        
10
 This paper defines an increase in ‘old old’ as increases in the numbers of those aged 75+ 
ܥ݋ݏݐ஺௚௘௜௡௚ +  ܥ݋ݏݐு௘௔௟௧௛ ௦௧௔௧௨௦ +  ܥ݋ݏݐா௖௢௡௢௠௜௖ ூ௡௔௖௧௜௩௜௧௬ ൑  ܵݑݎ݌݈ݑݏ 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(1)  Policy section  
June 2015 82 
a. Increase in retirement age – increase economically active as a proportion of total 
population (as demonstrated by dependency ratio). 
b. Investment in education and learning (particularly in early and formative years of life) 
to prevent realisation of NEET states. 
c. Increases in immigration levels (Lisenkova et al., 2010) to sustain such large 
increases in ‘old old’ and subsequent dependency. 
II. Decrease future demands for health care services and social protection 
a. Finding new models to provide cost effective care for ‘old old’ due to prevalence of 
chronic illness. As the analysis shows, relatively small numbers of ‘old old’ consider 
themselves to be in poor health – so there is no reason to suppose that people in this 
life stage cannot have a rich a fulfilling quality of life. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I – Key assumptions and clarifications with regard to sources of data and their respective data sets 
Demographic Trend Assumption/clarification 
Dependency Ratio 2013 – working age population 16-64 
2035 – working age population 16-66 (planned changes in retirement age) 
Dependents – those <16; and 65+/67+ 
Assumes those <16 and of pensionable age are economically inactive 
Assumes those of working age are economically active 
Self-Reported Health Scottish Health Survey: covers health of those 16+; living in private households (might not represent 
reality); in 2012/2013, 4815 adults took part in the survey; monitors trends in population health over time.  
Assumes those stating bad/fair health will require some form of health care expenditure, and are therefore 
dependent in that way 
Self-reported health accounts for only those 16+ as the Scottish Health Survey cover age cohorts 16+ 
Scottish Health Survey officially published every 5 years therefore forecasts are made for the time frame 
2033-37, but applied to 2035 population estimates 
Some rates are given for larger age bands than 5 year cohorts so when this is the case, this paper 
analyses the proportion in the smaller age cohort and applies it to the overall number of people the rate 
applies to. 
Self-reported health is subjective however this paper only illustrates health using this measure as a proxy 
– it is realised that this is not fully representative. 
Economic Activity Annual Population Survey: covers the year ending 31 December 2013; it combines results from Labour 
Force Survey; primary source of information on local labour markets providing headline estimates on 
employment, unemployment and economic activity; largest annual household survey in Scotland 
2013 – working age population 16-64 
2035 – working age population 16-66  
2013 – average age of retirement 65 (AGE UK, 2014) 
2035 – average age of retirement 67 (AGE, UK, 2014) 
Forecasts allows rates to be projected for cohorts up to 60-64; in 2035 estimate, those 65-66 are assumed 
the same employment rates as those 60-64 
Those classified by Annual Population Survey results as Unemployed/Economically Inactive are all 
considered economically inactive in the case of this paper as, at that specific point in time, the people in 
question present a cost in terms of public spending (social security). 
Not all employment based rates are given by age cohort and therefore cannot be aggregated in this 
respect. In this case, the same rate is applied to all age cohorts. It is deemed too unreliable to 
change/manipulate this data. 
Overall Projections are trend based, not policy forecasts and therefore do not take account of policy change; and 
also ignore any economic upturns etc. Uncertainty and inaccuracy in this respect hampers analysis 
As population projections are trend-based and not policy forecasts, the reliability of projections decreases 
over time, since the process of change is cumulative (General Registry Office, 2014) i.e. if new policies 
are introduced, they may result in the original projections not being realised; a key justification for the 
relatively short time horizon that this paper adopts. 
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Scotland’s labour market: ‘job polarisation’ and inclusive 
growth 
 
Gail Rogers and Kenny Richmond, Scottish Enterprise 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of ‘job polarisation’, or the ‘hollowing-out’ of the labour market, is well documented across 
many advanced economies1. Job polarisation is the process by which the shares of total employment accounted 
for by both high skill/high wage (and non-routine cognitive/interactive) and low skill/low wage (or non-routine, 
non-skilled) jobs have expanded relative to that of middle-ranked jobs. Job polarisation is seen to be a major 
factor in rising household income inequality.   
 
This paper focuses on Scotland’s changing labour market, and in particular on recent trends in occupational 
structure and the impact these are having on job polarisation and on particular occupational groups, such as 
administration and lower skilled production. The paper also considers future labour market trends, and 
discusses potential approaches to address the negative impacts of jobs polarisation. 
 
2. Scotland’s changing labour market 
 
To measure job polarisation, the methodology used in this paper (and commonly used in other research) is to 
rank occupations by their weekly median wage in a base year, and to then divide these into ten deciles, where 
decile 1 is the 10% of occupations paying the lowest median wage and decile 10 the highest. Changes in the 
number of jobs per occupation over time are then measured. 
 
Figure 1 shows that over the 2001 to 20102 period the number of jobs in Scotland in medium skilled/medium paid 
occupations declined (by -62,500), and the number in both the lower (+46,000) and higher skilled (+118,500) 
occupation deciles increased, leading to a more polarised labour market (see Appendix One for a list of 
occupations in each decile). Jobs polarisation was evident in the period prior to the recession (2001 to 2008), so 
the downturn did not significantly impact the overall trend.  
 
In terms of share of total employment, the proportion of all jobs in the middle deciles (deciles 3 – 6) declined by 4 
percentage points, the proportion in the top three deciles rising by 3 percentage points and that in the lowest two 
deciles falling by 1 percentage point (Table 1). 
 
While this pattern of job polarisation has been found throughout Europe, the growth in the number of lower skilled 
/lower paid service jobs has been greater in the UK than in many other European countries3.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 
1
 See for example Are Middle-Paid Jobs in OECD Countries Disappearing?  An Overview, ILO Working paper (2010) and the 
EU’s Employment polarisation and job quality in the crisis, EU (2013) 
2
 Data for later years is based on a different occupational structure and so cannot be used to show long-term trends 
3
 Hollowing out and the future of the labour market, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (2013)  
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Figure 1: Job polarisation in Scotland, 2001-20104 
 
Source: Stirling University (Annual Survey of Household Earnings and Labour Force Survey). Based on SOC 2000 
classifications.    See Appendix 3 for figure data 
 
 
Table 1: Proportion of jobs in Scotland by Occupation Decile (ranked by wage) 
 
Deciles 1-2 Deciles 3-6 Deciles 7-10 
2001 30% 37% 33% 
2010 31% 33% 36% 
Percentage point change  +1  -4 +3 
 
Source: Stirling University (Annual Survey of Household Earnings and Labour Force Survey). Based on SOC 2000 
Classifications. 
 
Data from 2011 onwards is classified under a different occupational structure and cannot be directly compared 
with data from 2001-10. Over the period 2011-2014 (Figure 2), the number of jobs rose across all deciles, but the 
rises were highest in deciles 1 and 2 and in deciles 8 to 10 (see Appendix Two for a list of occupations in each 
decile). This suggests that the trend of job polarisation has continued in the post recession years. 
 
 
Figure 2: Job polarisation in Scotland, 2011-2014 
 
Source: Stirling University (Annual Survey of Household Earnings and Labour Force Survey). Based on SOC 2010. 
See Appendix 3 for figure data 
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It is important to note that that although intermediate jobs (ranked by wage) are declining in number, they are not 
disappearing completely. Large numbers of intermediate-level jobs remain (there were 1 million such jobs in 
deciles 3 to 7 in 2014) and, due to replacement demand (e.g. as people retire or move occupation), significant 
numbers of job openings / opportunities will still be available. However, the challenge is that, relative to higher 
and lower skilled occupations, the proportion of all jobs in intermediate level occupations is declining.  
 
This changing labour market structure, in terms of employment share and numbers, has contributed to growing 
household income inequality over the 2000s (prior to the recession)5. In addition, the characteristics of jobs in 
lower paid occupations are also a cause of rising inequality. Lower paid occupations tend to have a higher 
proportion of part-time workers and self-employment (especially in elementary, sales and customer services 
occupations), and a higher proportion of workers on zero hours contracts (especially cleaners, care workers and 
call centre/customer services workers plus those in accommodation and food occupations)6.  
 
3. The causes of jobs polarisation? 
 
The most frequently cited reason for the hollowing-out of the labour market is technological change. The Scottish 
Government’s latest Economic Strategy (SES, 2015) notes that technological change has been ‘one factor which 
has changed the composition of the labour market. The process where labour is substituted for technology in 
many countries, including Scotland has tended to impact on semi-skilled jobs that are medium-paid. This has 
resulted in the share of people employed in high-paid and low-paid jobs increasing relative to those in medium-
paid jobs, creating ‘job polarisation’7. SES also highlights that jobs polarisation has been one of the main factors 
driving income inequality across countries. 
 
Technological advances and the falling cost of computing power has led to technology replacing jobs involving 
routine tasks that can be easily ‘programmed’ or automated, such as administrative and production jobs. These 
jobs are often found in the middle of the job distribution, when ranked by wages (see Appendices 1 and 2).  
  
The changing characteristics of jobs are also a cause of polarisation. In a majority of OECD countries, the 
number of ‘standard jobs’ (defined as full time and permanent) has declined in the occupations in the mid-
occupation deciles (in terms of wage), while non-standard jobs (defined as either part-time, self employed or 
temporary) have contributed to an increase in jobs at both ends of the occupational distribution. Scotland has 
experienced a significant increase in the number of people self-employed in recent years8 (an increase of 83,000 
between 2000 and 2014, 88% of the total growth in employment)9. 
 
A further cause of job polarisation is ‘offshoring’, whereby firms take advantage of lower labour costs in other 
countries to ‘offshore’ part of their production process or service provision to cheaper locations. The most likely 
jobs to be offshored are lower skilled technical production jobs or administrative tasks (for example, customer call 
centres) – again activities that tend to be mid-paid occupations.  
 
 
                                                        
5
 Gini co-efficient in Scotland, Scottish Government 
6
 Zero Hours Contracts: Myth and Reality, CIPD (2013) and Analysis of Employee Contracts that do not Guarantee a Minimum 
Number of Hours, ONS (2015) 
7
 Scotland’s Economic Strategy, Scottish Government (2015) 
8
 In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD (2015) 
9
 Businesses in Scotland, Scottish Government, Time Series 1 
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4. Does jobs polarisation disproportionately affect particular groups? 
 
Young people 
 
Recent research at the UK10 level has considered the effects of job polarisation on young workers (and its 
findings are broadly consistent with the data for Scotland11). Data shows that lower paid occupations tend to 
have a higher proportion of young workers, for example over 20% of those employed in occupations in the lowest 
earnings decile were aged 16-24, compared to 2.2% of occupations in the highest paid decile.  
 
This highlights a key difficulty for young people. Most enter the labour market in fairly low-paying occupations, 
where there has been a modest growth in employment. They may then aspire to move into better paying 
occupations but the ‘bridge’ between lower-level and higher-level jobs is disappearing, as the number of jobs in 
the middle wage occupations falls. So the chances to make that transition are becoming harder.  The research’s 
authors conclude that young people ‘face an increasingly polarised labour market’.  
 
According the Employer Skills Survey 201312 the main obstacle to young people in Scotland getting new jobs and 
progressing into higher paid jobs is competition in the market place rather than perceptions that young applicants 
do not have the capability to perform in the job role. Where the choice not to recruit a young applicant was due to 
the young person not having the capabilities to do the job, the main things lacking were skills (65% of applicants) 
and experience (73% of applicants), and sometimes both (55% of applicants).  This is also reflected in the 
Employers Perspective Survey13 for Scotland in 2014 which identified relevant work experience as the most 
important factor in the recruitment of young people, with 66% of employers rating it as significant or critical.  
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of jobs in occupation deciles taken by 16-24 Year Olds (UK, 2008) 
 
Source: “What should be done about rising unemployment in the UK?”  
Note: Scottish trends likely to be very similar  
 
These surveys highlight the important role that work experience (and ‘world of work’ skills) play, along with 
relevant skills, in helping young people transition into work, and transition between jobs/occupations. The 
                                                        
10
 What should be done about rising unemployment in the UK? David N.F. Bell and David G. Blanchflower (2009) 
11
 Inequality in Scotland: New Perspectives, David Bell, David Eiser and Michael McGoldrick (2014) 
12
 UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013 Scotland , UKCES (2013)  
13
 Employer Perspective Survey 2014, UKCES (2014) 
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Employer Perspective Survey also found that although employers are increasingly looking for work experience 
when recruiting young people, most do not offer such work placements themselves. This highlights the challenge 
that young people may struggle to get jobs without work experience, but cannot develop work experience without 
access to jobs or work placements to help build up evidence of work experience.  
 
However, it is likely that the situation is different for qualified young people, especially graduates, who are more 
likely to enter employment towards the higher skilled/higher wage end of the occupation spectrum.   
 
Women 
 
Analysis by the University of Stirling14 shows a substantial decrease for the period 1984-2013 in the number of 
people who choose to stay at home, primarily to look after children. The report assumes that this relates mainly 
to women, and that many of the new entrants to the labour market over the past twenty years are women who 
may, through choice, be working part-time. As part-time jobs are more likely to be in lower wage, lower skilled 
occupations, this may result in women being more prevalent at the lower wage jobs end of the spectrum, with 
opportunities for progression to higher paid occupations limited. 
 
The Joseph Rowantree Foundation report Future of the UK Labour Market also identifies women as the group 
most likely to experience low pay and to find themselves stuck in low-paying occupations15. Part of the reason for 
this lies in the industries in which they work, for example in hospitality and food service, retail and customer 
services, all of which have a high proportion of lower skilled/paid occupations.  
 
 
Figure 4: Male / Female employment by broad occupation 2014 (%) 
 
Source: NOMIS, Annual Population Survey. (LWLS = lower wage, lower skilled; HWHS = higher wage, higher skilled) 
 
The latest data from the Annual Population Survey suggests that women make up the significant majority of 
employment in Sales & Customer Service (66%), Caring & Leisure (80%) and Admin & Secretarial (79%) 
                                                        
14
 Inequality in Scotland: New Perspectives, David Bell, David Eiser and Michael McGoldrick (2014) 
15
 Future of the UK Labour Market, Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2014) 
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occupations. In the higher skilled occupations, women do have a slight majority in Professional Occupations 
(53%) and a slight minority in Associate Professional & Technical occupations; however they are a significant 
minority in Managers, Directors and Senior Official occupations. 
 
This suggests that women are more predominantly employed in a number of middle ranked occupations which 
are forecast to decline in number in the future, as discussed in Section 5.  
 
4. Potential impact of job polarisation on worker mobility 
 
The Work Foundation’s research paper The Hourglass and the Escalator16 notes that one of the potentially 
damaging aspects of growing polarisation in the labour market is that it may create additional barriers to earnings 
mobility, as a high proportion of people stay in low wage/low skilled jobs. Estimates from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) suggest that around a third of those in the bottom ten per cent of earners in Britain in 
2001/02 were still there in 2008/9, and that more than 60% remained in the bottom three deciles of earnings. The 
BHPS also shows that women and those with no qualifications were significantly more likely to remain stuck at 
the bottom of the earnings distribution (although those with no qualifications may be likely to remain there even if 
there were more medium skilled jobs).  While there are fears that growing polarisation in the labour market may 
create even more barriers to occupational mobility as there are fewer jobs in mid-paid occupations, there has 
been no specific research undertaken on this key question. 
 
However, research by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKES) highlights that progression is more 
likely in low-and semi-skilled occupations in some sectors than compared to others. In particular, progression is 
more likely in construction, manufacturing, transportation and health service sectors, but less likely in lower-
paying service sectors17. This may reflect a greater culture of training, such as the use of apprenticeships and the 
need for continuous professional development, in these sectors. The report also notes that workers in elementary 
occupations are significantly less likely to receive workplace training, further decreasing the ability to progress.  
The Hollowing out and the future of the labour market report18 also suggests that the large fall in the number of 
jobs in certain types of intermediate skilled/wage occupations, particularly in skilled production, has implications 
for worker mobility.  Although the report did not find any research that has explicitly studied the effect that labour 
market hollowing-out has had on the probability of progression from low-level jobs, the researchers argue that 
progression within a firm to higher paid jobs, or progression within ‘occupational types’ in an industry (e.g. from 
elementary process/plant occupations to higher skilled plant & machine operatives) requires continued job 
tenure. However, a key feature of low-wage jobs is short tenure and high employee turnover. Rather than 
progression to higher occupation levels, the most frequent change in job status for those in low-pay jobs is 
movement into unemployment, as part of a ‘low-pay-no-pay cycle’. Such insecurity reduces the opportunity to 
acquire skills and experience or the likelihood of receiving training, all of which further reduce the chances of 
future progression into higher paid jobs. The authors argue that the characteristics of the firm are also relevant, 
with progression more likely in larger companies than in SMEs.  
 
However, another perspective is that the growth in higher paid occupations may offer more opportunities for 
those in mid-ranked occupations to progress, for example from mid-management to senior management, or from 
science technician to science professional. 
 
                                                        
16
 The Hourglass and the Escalator - Labour market change and mobility, The Work Foundation (2011) 
17
 The Role of Skills from Worklessness to Sustainable Employment with Progression, UKCES (2011) 
18
 Hollowing out and the future of the labour market, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (2013) 
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5. Will job polarisation continue? 
 
Research by UKCES19 has assessed employment and occupation prospects over a ten year horizon, 2012 to 
2022. Data is available to forecast net change in employment and ‘replacement demand’, and the occupation 
analysis is based on skill levels rather than wage levels. In Scotland, for the period up until 2022, key forecast 
trends are: 
 
x Jobs growth in each of the highest skilled (and so highest paid) occupations (manager, professionals and 
associate professional/technicians)  
x A decline in the number of jobs in some of the more intermediate skilled  occupations, such as skilled 
trades, process & plant operatives and admin/secretarial  
x A fall in the number of jobs in some lower skilled occupations (elementary and sales/customer services) 
with a rise in others (e.g. caring, leisure and other services occupations where jobs increases are 
expected). 
 
Figure 5: Forecast employment change by occupation in Scotland, 2012-2022 
 
 
Source: UKES (LWLS = lower wage, lower skilled; HWHS = higher wage, higher skilled) 
See Appendix 3 for figure data 
 
Figure 5 suggests that the trend in recent years of a decline in the number of medium-skilled and waged jobs, 
and a rise in the number of higher skilled and waged jobs, is likely to continue. However, the projections also 
suggest that the number of jobs in some of the lower skilled/lower paid occupations, such as elementary 
occupations and sales/retail, will also fall.  
 
As highlighted earlier, although the number of jobs in the more intermediate skilled and paid occupations is 
expected to decline, replacement demand will mean that there will still be job openings / opportunities for these 
types of job. 
                                                        
19
 Working Futures 2012-2022 and Scotland Report, UKCES (2014) 
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In terms of Scotland’s overall occupational structure, the percentage share of the three highest skilled/paid 
occupations is expected to rise by 5 percentage points (to 45%), to fall by 5 percentage points (to 26%) for the 
intermediate skilled/paid occupations, and remain stable (at 29%) for the lower skilled/paid occupations. 
 
Therefore, future projections suggest continued job polarisation in Scotland’s labour market. 
 
Figure 6: Scotland’s changing employment structure, 2012-2022 
 
Source: UKES (LWLS = lower wage, lower skilled; HWHS = higher wage, higher skilled) 
 
6. Growth sectors and job polarisation 
 
In-depth data on the breakdown of occupations by sector is not currently publicly available for Scotland, but 
information has been published for England and Wales based on the 2011 Census, and it is assumed that the 
pattern will be very similar for Scotland.  
 
In Table 2 below, the proportion of growth sector20 employment by low / medium / high skill occupational group is 
shown with low defined as 0-10% of sector occupations, medium as 11-20% of sector occupations and high as 
21% plus. Those occupations where job numbers are expected to decline in Scotland up to 2022, and that 
account for 11% or more of a sector’s overall employment, are highlighted. In additional to the Growth Sectors, 
retail has also been included as an example of a locally-traded sector that is highlighted in Scotland’s Economic 
Strategy as an emerging policy focus.  
 
The data suggests that sectors most likely to be negatively affected by future changes in Scotland’s occupational 
structure are Food & Drink, Tourism, Energy, Textiles, Engineering and retail, all of which have higher 
proportions of occupations that are expected to decline in numbers up to 2022 (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Estimated percentage occupational split, by growth sector 
 
  < Lower wage/lower skilled                                                                          Higher wage/higher skilled >  
  
Elementary  
 
Sales and 
customer 
service  
Caring, 
leisure 
and other 
service  
Process, 
plant and 
machine 
operators 
 Skilled 
trades  
Admin & 
secretarial  
Associate 
professional 
& technical  
Profess-
ional  
Managers 
directors 
and senior 
officials 
Chemicals Low Low Low Med Low Low Med Med Med 
Construction Low Low Low Low High Low Low Low Med 
Creative Industries Low Low Low Low Low Low High High Med 
Energy  Med Low Low Med Med Low Med Med Med 
Financial Services Low Low Low Low Low High High High Med 
Food & Drink Med Low Low High High Low Low Low Med 
Life sciences Low Low Low Low Low Low Med High Med 
Engineering Low Low Low Med Med Low Med High Med 
Textiles Low Low Low High High Low Low Low Med 
Tourism High Low Low Low Med Low Med Low Med 
    
 
     Retail Low High Low Low Low Low Low Low Med 
 
Note: Occupations within each sector Low = 0-10% of total sector jobs in the occupation, Med = 11-20%, High = 21+%  
This table shows occupational categories rather than wage level deciles. It assumes that wages and skills rise from LWLS at 
Elementary to HWHS for Managers, Directors & Senior Officials 
Source: NOMIS Census data 2011, England & Wales 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the changing nature of Scotland’s contemporary labour 
market.  
 
The number of jobs in both the lower skilled/paid and higher skilled/paid occupations has risen, and the number 
in the intermediate skilled/paid occupations has fallen, contributing to jobs polarisation and to growing income 
inequality, and negatively affecting specific groups such as young people and women. These trends have been 
driven by global technological changes, and so affect many other advanced economies. Labour market 
projections for Scotland suggest these trends will continue, and are likely to impact on a number of Scotland’s 
Growth Sectors. 
 
Job polarisation appears to have a disproportionate effect on already disadvantaged groups – specifically young 
people and women as they tend to make up a higher proportion of workers in low wage, low skill occupations. It 
also has implications for potential career progression for those in lower paid occupations, due to the decline of 
mid-range occupations (although there may be increasing opportunities for those in mid-range occupations to 
progress into higher ones). 
 
The UKCES report Growth Through People: Evidence and Analysis highlights that improving workplace 
productivity should be recognised as the key route to increasing pay and prosperity21.  
                                                        
21
 Growth Through People: Evidence and Analysis, UKCES (2014) 
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Workplace innovation is a key driver of improved workplace practices and productivity, and BIS research has 
shown that workplaces with ‘very satisfied’ employees have higher labour productivity, higher quality of output, 
and higher overall performance22. There is a significant amount of evidence to support the argument that job 
design (‘good jobs’), employee health, and an employee’s ability to perform productively at work, are closely 
linked 23 .  However, data suggests that only 12% of Scottish employers are ‘higher performance working’ 
employers (defined as ‘a general approach to managing organisations that aims to stimulate more effective 
employee involvement and commitment in order to achieve high levels of performance), the same proportion as 
the UK as a whole24. This suggests that there is very considerable scope to increase the number of employers in 
Scotland adopting high performance working practices that in turn could boost productivity levels and increase 
wage levels.  
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Appendix One: Standard Occupation Classifications 2000 
 
Decile 1 Decile2  Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9  Decile 10 
housekeeping  elementary 
construction  
personal services   plant and machine 
operatives 
construction 
operatives 
librarians and 
related 
professional 
public service and 
other assoc 
professions 
managers in other 
service industries 
transport associate 
professionals 
corporate 
managers & senior 
officials 
food preparation 
trades 
customer service  administrative : 
records 
administrative: 
government & 
relate 
construction trades mangers in 
farming, 
horticulture, 
forestry etc 
conservation 
associate 
professional 
therapists production 
managers 
legal professionals 
childcare & related 
personal services 
transport drivers 
and operatives 
textiles and 
garment trades 
building trades printing trades electrical trades artistic and literary  protective service  business & finance 
assoc 
professionals 
health 
professionals 
elementary security  elementary goods 
storage occupation 
administrative : 
general 
administrative: 
communications 
sports and fitness  science and 
engineering 
technicians 
health associate 
professionals 
IT service delivery  engineering 
professionals 
protective service 
officers 
hairdressers and 
related occupation 
agricultural trades mobile machine 
drivers & 
operatives 
process operatives metal forming, 
welding and related 
metal machining, 
fitting, instrument 
mkrs 
sales & related 
assoc 
professionals 
media associate 
professionals 
financial institution 
and office manager 
functional 
managers 
sales assistants 
and retail cashier 
healthcare & 
related personal 
service 
assemblers and 
routine operatives 
elementary 
administration  
vehicle trades managers in distrib, 
storage and retail 
design associate 
professionals 
research 
professionals 
quality and 
customer care 
managers 
business & 
statistical 
professional 
elementary sales  elementary process 
plant occupation 
animal care 
services 
skilled trades n.e.c sales related  social welfare 
assoc 
professionals 
public service 
professionals 
health and social 
services managers 
architects, town 
planners, surveyor 
teaching 
professionals 
elementary 
cleaning  
elementary 
agricultural  
leisure & travel 
service occupation 
secretarial and 
related  
administrative : 
finance 
managers in 
hospitality and 
leisure 
draughtspersons & 
building inspectors 
legal associate 
professionals 
science 
professionals 
info & 
communication 
technology 
elementary 
personal service  
         
 
Occupations highlighted in green posted an increase in employment over 2001-2010, while those in red posted a decline 
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Appendix Two: Standard Occupation Classifications 2010 
 
Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
Food preparation & 
hospitality trades 
Childcare & related 
personal services 
 Other 
administrative  
Administrative : 
Government & 
related 
organisations 
Managers & 
directors in retail & 
wholesale 
Managers & 
proprietors in 
agriculture related 
servs 
Managers & 
directors in 
transport & 
logistics 
Managers & 
proprietors in other 
services 
Production 
managers & 
directors 
Chief executives & 
senior officials 
    Hairdressers & 
related services 
Animal care & 
control services 
    Secretarial & 
related  
Administrative : 
Finance 
Managers & 
proprietors in 
hospitality & leisure 
services 
Librarians & related 
professionals 
Managers & 
proprietors in 
health & care 
services 
    Conservation & 
environment 
professionals 
Health & social 
services managers 
& directors 
Functional managers 
& directors 
Cleaning & 
housekeeping 
managers & 
supervisors 
Caring personal 
services 
Agricultural & 
related trades 
Administrative : 
Records 
Welfare & housing 
associate 
professionals 
Science, 
engineering & 
production 
technicians 
    
Draughtspersons & 
related 
architectural 
technicians 
Nursing & 
midwifery 
professionals 
Natural & social 
science 
professionals 
Financial institution 
managers & 
directors 
    Sales assistants 
& retail cashiers 
    Housekeeping & 
related services 
Textiles & 
garments trades 
Building finishing 
trades 
Sports & fitness  Design  Information 
technology 
technicians 
Welfare 
professionals 
Engineering 
professionals 
Senior officers in 
protective services 
Sales supervisors Customer service  Other skilled trades Plant & machine 
operatives 
Conservation & 
environmental 
assoc profs 
Public services & 
other associate 
professionals 
Health associate 
professionals 
Media 
professionals 
Information 
technology & 
telecommunication
s professionals 
Research & 
development 
managers  
Elementary 
process plant  
Process operatives Leisure & travel 
services 
Assemblers & 
routine operatives 
Metal forming, 
welding & related 
trades 
Administrative : 
Office managers & 
supervisors 
Artistic, literary & 
media  
Protective service  Therapy 
professionals 
Health professionals 
Elementary 
cleaning  
Elementary 
agricultural  
Sales related  Construction 
operatives 
Vehicle trades Metal machining, 
fitting & instrument 
making trades 
Legal associate 
professionals 
Business, finance 
& related associate 
professionals 
Business, research 
& administrative 
professionals 
Teaching & 
educational 
professionals 
Elementary 
security  
Elementary sales  Road transport 
drivers 
Mobile machine 
drivers & 
operatives 
    Construction & 
building trades 
Electrical & 
electronic trades 
Skilled metal, 
electrical & 
electronic trades 
supervisors 
Sales, marketing & 
related associate 
profs 
Architects, town 
planners & 
surveyors 
Legal professionals 
Other elementary 
services  
Elementary storage  Elementary 
construction  
Elementary 
administration  
    Printing trades Construction & 
building trades 
supervisors 
Customer service 
managers & 
supervisors 
Other drivers & 
transport 
operatives 
Quality & 
regulatory 
professionals 
Transport associate 
professionals 
 
Occupations highlighted in green posted an increase in employment over 2011-14, while those in red posted a decline. 
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Appendix 3: Data Tables 
 
 
Data for Figure 1: Job polarisation in Scotland, 2001-2010 
 
 
Decile of occupation wage 
 
 
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High Total 
2001 442644 260967 259731 210113 268365 143395 146935 211428 163125 244278 2350980 
2010 444362 305461 240967 190288 248375 139510 163857 248033 193545 278967 2453363 
Change 1717 44494 -18764 -19825 -19990 -3886 16922 36605 30420 34689 102383 
% change 0.4 17.0 -7.2 -9.4 -7.4 -2.7 11.5 17.3 18.6 14.2 4.4 
 
Source: Stirling University (Annual Survey of Household Earnings and Labour Force Survey). Based on SOC 2000 
classifications. 
 
 
Data for Figure 2: Job polarisation in Scotland, 2011-2014 
 
  
Decile of occupation wage 
 
 
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High Total 
2011 440803 312268 282256 248214 195608 176295 88300 273251 229021 226579 2472594 
2014 452026 341108 288885 252551 202731 178440 94242 286071 246496 240657 2583207 
Change 11223 28839 6629 4337 7123 2145 5942 12821 17475 14079 110613 
%change 2.5 9.2 2.3 1.7 3.6 1.2 6.7 4.7 7.6 6.2 4.5 
 
Source: Stirling University (Annual Survey of Household Earnings and Labour Force Survey). Based on SOC 2010. 
 
 
Data for Figure 5: Forecast employment change (000s) by occupation in Scotland, 2012-2022 
 
  Net Change 
Replacement  
demand 
Total  
Requirement 
Elementary occupations -11 137 126 
Sales & customer service -7 98 91 
Caring, leisure & other service 55 67 122 
Process, plant & machine ops -24 61 37 
Administrative & secretarial -36 119 83 
Skilled trades occupations -31 148 117 
Associate professional & tech 47 112 159 
Professional occupations 107 194 301 
Managers, directors & senior officials 41 92 134 
Total 140 0 140 
 
Source: UKES 
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The Barnett formula under the Smith Reforms 
 
Jim  Cuthbert 
 
Abstract:   
 
With the implementation of the Smith Commission reforms, there will be abatements to the Scottish 
government’s block grant as calculated by the Barnett formula, to allow for the tax revenues which 
Westminster will forego.  The income tax abatement will be increased through time in an arrangement 
known as Holtham indexation.  The purpose of this paper is to model these new fiscal arrangements. 
The modelling implies that, other than in an unlikely special case, the system cannot run on indefinitely 
with fixed parameter values, without reaching relative values of per capita public expenditure in Scotland 
and England which would be politically unacceptable.  Moreover, there is a likelihood of adverse 
dynamic effects which would further destabilise the system.  The paper also puts forward an adjustment 
to the original form of Holtham indexation, to take account of relative population growth. While not 
answering every problem, this adjustment has strong equity arguments in its favour, and would also 
significantly stabilise the system.  It is particularly important that the implications of this type of modelling 
should be taken on board by policy makers and parliamentarians just now, when the detailed legislative 
and other arrangements for implementing the Smith reforms are about to be finalised. 
 
I Introduction 
 
An earlier paper in the Fraser of Allander Commentary, (Cuthbert, 2001), modelled the way in which 
relative population change between England and Scotland interacted with the Barnett formula. It was 
shown there how relative population growth in England compared to Scotland could have a very marked 
effect on the limiting ratio of per capita public expenditure between England and Scotland, and on the 
trajectory towards that limit. 
 
This paper extends the modelling in that earlier paper, to incorporate the effects of the proposed method 
of indexation, (Holtham indexation), of the abatement to the Barnett block grant which will come into 
effect as the Smith Commission reforms are implemented. It turns out that both relative population 
growth, and the relative rate of growth in the relevant tax base between England and Scotland, will play 
an important part in determining the behaviour of the Barnett formula as modified by the Smith 
Commission proposals. In particular, the modelling indicates the potential for the emergence of dynamic 
effects, in which relative population growth could interact with growth in the tax base, in a way which 
could adversely affect Scotland. 
 
The paper also puts forward a suggested modification of Holtham indexation: not only is there a strong 
equity argument for this modification, but it would also correct some of the worst effects of unadjusted 
Holtham indexation. 
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II Background (1): The Smith Commission proposals on tax, and Holtham indexation 
 
The Smith Commission reported on 24 November 2014, (Smith Commission, 2014), and on 21 January 
2015 the then coalition government put forward its proposals for implementation in “Scotland in the 
United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement”, (Cm8990).This paper is concerned with the Smith proposals 
relating to tax. What is proposed in the light of Cm8990 is that Scotland would be given control of certain 
taxes - principally non-savings, non-dividend income tax, together with air passenger duty, and the 
aggregates levy: and that the Scottish government would receive the revenues from these taxes. In 
addition, while Scotland would have no control over the rates of VAT, about half of the VAT revenues 
attributed to Scotland would be assigned to the Scottish government. In total, Cm8990 estimates that 
about half of the Scottish budget would come from these tax resources, or those which Scotland already 
controlled. 
 
In line with pledges made during the Scottish independence referendum campaign, however, a 
commitment was made to retain the Barnett formula. What would happen after the implementation of 
Smith is that there would be an abatement to the Scottish government’s block grant as calculated by the 
Barnett formula, to allow for the tax revenues foregone by Westminster in relation to the various taxes to 
be devolved or hypothecated to Scotland. In line with the ‘no-detriment’ principle of Smith, the initial size 
of the abatements would be equal to the tax revenues raised by the various taxes at the then current UK 
rates of tax. 
 
It was recognised, however, that the size of the abatements would need to be increased each year by an 
appropriate form of indexation. For income tax, what is proposed in Cm8990 is that indexation should be 
carried out using a method proposed by the Holtham Commission for Wales: (Holtham Commission, 
2010). Under this “Holtham” approach, the abatement for income tax would be increased each year in 
line with the increase in the overall income tax base for the UK. 
 
At time of writing, the precise details of Holtham indexation have not been specified: but it was 
recognised by Holtham himself that the method could penalise Scotland if the Scottish tax base did not 
grow as fast as that for the UK as a whole. As Professor Holtham himself said, in evidence to the 
Scottish Parliament Finance Committee in April 2013, the method “might not be in Scotland’s interest if 
[the Scottish] tax base grows more slowly than that of the UK”: (Scottish Parliament Finance Committee, 
2013).  
 
No detail is available at present on the proposed indexation methods for the abatements to the Scottish 
block grant for the other devolved taxes: this paper will concentrate solely on the approach currently 
proposed for income tax, (which is, by a good margin, the largest of the taxes to be devolved.) 
 
III Background (2): The effect of relative population change on the Barnett formula 
 
As already noted, a previous paper in this commentary, (Cuthbert, 2001), analysed what the effect would 
be on the Barnett formula if population was growing in England relative to Scotland - as has been the 
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case for many years. This section recapitulates, (without going into any proofs), on the notation and 
formulae established in that paper. 
 
Under the Barnett formula, the change in the Scottish government’s Departmental Expenditure Limit 
(DEL) each year is determined as a per capita share of the change in expenditure on corresponding 
services in England. In Cuthbert (2001) a simplified model of Barnett was developed, under which the 
Scottish DEL for any given year is adjusted only once by Barnett, when the new baseline for that year is 
first established. Another simplification is the assumption that public expenditure in England is growing 
by a constant percentage each year. 
 
Specifically, the following notation and assumptions were used:- 
Let E t  denote expenditure in England in year t, and E
S
t  expenditure in Scotland: (strictly, 
“expenditure” here is that covered in the relevant DEL). 
Let p t  denote population in England in year t, and p
S
t  population in Scotland. 
Let R t  denote the ratio of per capita expenditures between Scotland and England at time t. 
Let k denote lag, (in years).  
It was assumed that 
a) E =   Et +1 tT   : (i.e. expenditure in England grows at a constant rate.) 
 
b)  p
p
 =  
p
p
t+1
t
S
t+1
S
t
O   for all t, where O  1t : (i.e., there is a constant relative rate of 
growth of population in England relative to Scotland). 
 
c) In the annual public expenditure planning round, the new final year baseline is determined as 
being equal to the previous end year figure: and Barnett applies only to that end year, with 
population shares determined at a lag k. 
 
The above model was solved, to show how the per capita spending relativity between Scotland and 
England, denoted by R t , evolves through time from its initial starting value in year 0. 
The relevant formula for R t  is as follows: 
  
 )-(
1)-(
 +  ])-(
1)-(
 [R)( = R kk0tt OT
TOOT
TOT
O 
      , for O T  z  .   (1) 
 
The derivation of formula (1) is given in the Annex to Cuthbert (2001) 
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What formula (1) means is that, in the circumstance where OT   <   1  , then the initial per capita 
spending relativity, R0 ,will decay geometrically to the limiting value  
( -1)
( -
kO TT O)   , which is a 
function of the expenditure growth rate in England, the rate of relative population growth, and the lag. 
 
What this implies is that, when the nominal rate of growth in public expenditure is greater than the 
relative rate of population growth, then the Barnett formula will deliver convergence of the ratio of per 
capita spending levels in Scotland to England towards a limiting value. The significance of formula (1), 
however, is that it indicates that the limiting value will be 1 only if O =1. If !O , then the limiting 
value will be greater than 1: and in the circumstance where T  is not much greater than O , the limiting 
value could be very much greater than 1. For example, a value of  O , (a common historic 
value), and 025.1 T , (together with k = 4), would imply a limiting situation where public expenditure 
per head in Scotland was almost 10% above that in England. 
 
These questions are explored in more detail in Cuthbert, (2001): but formula (1) explains a lot about why 
the Barnett formula has not actually brought about the convergence towards equality in per capita 
spending levels which many commentators were expecting. 
Another important implication of formula (1) is that, if 1  !T
O
, that is, if the rate of growth in nominal 
public expenditure in England falls below the relative rate of population growth in England compared to 
Scotland, then per capita expenditure will increase in Scotland relative to England, and will go on 
increasing. This implication was not studied in detail in the earlier paper, because at that time this 
situation was not expected to occur. But this has been the situation since 2010, given the cutbacks in 
public expenditure following the effects of the 2008 crash. And again, formula (1) explains how the 
Barnett formula, in the presence of relative population change (as between Scotland and England), has 
to some extent protected Scotland from the worst effects of UK public expenditure cuts. 
 
IV Extending the model to include Holtham indexation of a Barnett abatement 
 
In this section, the model outlined in the previous section is extended to cover the situation where there 
is an abatement to the Barnett formula block grant for tax revenues which the Scottish government will 
receive direct: and where this abatement is indexed using the Holtham approach. In developing this 
model, a number of simplifying assumptions are made (in addition to the simplifications in the original 
approach.) In particular, it is assumed that the Scottish government adopts a neutral tax policy, under 
which it does not change its tax rates away from those current in the rest of the UK, (rUK): and it is 
assumed that the ratio of tax receipts to the tax base stays constant through time, in both Scotland and 
the UK as a whole. 
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Additional notation, and further assumptions, are as follows. 
 
Let t
S
t
E
t T and ,T ,T  represent, respectively, tax revenues in England, Scotland and the 
whole UK in year t. 
 
Let I  be the relative rate of growth in the tax base in England as compared to Scotland. It is 
assumed that I  is constant from year to year. In line with the above assumption that tax take is 
proportional to tax base, it follows that 
 
  
S
1-t
S
t
E
1-t
E
t
T
T
T
T I  , for all t. 
 
Let ta represent the abatement to the Barnett formula block grant in year t: then  
S
00 T  a  , 
(given the no-detriment assumption in setting the initial abatement), and 
0
0
t
t aT
T
  a  
 , under Holtham indexation, given the assumption that tax take is proportional to 
the tax base. 
 
Let 
S
tE  represent abated expenditure in Scotland in year t:  
therefore    
S
tt
S
t
S
t T  a- E  E   . 
Finally, let tR  represent relative per capita spending levels in Scotland and England, when 
Scotland receives the abated block grant, plus its own revenues on devolved taxes. 
 
Then it is shown in Annex 1 that 
   
)-(1)
E
T)(
p
p)(
T
a( - R  R t-t
t
E
t
S
0
0
0
0
tt IO       (2) 
 
where tR is as given in formula (1).  
Note that, if it is assumed that the term )
E
T(
t
E
t
 remains roughly constant, (that is, if the share of 
“devolved” expenditure in England funded by “devolved” taxes remains roughly constant), then the 
second term on the right in formula (2) will be of the form  )-(1K -tt IO  , 
where the constant K in this expression is a fraction, with a value approximately equal to 0.5. This 
follows since the first term in brackets in equation (2) is Scotland’s initial share of UK taxes, and the 
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second term is the ratio of English to Scottish population, so the product of these two terms will be 
approximately 1. The third term is the share of expenditure in England, (on the same services as are 
devolved in Scotland), which is funded by taxes which are devolved in Scotland: the corresponding 
figure is approximately 0.5 in Scotland, and the English figure is likely to be broadly similar. 
        
So, roughly speaking,  
 
 
)-(1K - R  R -tttt IO   , where K is approximately equal to 0.5.  (3) 
 
In deriving the approximate expression in formula (3), a number of further assumptions are clearly being 
made: for example, it involves sweeping up all forms of taxation into a composite aggregate: it involves 
assuming that the abatements for the non-income tax element of the aggregate are indexed by 
something like Holtham indexation: and it involves assuming that the relative growth rates for the 
different tax bases, (the I values for each element), are the same. Nevertheless, while bearing these 
assumptions in mind, the approximation in formula (3) is a useful guide as to how the dynamics of the 
post-Smith system are likely to evolve.  
 
V Implications 
 
So what are the implications of the above analysis? 
 
i) When tax bases grow at the same rate, the Barnett formula works as at present: An 
immediate implication of formula (3) is that, if I  = 1, (that is, when the tax base in Scotland is 
growing at the same rate as that for the UK as a whole), then the last term is equal to zero, and 
hence the evolution of relative per capita spend would be exactly as under the original Barnett 
formula. This is as expected; Holtham indexation is neutral when the tax bases grow at the 
same rate. 
 
ii) But things are very different if the tax bases do not grow at the same rate. If tO , (that 
is, if population is growing relatively faster in England as compared with Scotland, as has been 
the case for many years), and if 1zI , (that is, if the tax bases are not growing at the same 
rate), then the formulae imply that relative per capita spend will eventually move to values 
which are, under any criterion, untenable. In the most stable case, when 1   O  and 1  !I , 
formula (3) implies that, for large t,  R t will behave asymptotically as K - R t : which would 
imply, if the unadjusted Barnett formula was leading to long term convergence of per capita 
spending levels to something like parity, that public expenditure per head in Scotland would 
converge to something like 50% of the value in England.  
In the less stable case, where 1  !O , then the final term in formula (3) diverges – upwards if 
1  I , and downwards if 1  !I . 
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iii) And increases in relative population change magnify the effects. Finally, it is worth noting 
that, because of the tO  component in the final term of equation (3), any increase in O , (that 
is, the rate of relative population change in England compared to Scotland),  magnifies the 
effect of Holtham indexation. 
 
VI Potential Dynamic Effects 
 
What the previous section means is that, (other than in the unlikely case where 1   I ), the system is 
such that it cannot proceed indefinitely with constant values of IOT  and  , : eventually, relative values 
of per capita spend in Scotland as compared to England would move to values which would be politically 
unacceptable, and something would have to change.  
 
Such a change might come about as a result of policy action: either by the Westminster government, 
(e.g. in the form of a fiscal transfer): or through specific policy action by the Scottish government. There 
is more discussion of this possibility later. But left to itself, it appears likely that the way the parameters 
in the system will evolve will be destabilising, rather than stabilising.  
 
To illustrate this kind of possibility, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose that, due to a 
boom in financial services in the City, there was an increase in English tax receipts, and that the 
Westminster government responded to this by increasing the rate of planned public expenditure growth. 
The implication, in terms of the model, is that the parameter  T , (the rate of growth of public 
expenditure in England), and I  , (the relative rate of growth in the tax base), would both increase at 
some specific time. Looking at formula (3), the effect of the increase in  T will be to reduce the limiting 
value to which the unadjusted Barnett formula is converging, (i.e. the term )-(
1)-(
 
k
OT
TO ): to increase the 
rate of convergence to that value, (as the term T
O
 becomes smaller), and to increase the amount 
subtracted off in the final term of formula (3), (since )-(1K -tt IO  is an increasing function of I ). In 
other words, the increases in IT  and  will both have the effect of reducing  R t , (that is, relative per 
capita spend in Scotland as compared to England). 
 
But the effects are unlikely to simply end there: the decline in  R t is likely to have a depressing effect 
on the Scottish economy: and that, together with the initial stimulus to the economy in London and the 
South East, is likely to contribute in turn to an increase in the relative population growth parameter, O . 
The effect of an increase in O works in different directions in the different components of formula (3): in 
the Barnett element, it will increase the limiting value, and slow the rate of convergence: but the tO  
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term will magnify the Holtham reduction element. For reasonable values of the parameters, the latter 
effect will dominate, however. So the overall effect of increasing O  will be to further reduce  R t . 
 
The danger is that the effect of reducing relative per capita spend in Scotland,  R t , will be to further 
depress the Scottish economy, with further knock on effects on the relative growth rates of the tax base 
and of population. In other words, the adverse effects of the long term behaviour of  R t with fixed 
parameter values, which as has already been noted are untenable, (unless 1   I ), are likely to be 
accentuated by further dynamic effects on the parameters. 
 
Of course, for a mechanism of this type to take effect, it would have to be the case that changes in the 
model parameters, of the order of magnitude that might reasonably be expected in the real world, would 
have material effects on  R t . Figure 1 below illustrates that modest changes in parameter values can 
indeed have material effects. The figure considers two scenarios. Under Scenario 1, the values of the 
parameters are T  = 1.05, O = 1.0028, and I  = 1.005: and under Scenario 2, T  = 1.06, O = 1.004, 
and I  = 1.008 . What figure 1 shows is how the ratio of relative per capita spend in Scotland to England 
would evolve from an initial value of 1.14, first of all under the pure Barnett formula, (with values of T  
and O as in Scenario 1): then under Holtham indexation, with Scenario 1 parameters: and finally under 
Holtham indexation and Scenario 2 parameters. The figure illustrates how the fairly modest changes in 
parameter values between the two scenarios do indeed have a quite marked effect on the rate of decline 
of  R t . (The figure also illustrates how, for the scenario 1 parameter values, Holtham indexation is 
indeed much less favourable for Scotland than the original pure Barnett formula.) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: S/E per capita expenditure ratio, under Barnett, and two scenarios with Holtham
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The overall implication is that, without active policy intervention, the system currently being set up is 
likely to be unstable. Which then raises the question: are the available policy levers such that the system 
can be adequately controlled? 
 
At this point the argument becomes more speculative. But as regards the policy levers wielded by the 
Scottish government, it appears unlikely that they would be sufficient to counter the kind of adverse 
dynamics outlined above. The economic powers which the Scottish government will possess after the 
implementation of Smith will themselves be fairly limited. The Scottish government is likely to have little 
scope to counter a decline in  R t  by raising tax rates – because if tax rates get badly out of line with 
rUK, that in itself will depress the Scottish economy, giving a further adverse push to 
  and OI . And in 
a situation where  R t is already declining, the scope for boosting the economy by radically cutting tax 
rates will be limited. 
 
Overall, the conclusion is that the system is unlikely to be stable unless Westminster is prepared to 
actively deploy the other potential type of policy measure – namely, adjustments to overall fiscal 
transfers. 
 
The above discussion illustrates the possibility of Scotland becoming locked into a cycle where relative 
expenditure per head, compared to England, is aggressively reduced, much faster than would happen 
under the Barnett formula: and where, unlike the Barnett formula, these reductions would not stop once 
parity was reached. However, in the long run, the chances of a converse cycle, where  R t  
progressively increases, seem unlikely. This is because, assuming that there is long run economic 
normalisation of the UK economy, and that nominal public expenditure maintains a roughly constant 
share of nominal GDP, then relatively high trend values of UK nominal public expenditure growth could 
be expected, which would imply a high value of T . If the Scottish economy did start to boom, then this is 
likely to depress the relative population growth parameter, O . The combination of a high T  and low O
would imply that the unadjusted Barnett formula would have an tR value which would converge 
downwards fairly rapidly towards 1. Against the background of a declining Barnett term, tR  in formula 
(3), the chances of an unstable upswing in relative per capita spend,  R t , look remote. 
 
VII A suggested adjustment to Holtham indexation. 
 
Under Holtham indexation as currently proposed, neutrality will occur if the tax base in Scotland grows at 
the same rate as the tax base in the UK as a whole. If the UK population is growing relative to that in 
Scotland, then for this condition to be satisfied, it must hold that the tax base per head in Scotland must 
grow at the same rate as the tax base per head in the UK, multiplied by the relative rate of population 
growth in the UK as a whole compared to Scotland. This implies that, for Holtham indexation to be 
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neutral, Scotland must grow its tax base per head at a faster rate than the per capita tax base in the UK 
as a whole. 
 
An alternative criterion for neutrality would be that the system should be neutral if the per capita tax 
bases in Scotland and the UK were growing at the same rate. To achieve an indexation system which 
satisfied this neutrality condition, what would be required would be to use an indexation factor which was 
equal to the growth in the UK tax base over the relevant period, divided by the relative growth in the UK 
to Scottish populations over the period.  
 
There is a good argument in terms of equity for making this adjustment to Holtham indexation. In 
addition, making the change has the effect of somewhat dampening the instability that is a danger with 
an unadjusted Holtham indexation. Without going into the detail of the algebra, it can be shown that the 
effect of the adjustment is to replace formula (2) above by an expression for  R t which can be 
approximated by 
 
 ))(-(1)
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T)(
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p)(
T
a( - R  R t
t
E
t
S
0
0
E
0
0
tt I
O       (4) 
 
The expression in formula (4) will converge if  1 !! OI  , (assuming )  OT ! , whereas unadjusted 
Holtham indexation would diverge in these circumstances. 
 
The adjusted system is still not satisfactory: the limit of equation (4) would still, in the long run, represent 
an untenable ratio of per capita expenditure. But the behaviour of the system will be much more 
damped: so the potential for adverse dynamic effects is reduced. 
 
As an illustration of the effect of the adjustment to Holtham indexation, Figure 2 shows exactly the same 
scenarios as Figure 1, but now with adjusted Holtham indexation. It can be seen that the adjustment has 
had the effect of significantly reducing the departure from the original Barnett formula: and of reducing 
the effect of moving from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2. 
 
There are therefore technical, as well as equity, arguments for making the suggested adjustment to 
Holtham indexation: although, as has been seen, the long run position even with the adjustment is still 
likely to be untenable. 
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VIII Conclusion 
 
This paper has modelled the way in which the revenues received by the Scottish government will 
behave, under the type of arrangement currently proposed for the implementation of the Smith 
Commission reforms as set out in Cm8990: specifically, what is considered is the kind of arrangement 
being proposed for income tax, under which there will be an abatement to the Barnett formula block 
grant in relation to the tax revenues foregone by Westminster, and this abatement will then be indexed 
by what is known as the Holtham approach.  
 
 A number of simplifying assumptions have been made: e.g. that the Scottish government adopts a 
neutral tax policy: and that tax revenues maintain a constant proportion of the tax base, in both Scotland 
and the UK. Nevertheless, despite the magnitude of these simplifying assumptions, the results of the 
modelling are of considerable interest, since they illustrate the underlying pressures which are likely to 
shape the dynamics of the system. 
 
There are three key parameters in the system: the rate of growth of public expenditure in England, (T ): 
the relative rate of growth of population in England compared to Scotland, ( O ): and the relative rate of 
growth of the tax base in England compared to Scotland, (I ). 
 
What the model shows is that, other than the unlikely case when I  = 1, then for fixed values of 
IOT  and  , , the system will evolve towards a position where relative per capita spending levels in 
Scotland and England are so different that the situation is politically untenable. What this implies is that 
the system cannot run on indefinitely for fixed values of IOT  and  , : something would have to change. 
Figure 2: S/E per capita expenditureratio: under Barnett, and two scenarios with adjusted Holtham
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In fact, the situation is worse than this, because, as the paper explains, there are likely to be dynamic 
feedback effects on IOT  and  ,  which will make the system more unstable. 
 
The implication is that, to maintain the operation of the fiscal system in some reasonable form of stability, 
active policy intervention will be required, by the Scottish government, by Westminster, or by both. The 
policy levers available to the Scottish government are so limited that it is unlikely to be able to maintain 
stability on its own. (It is worth remembering that the Scottish government will have control of only a 
single major tax, income tax: that it will have restricted borrowing powers: and that it lacks control of 
competition policy, international trade development, licensing of North Sea oil, utility regulation, and a 
number of labour market responsibilities.) This implies that an active monitoring of the system by 
Westminster, and adjustment of fiscal transfers, are likely to be required. 
 
The paper also proposes an adjustment to crude Holtham indexation which, while by no means 
providing a complete answer to the likely problems, has strong equity arguments in its favour, and would 
also have a stabilising effect on the system. 
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Annex 1: Proof of formula (2) 
 
The notation is as in the main part of the paper. The proof proceeds in a number of steps. 
 
1) Express StT in terms of 
E
tT . 
Since, by definition, 
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T I  , for all t, it follows that  
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2) Calculate the Holtham indexation factor. 
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3) Calculate adjustment to Barnett block grant. 
 
Adjustment to Barnett block grant 
 = - (indexed abatement) + (Scottish tax revenues) 
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4) Calculate  R t . 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 39(1)  Policy section  
June 2015 111 
     
 R t  = 
t
t
S
t
S
t
E
p
 
p
E
 
  = )
p
p]( - 1)[
E
T()
T
a( -R S
t
tt-
t
E
t
0
0
t I  
  = ] - 1[)
E
T()
p
p)(
T
a( -R t-t
t
E
t
S
0
0
0
0
t IO  ,  since  )p
p(  
p
p
S
0
0t
S
t
t O : 
 
thus establishing formula (2). 
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